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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Internalized Islamophobia: The Discursive Construction  
of “Islam” and “Muslims” in the Egyptian  
Public Discourse 
 
by  
 
Sahar El Zahed  
Doctor of Philosophy in Islamic Studies  
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019  
Professor Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, Chair 
 
This dissertation examines the way “Islam” and “observant Muslims” are represented in the 
Egyptian public discourse from 30 June 2012—which marks the arrival of President Mohammad 
Morsi, the first democratically elected president in Egypt, to power—to 30 June 2018, which 
marks the end of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s first four-year presidential term. Through a 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 24 different episodes of some of the most widely watched 
late-night TV shows, and 2 official speeches, were examined for a better understanding of how 
the Islamic faith is portrayed in a country with a Muslim majority such as Egypt. Results 
indicated that since President Morsi’s ascent to power, postcolonial self-acclaimed secular 
“liberals” and the ruling class have constructed an Islamophobic rhetoric derived from the 
Western Orientalist discourse through four specific representational practices: 1) establishing 
“Islam” as inherently problematic, violent, static, and incompatible with modernity and 
democracy; 2) creating a link between terrorism and the Islamic faith by claiming that violence is 
a religious obligation that has an essential place in Islam; 3) representing the “war on terrorism” 
as part of a struggle that seeks to defend Egypt and its values against “Islam” and “observant 
Muslims”; and 4) creating an image of “Egyptian-ness” dominated by Western perceptions of 
iii	
modernity. This hegemonic narrative seeks not only to justify the military coup d’état of 3 July 
2013, but also to exclude “Islam” and “observant Muslims” from Egyptian society by creating 
fear of the religion and attaching narrow and negative connotations to the words “Islam” and 
“observant Muslims” that are signifiers for an undeterminable and diverse array of notions in 
existing manifestations of societies and individuals.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION 
1.1 Background 
 In August 2016, images of veiled Muslim women forced to remove some of their modest 
clothes on French beaches and resorts, or leave, erupted a worldwide storm of criticism. The 
national legislative ban on the burkini (a two-piece swimsuit worn by Muslim women that covers 
the entire body) was challenged by human rights and women’s rights organizations, which 
considered the ban part of discriminatory restrictions against Muslim minorities (Rubin, 2016). A 
French court subsequently suspended the ban, affirming that it is a violation of fundamental 
liberties to implement a law forbidding women from wearing burkinis (Dearden, 2016).1  
At that point, virtually no one suspected that these same discriminatory restrictions are 
practised against veiled Muslim women, in Egypt—a country with a Muslim majority where 
wearing a veil has been a common practice for more than 1,400 years. Not only was the burkini 
banned2 in some Egyptian hotels and resorts, but veiled women themselves also have been 
forbidden from entering specific resorts, public beaches, hotels, restaurants, and concerts since 
2015. According to al-Yawm el Sabi’, an Egyptian newspaper, some women were also banned 
from working in some of these venues (Khalil, 2015). Many Muslims protested these uncommon 
restrictions on veiled women using social media to express their frustration not only over these 
limitations but also over the Ministry of Tourism’s disregard of these measures. However, the 																																																								
1 This chapter is based in part on the previously published book chapter listed below:  
   El Zahed, S. (2019). Internalized Islamophobia: The making of Islam in the Egyptian media. In E. Baurakli & F.  
   Hafez (Eds.), Islamophobia in Muslim majority societies (pp. 137-160). London & New York: Routledge. 
 	
2 The ban on the burkini in Egypt is not a national legislative ban. These restrictions are imposed by the owners of          
resorts and hotels, but are ignored by the Egyptian government. 	
2	
ban on the burkini or veil in some Egyptian resorts, hotels, restaurants, concerts, and beaches is 
not the only exclusive restraint against Muslim conservatives in the country. 
 Furthermore, Muslim veiled women were the target of a Facebook and media campaign 
that invited them to protest paternal guardianship by removing their veils in al-Tahrir Square. In 
2015, Sherif el-Shubashi, a controversial famous Egyptian journalist, publicly asked veiled 
Egyptian women, on his Facebook page, to organize a million-women demonstration to take 
their veils off in al-Tahrir Square. El-Shubashi asserts that the majority of veiled women do not 
deliberately choose to wear the Islamic scarves; rather, they are forced to wear it by their fathers, 
husbands, or guardians who threaten to beat them and lock them in the house if they don’t wear 
it (AlHayah TV Network, 11 January, 2016; CNN, 2015). Moreover, he stresses that the idea of 
wearing a veil is against freedom, and therefore should be countered by the state just like 
terrorism. Many other journalists and policymakers—including Egyptian journalist, Farida el-
Shubashi and former minister of culture, Jaber Asfoor—joined el-Shubashi in his anti-hijab 
campaign that used the Western ‘saver’ discourse3 of Muslim women by depicting the veil as a 
sign of oppression (Al Jazeera Arabic, 2015). 
 On another occasion, on 19 June 2017, following the vehicular attack outside a London 
mosque, the Egyptian TV host Youssef el-Husseini depicted the entire 1.6 billion Muslims 
worldwide of representing a menace to the world. He said, “In all the previous vehicular attacks, 
at least in 2016 and 2017, the “heroes” were, unfortunately, Muslims. And then people wonder 
why they hate us. Why do they hate us?! If they didn't, there would be something mentally 																																																								
3 “Discourse” refers to the way knowledge about a particular topic is represented and constructed through a group of 
statements, “ideas,” or “patterned way of thinking”. According to Foucault, “discourse” produces, reproduces, and is 
produced by the social system through forms of domination, selection, and exclusion (Young, 1981). It is not a way 
that communicates information about the world nor is it a mere reflection of pre-existing realities, but instead it 
should be viewed as a “‘machine’ that generates, and as a result constitutes, the social world” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 
2002).  	
3	
wrong with them. [We] use weapons all the time, slaughter people all the time, flay people all the 
time, burn people alive all the time, run people over all the time, and plant explosive devices and 
car bombs all the time. Why do you still expect them to love you?” (Memri TV, 2017) 
 In addition to being ironic, it is absolutely confusing that although el-Husseini is 
commenting on an attack in which Muslims were the victims and not the perpetrators, he 
continues to attribute terrorism to “Islam” and “Muslims.” “Islam” is blamed even when 
Muslims are the victims. These ongoing TV clips and anti-Islam incidents are only a few 
examples of the current debates on “Islam” and “Muslims” prevalent in Egyptian mainstream 
media today, which are shaping the national and public discourse. An influx of accounts and 
debates over Islam’s legacy and meanings has focused primarily on the relationship between 
“Islam” and terrorism. These accounts, which arguably intensified after President Mohammad 
Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood came into power, are characterized by an unprecedented 
exaggerated hostility towards “Islam”. Although President Morsi’s term was not very lengthy, 
the mass media have continued to be the primary platform for these Islamophobic debates that 
perpetuate and promulgate hatred and fear of “Islam”. Aiming to delegitimize President Morsi, 
the Egyptian mass media’s discourse on “Islam” has had negative effects on Islam in the country. 
This disparaging discourse is arguably an offshoot of the derogatory Islamophobic and 
Orientalist narratives on “Islam”, constructing an image of it as an inherently violent religion that 
advocates terrorism, with global ramifications. 
 By analyzing some of the most popular and widely viewed late-night TV shows, this 
dissertation: 
• investigates and elaborates on the ways in which various meanings of Islamophobia 
inform the making of “Islam” in the Egyptian mainstream media; 
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• asks how the established Egyptian late-night TV shows’ discourse on “Islam” has fueled 
the so-called “war on terrorism,” while also shaping and paving the way for public 
acceptance of the government’s unprecedented violations of human rights; and 
• addresses the question of who is benefiting from this discourse that misrepresents “Islam” 
and Islamic teachings in a country with a Muslim majority. 
Drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis, this dissertation proposes that such political late-
night TV shows reproduce, reinforce, and circulate a narrative on “Islam" stemming from 
Western Orientalist and Islamophobic discourse through the following four specific 
representational practices:  
1) it establishes “Islam” as a static, anti-modern, and backward religion that propagates 
terrorism and irrationality;  
2) it creates a link between terrorism and the Islamic faith by claiming that violence is a 
religious obligation that has an essential place in “Islam”;  
3) it represents the “war on terrorism” as a part of a struggle that seeks to defend Egypt 
and its values against Islamism; and  
4) it creates an image of “Egyptian-ness”4 dominated by a Western perspective on 
modernity.  
Through the analysis of 24 episodes of the most popular and widely viewed TV talk 
shows in Egypt, segments of a presidential speech for President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and 
segments of a speech by Egypt’s former Mufti, this dissertation explores the relationships 
between language and ideology, and the ways in which the newly established discourse 
‘terrorism’ in “Islam”—in Egyptian political talk shows broadcast by private and state TV 																																																								
4 “Egyptian-ness” in this dissertation refers to the quality or characteristic of being Egyptian. 	
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channels has underpinned, justified, and paved the way for the so-called “war on terrorism” in 
Egypt. This dissertation also elaborates on the ways in which various meanings of colonialism, 
Islamophobia, and Orientalism influence the discursive construction of “Islam” and “Muslims” 
amongst policymakers and self-acclaimed secular liberals who—as seen in the role of TV hosts, 
producers, directors, and owners of TV satelitte channels—dominate and determine how this 
production of cultural tropes takes form.  
 Given that Islamophobia from within Muslim societies is indebted to Orientalism and is a 
result and extension of Western Islamophobia, this chapter opens with a review of the relevant 
scholarly literature on the ways in which Islamophobia and Orientalist discourse on “Islam” 
emerged and developed over the centuries. 
 1.1.1 Islamophobia, Orientalism, and Internalized Islamophobia5  
 Islamophobia here is not only understood as an exclusive attitude that portrays “Islam” as 
an un-Western and un-modern religion, as well as labelling “Muslims” as enemies or untrue 
citizens of the West (Shyrock, 2010), but also as a powerful tool of political mobilization that 
ruling elites use to advance their political and economic interests (Shyrock, 2010; Kumar, 2012). 
It has provided a discourse that represents Muslims as “pure religious subjects separated from 
their race thus disarticulating Islamophobia from the field of racial biopolitics that had created it” 
(Tyrer, 2013, p. 146). This attempt of the West to rule the East has a long history and is built also 
on scholarly efforts to define “Islam.” “The term ‘Islam’ as it is used today seems to mean one 
simple thing but in fact is part fiction, part ideological label, part minimal designation of a 
religion called Islam” (Said, 1997, p. l). The difference between “Islam” as the religion of more 
than 1.6 billion diverse people from all around the world and the term “Islam” as used in 																																																								5	Internalized Islamophobia refers to Islamophobia in modern Muslim majority nation-states as practised by 
postcolonial Muslim elites. 
6	
conventional Western representations is enormous (Said, 1994). European and US anti-Islam 
discourses have played a significant role in widening this gap by constituting “Islam” as an alien 
“Other” (Salama, 2013).  
 The core of these anti-Islam discourses and irrational set of associations about an 
imaginary unity of more than one and a half billion diverse persons was originally constructed 
during the 11th century, when the Catholic Church called on Europeans to unite together to fight 
a common enemy—“Islam”—and has since continued to instruct Western knowledge and shape 
its perceptions of “Islam” and “Muslims” (Lyons, 2012; Kumar, 2012). It was an excellent 
opportunity for the Catholic Church to use religion to lead Europe and create a European 
Christian identity uniting all Europeans. The same ideology was used again in 1492 to justify the 
massacres and expulsion of Muslims (Moriscos)—whose rule over the Iberian Peninsula lasted 
for eight centuries—from Spain. In the 14th and 15th centuries, the idea of a united Christian 
Europe was replaced by nationalism, and the Europeans began to define themselves, not as 
Europeans, but as English, French, and so on (Kumar, 2012). When the Ottomans began to lose 
their military superiority over Europe in the 17th century, the idea of democracy for the White 
West and despotism to the non-White East began to take place (Kumar, 2012). By distinguishing 
between reason and emotions as well as debasing the emotional Eastern “Other,” the 18th century 
European Enlightenment simultaneously elevated the intellectual European (Alquwaizani, 2012). 
The West has sought both to subordinate and devalue other societies, and at the same time to find 
in them clues to its own humanity (Asad, 1973). This task was given to enlightened scholars who 
began to classify humans according to race and color, producing an image in which whiteness 
was associated with cultural and racial superiority, and non-Whites were associated with 
savagery and unreason (Kumar, 2012).   
7	
 1.1.2 Western Interference 
 These stereotypical images were relegated to academics who turned them into a full-
fledged science that (mis)represents the Orient, talking in its name as if it was a fixed entity—a 
label that could be conveniently applied to all Orientals as if they had no voices of their own and 
lacked the ability to represent themselves (Kumar, 2012; Alquwaizani, 2012). These joint efforts 
of academics and intellectuals succeeded in constructing Orientalism as a complete language, a 
discourse, and an ideology, with the aim of maintaining Europe’s domination of the Orient and 
making it look natural and inevitable (Dabashi, 2011). The way in which this discourse has been 
conceptualized has produced an idea that validates the presence and the political engagement of 
the Western colonizer in the East by establishing a cluster of ideas or a body of thoughts, that 
together, construct a discursive formation that persuades people to accept, and believe, that 
colonization is better for them (Lal, 2014). It is a mode of thought that haunts those colonized, as 
an idea that an individual perpetually needs the colonizer to intervene and proceed with the 
individual’s civilizational and representational scheme. In fact, it is a reductionist, flattening, and 
totalizing discourse that wipes away the identity and civilization of the colonized, dislocating 
their identity and creating a sense of inferiority encapsulated within the ‘Eastern’ self (Lal, 
2014). As such, Orientalism is not simply a style of thought that describes the Orient to the West, 
it is also a self-reflection of the Orient in redefining and appropriating itself.  
 The uppermost share of this racist discourse was given to “Islam” as Western scholars 
translated the collection of One Thousand and One Nights into a number of European languages, 
and it was used afterwards by novelists and poets to construct an image of the Muslim Orient 
that is associated with terror, sensuality, and pleasure (Kumar, 2012). They played a vital role in 
representing “Islam” and “Muslims” as the enemy, and as Europe’s ‘Other’ that should be 
8	
chased out, whose lands should be invaded and colonized by the West to introduce its people to 
modernity, enlightenment, and democracy (Qureshi & Sells, 2003). Subsequently, “Islam” in 
European discourses has continued to be perceived as a backward religion and as being at odds 
with modernity, globalism, democracy, freedom, etc. 
 1.1.3 A Global Discourse 
 In his discussion of the reasons that led the West to continuously represent Islam as a 
religion that does not belong to the West, Said (1997) attributes this longstanding hostility and 
constant fear of Islam to the historical relationship between Islam and Christianity. He points out 
that the West has always seen “Islam” as a persistent concern and challenge to Christianity 
because it is the only religion that has never entirely submitted to the West and has refused to 
submit to the concept of the separation between the church and state. Accordingly, it could be 
said that just as the secularization of Christianity turned the West into a modern and Western 
place and turned the Western culture into a great culture, it was Islam’s “religiocultural 
challenge” to secularism on the other hand, that has reduced “Islam” in the Western eyes to a 
monolithic entity (Said, 1997). “In one way or another that combination of fear and hostility has 
persisted to present day, both in scholarly and non-scholarly attention to an Islam which is 
viewed as belonging to a part of the world—the Orient—counter posed imaginatively, 
geographically, and historically against Europe and the West” (Said, 1994, p. 343). 
 It is paradoxical but profoundly true that the modern postcolonial world that condemns 
racism and discrimination remains loyal and tolerant to a 600- or 1,000-year-old racist language 
that “otherizes” about one-fourth of the world’s population (Lyons, 2012). This line of continuity 
was seen in the past few decades—particularly after the end of the Cold War and especially post-
September 11, 2001—in which there has been a global and dramatic shift regarding the 
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escalation of hostility toward “Islam” and Muslims, not only in the United States, but also 
around the world. The events of September 11 have reopened old debates on “Islam” as well as 
the ‘West’ by bringing to the surface ‘inconvenient questions’ not only about the position of 
“Islam” in relationship to modernity and the European understanding of world history, but also 
the implications of this understanding in the world today (Salama, 2013). Subsequently, “Islam” 
has been at the forefront of media discussions, and the intense focus on the role of “Islam” in 
terrorizing and threatening the West, its civilization, and its ways of life has become greater than 
ever before. The same “crafted” views of “Islam” were recycled and restored to be used again in 
contemporary critiques of the religion (Salama, 2013).  
 Although these anti-Islam discourses are constructed in the West by a few powerful 
political and intellectual elites and prominent Islamophobes, it has a universal quality that allows 
it to depict the 1.6 billion Muslims around the world as real potential enemies (Shryock, 2010). 
Such ideologies of constructing others as different and threatening led to a shared sense of 
legitimacy, collective oppression, and violent exclusion (Werbner, 2013). Anti-Islam 
postcolonial discourses furnished the ground for biased narratives to be acceptable to public 
opinion, creating a worldwide atmosphere of hatred, prejudice, and racism that justifies 
violations and crimes against Muslims—in the name of the “war on terror.” 
 Indeed, it is this same anti-Islam discourse that set the foundation for the Egyptian 
President, el-Sisi, to be accepted by domestic, regional, and international communities despite 
his unprecedented violations of human rights, under the name of “the war on terror.” The next 
section will elaborate and discuss a brief overview of Egypt with a focus on the recent political 
situation since the 2013 military coup d’état. This overview will give an understanding of the 
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circumstances that contributed to the recent formation of a “Self-Orientalist” discourse on 
“Islam”, in Egypt. 
 1.1.4 Overview 
 Egypt is located in the northeast of the African continent and faces the Mediterranean Sea 
on the north and the Red Sea on the east. The Nile River, the world’s longest river, runs through 
its land creating a fertile green valley across it. Along both sides of the Nile River and the Nile 
delta are small scattered cities and villages where many generations of Egyptians have lived and 
farmed. By the Nile banks, Egypt’s ancient Pharaoh civilization developed, which traced back to 
3,100 BC.  
 Close to the Nile Delta is Cairo, “the city that never sleeps,” as many like to call it. The 
national capital and the country’s largest city, it is home for about 19 million people. Egypt is 
one of the most populous countries in the Middle East with an estimated population of more than 
90 million. Islam is the religion of about 90% of Egyptians, but there is also a large minority of 
Christians (Copts) in Egypt whose numbers are estimated to be about 10% of the population. 
Islam stretched back to the seventh century when Arab Muslims under the leadership of Amr 
ibin el-'As defeated the Byzantines and introduced Islam to the country. Egypt, or “Misr” as the 
country is called in Arabic, was under the Byzantine Empire rule until the seventh century. 
Afterwards, the country became a part of the Islamic Caliphate and remained under its control 
until Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798. The short-term French occupation of Egypt 
(1798-1801) allowed Mohammad Ali Pasha to take control of Egypt by separating it from the 
Ottoman Caliphate—the last Islamic Caliphate—and establishing his dynasty, which lasted from 
the early 19th century to the middle of the 20th century when the 1952 Egyptian revolution ended 
both British colonization and the Egyptian Khedivate.  
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 Since then, with the exception of Mohammad Morsi’s short term as President (June 2012 
to July 2013), Egypt has been controlled by the Egyptian military given that all of the presidents 
who served the country were former military officers starting with President Mohammad 
Naguib, who was sworn in as the country’s first president in the aftermath of the revolution until 
President Mubarak. President Naguib’s rule did not last long as Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second 
Egyptian president, seized control of the country in 1954 after removing President Naguib. After 
President Nasser’s death, his prime minister, Anwar Sadat, took office in 1971 and his rule lasted 
until his assassination in 1981. Sadat was followed by the fourth president Hosni Mubarak, 
whose rule of the country lasted for 30 years until he was swept from power as a result of the 
2011 Egyptian uprising.  All of the four Egyptian presidents who ruled the country between 1952 
and 2011 were sworn in as presidents without elections; under their rule, Egypt has never had 
free elections as the people had no say on who controls the country. It is true that in 2005, under 
Mubarak’s rule, Egypt had its first multi-candidate presidential election in the country’s history, 
but this election was marked by fraud and boycotts. President Mohammad Morsi was the first 
Egyptian president ever to take office as a result of free elections. However, he only served from 
June 2012 to July 2013 as he was removed from power due to a coup d’état led by his then 
defence minister, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.  
 1.1.5 The Case of Ousting the First Democratically Elected President 
 On July 13, 2013, almost a year after the inauguration of Mohammed Morsi who was the 
first civilian and democratically elected Egyptian President, a military coup led by his defence 
minister, and now President, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, removed President Morsi and “ultimately gave 
rise to precisely the kind of authoritarianism Egyptian revolutionaries had been railing against in 
January 2011” (Fahmy & Faruqi, 2017, p. 1). As a reaction to the removal of President Morsi, 
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the opponents of the military coup organized two massive sit-in protests in Raba’a and El-Nahda 
squares demanding the reinstatement of the elected president. One month later, on 14 August 
2013, the Egyptian security forces raided the two camps and opened fire on peaceful civilians, 
killing hundreds of them in what was later described by Human Rights Watch as one of the 
world’s most massive killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013). 
 Since this horrifying massacre, repression and unprecedented levels of human rights 
violations against the regime’s political opponents and members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
have continued and have been largely tolerated in the name of the “war on terror.” According to 
Human Rights Watch, during the first year after the 2013 coup, at least 2,500 civilians were 
killed and 17,000 were injured (Dunne & Williamson, 2014). By March 2015, nearly two years 
after the coup, approximately 40,000 people—including leftists, journalists, and students—were 
arrested because they allegedly supported the Muslim Brotherhood (Human Rights Watch, 
2015). “It is not an exaggeration to say that every offense which President Morsi was accused of 
has been blatantly, and often shamelessly, committed a hundred times over by President Sisi” 
(Abou el Fadl, 2017, p. 240).  
However, most secular liberal groups that advocate democracy and freedom turned a 
blind eye to this unparalleled abuse of human rights and neither condemned nor protested it. In 
fact, they launched a vigorous campaign not only on political Islam but “Islam” as a whole in 
order to justify not only the military coup that removed the country’s first democratically elected 
president but also the human rights violations that followed it. “A few protested and suffered the 
ire of the repressive state; a few more fell silent; but most, accompanied by atonal narratives 
about the many shades of legitimacy, continued to support the Sisi regime” (Abou el Fadl, 2017, 
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p. 241). Moreover, before the Raba’a massacre took place, secular and liberal Egyptians were 
relatedly heard criticizing el-Sisi for not being brutal enough with protestors and advocating him 
to kill them (Hamid, 2015). Calls for the killing of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
particular and protestors in general were also heard on TV shows, as popular TV hosts were 
repeatedly urging President el-Sisi to retaliate against the protestors; on one occasion, a popular 
Egyptian TV host publicly urged for more blood and more protestors’ corpses (Sada El Balad, 
2015). This situation brings into question the position of the Egyptian secularized intelligentsia 
in regards to the concept of democracy, as well as shedding light onto how they often imagine 
themselves as “the one and only true possessors of legitimacy, not because they represent the 
sovereign will, but because they, and they alone, possess the civilizational and intellectual values 
necessary for a progressive order in which true democracy, unhampered by reactionary forces, 
can be achieved” (Abou el Fadl, 2017, p. 241).  
 On the other hand, state and private Egyptian media represented the military coup as a 
legitimate move against President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood by amplifying the number 
of his opponents. The Tamarod movement, which led the 2013 insurgence, “exaggerated its 
claims to have collected twenty-two million signatures in opposition to Morsi's presidency” 
(Fahmy & Faruqi, 2017, p. 2).  They also emphasized the coup-supporters’ public reactions, 
including renowned anti-Islam politicians claiming the coup to be a legal act, and the cheering 
crowds on the al-Tahrir (Liberation) Square. Depicting the massacres as a necessary action in 
accordance with the “war on terror,” they also expressed it as a vital step towards the 
establishment of democracy by describing the opponents of the coup, be they Islamists or not, as 
a national security threat. Despite the fact that removing a democratically elected head of state is 
not usually tolerated and accepted by local and international communities, and despite the 
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insubstantiality of the official charges leveled by the military against President Morsi and his 
cabinet, the international community—with few exceptions—refrained from condemning the 
military coup and/or the massacre that accompanied it. Ironically, rather than calling for the 
return of the first democratically elected Egyptian president, they advocated for a faster return to 
democracy. 
 In order to justify these human rights violations, the political and secularized 
intelligentsia in Egypt resorted to a well-crafted Islamophobic discourse originating from 
Western Orientalism, with a deliberate representation of “Islam” as inherently problematic, 
violent, and non-democratic. They reinforced this image by characterizing the Islamic culture as 
static, hence lacking dynamism and growth, and thus an uninspiring model for any civilization. 
Subsequently, this narrative created a widespread consensus that downgrading the role of 
“Islam”—let alone political Islam—in shaping the Egyptian society is the way to restore and 
safeguard Egyptian democracy. 
 1.1.6 Modernization and Islamic Identity 
 The previous section highlights the political conditions under which narratives were 
constructed on “Islam” in general and political Islam in particular. It reveals the ways in which 
Egyptian secular liberals went against their liberal values by supporting the removal of the first 
democratically elected president, the return of the military to power, and the persecution of 
political Islamists under the claim of the “war on terror.” Islam in Egypt has been an object of 
change and the source of heated debates since the 19th century, and attempts to modernize Egypt 
have taken place on many occasions over the past two centuries since the country came into 
direct contact with European civilization. This issue raised enormous debates creating two 
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opposing trends: one argued that “Islam” and modernization do not conflict; and the other 
rejected the idea, stressing that Egyptians should adhere to their Islamic identity.   
 However, modernization attempts were not only limited to Egypt nor were they 
advocated solely by Egyptian modernists. In the postcolonial era, a move toward modernization 
and secularization started to take place in the entire Muslim world, which paved the way for a 
gradual displacement of “Islam” as the basis of Muslim society and for an acceptance of 
secularism in its place (Kumar, 2012). These modernizing reforms resulted in the creation of a 
new secular and Western-oriented middle class that was given positions of importance in 
government, education, and law. These people eventually led the early national liberation 
struggles in various Islamic countries (Kumar, 2012). This Arab class was a Western by-product 
formed through a discourse that made them feel inferior to the West (Moore-Gilbert, 1997). They 
viewed themselves through the lenses of the “Oriental” and thus exercised their hegemony in the 
region through the borrowed language of Orientalism, as well as through the vocabulary of 
modernization (Dabashi, 2011). Their desire to be modern led them to see religion as dispensable 
to the society and to see modernization and secularism as the only option (Bayoumi, 2010). With 
Western support and media propaganda, this class gradually succeeded in constructing a sense of 
devaluation of “Islam” in countries with Muslim majorities. They used the same Orientalist 
discourse to serve Western interests in the Middle East on the one hand and to advance their own 
ideological and political gains on the other side.  
 Interestingly, the emergence of this Western-oriented class was not a coincidence; the 
colonizer has always been aware that controlling the masses would not be possible without the 
help of native intellectuals. In India, the British colonial officer Thomas Macaulay revealed this 
concept when he stated, “We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters 
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between us and the millions whom we govern—a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, 
but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect” (Cutts, 1953, p. 825) . This is 
precisely what has been happening in the Muslim world, including Egypt, from the time when 
the Western colonizer decided to control people with ‘sociology’ rather than troops (Asad, 
1973).  
 Since then, debates over the relationship between “Islam” and modernization have been 
ongoing.  Both for the advocates and opponents of modernization, stripping Egypt of its Islamic 
identity was not an option; the central question was how to modernize while remaining Muslim 
(Najjar, 2014). Their aim was to marginalize the role Islam plays in the society, but not to distort 
it or to form a link to terrorism and violence.  
 However, the past few years have presented a dramatic shift in the discourse of Egyptian 
secularized intelligentsia on “Islam”; unlike their predecessors, they do not only call for a 
separation of “Islam” from politics, or a marginalization of its role, but rather for a separation of 
“Islam” from Egyptian society. Attempts to secularize the society and shift Egyptians’ 
perceptions of the place and nature of religion in their everyday life have occurred before under 
Presidents Nasser and Mubarak, but arguably, at no other time in Egyptian history has “Islam” 
been reduced to a handful of negative generalizations and stereotypes, as has been the case in 
recent years. A brief look at the contemporary situation in Egypt—where Gamal al-Din al-
Afghani and Muhammad Abduh planted the first seeds for an Islamic reform that sought to 
advance and modernize the system without stripping its Islamic identity—reveals how far 
Muslim modernists are today from these early attempts.  
In the following pages, this chapter investigates the ways in which various meanings of 
Orientalism inform the making of “Islam” among the secularized intelligentsia in Egypt, with a 
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focus on sketching some of the salient features of “Self-Orientalism” in the dominant discourse 
on “Islam” in the Egyptian media. 
1.2 Purpose of the Dissertation 
 The main focal point of this dissertation is to elaborate the ways in which various 
meanings of colonialism, Islamophobia, and Orientalism—as they relate to Islam—influence the 
discursive construction of “Islam” in the Egyptian mainstream media. It poses the following 
research questions and sub-questions:  
Research Questions 
1) What are the dominant narratives constructing “Islam” and “Muslims” in the Egyptian 
national public discourse6 between June 2012 and April 2018?  
o How is “Egyptian-ness” represented in the mainstream media?  
o How are processes of modernization and democratization of Egypt represented? 
2) In what ways does the contemporary discourse on “Islam” found in the Egyptian 
mainstream media during the research time period reinforce or challenge the Western 
Islamophobic discourse about Islam?   
o What kind of Orientalist and Islamophobic ideas, if any, have shaped the current 
public discourse on Islam in Egypt?  
o In what ways does it differ from Orientalism and Islamophobia in ‘Western’ 
societies? 
3) How can internalized Islamophobia, if any, in the Egyptian media be explained and 
justified? 																																																								6 By “public discourse,” this dissertation means the way knowledge about “Islam” and “Muslims” is represented 
through a group of statements and ideas that are constructed by the Egyptian ruling class and liberal elites. It is not a 
way that communicates information about “Islam” nor is it a mere reflection of pre-existing realities, but rather ideas 
that generate and constitute meanings on “Islam” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).  	
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o What are the political and social influences shaping it?  
o Who is benefiting from its circulation?  
These questions will be answered through a comprehensive analysis of internalized 
Islamophobia as a mode of representation of Islam in contemporary Egypt.  
Hypotheses  
1) This dissertation argues that the current discourse on “Islam” found in the Egyptian 
media and among the country’s political and intellectual elites is very much derived from 
Western Islamophobic narratives on Islam.  
2) It argues that the Egyptian media constructed a hegemonic discourse pertaining to 
“Islam” that goes far beyond the incompetence of political Islam and suggests rather that 
it is Islamic teachings themselves which are incompatible with the values of 
contemporary Egyptian society. It establishes an image of “Islam” as having a clash of 
values with Egyptian society. 
3) This discourse arguably constructs an image of “Islam” as an irrevocably static, anti-
modern, and backward religion that propagates terrorism and irrationality.  
4) It argues that this discourse creates a link between terrorism and the Islamic faith by 
claiming that violence has an essential place in “Islam”. 
5) It argues that this discourse creates an image of Egyptian-ness dominated by the Western 
perception of modernity.  
6) It also argues that there is no clash of values between “Islam” and Egyptian society, but 
Egyptian political and secular intellectual elites needed to create one to advance their 
interests, as well as to justify their ideological and political interests while shaping and 
controlling the public reaction.  
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7) It argues that the Egyptian mainstream media representation of “Islam” should be viewed 
not merely as a manifestation of the elites’ desire to support the government in holding 
on to its political power but rather that it reflects some deep-seated colonialist ideas about 
“Islam”. 
1.3 Significance of the Dissertation 
 The significance of this dissertation lies in the scarcity of research that examines the way 
in which Islam is covered in the Egyptian media. A review of the existing literature reveals that 
more comprehensive studies are needed on the discursive construction of “Islam” in countries 
with Muslim majorities. A large body of the existing literature is focused on the representation of 
Islam in the West, particularly in the United States and Europe, and the role of the media in 
emphasizing and propagating negative images of Islam and Muslims. Although evidence of the 
relationship between Islamophobia and the discourse on Islam in Western media has been 
established, no such relationship has been investigated within the mainstream media of countries 
with a Muslim majority. Yet, the results of prior studies on the media representation of “Islam” 
in the Muslim world pay more attention to ‘political Islam’ without revealing how Islam as a 
religion is represented, as evidenced by research by Pasha (2011), Perreault (2010), El- Haddad 
(2013), and others. Still, not enough is known about the impact of Islamophobia and Orientalism 
on the discursive formation of “Islam” in the Egyptian mainstream media.  
Therefore, this dissertation focuses on filling this gap by providing a comprehensive 
analysis of the contemporary discourse on “Islam” in Egypt, and its relationship to Western 
Islamophobia. It is among the first studies to examine Islamophobia—if there is any—in 
countries with Muslim majorities. Such a deliberate attempt to estrange and “otherize” Islam in 
Egypt, a country with a Muslim majority, is a phenomenon that very much deserves to be 
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studied, scrutinized, and analyzed as it reveals how postcolonial Egyptian elites see themselves, 
their identity, and their religion in relation to the West. This dissertation shows the ways in 
which the Egyptian secularized intelligentsia uses many of the same Western Orientalist 
signifiers to construct “Islam” as too dangerous to be allowed to manifest in the public sphere 
without strict paternalistic controls; and it highlights the role of political late-night TV shows as 
apparatuses of ideology that seek to shape and control public opinion in Egypt. Such 
considerations are not only new and timely but also invaluable because they can foster new 
debates, research, and analyses on the relationship between the discursive construction of 
“Islam” and Western Islamophobia in the Muslim world.  
1.4 The Dissertation Layout (The Research Layout) 
  This dissertation is divided into eight chapters.  
Chapter 1, the introduction, consists of four sections. The first section is a background 
narrative that sheds light on the thrust of this dissertation, provides a historical overview of 
Islamophobia and its relationship to colonialism and Orientalism with a focus on Edward Said’s 
postcolonial theory, and presents a critique of Orientalism. The second section is the focus and 
purpose of the dissertation, and it introduces the research questions and hypotheses. The third 
section discusses the significance of the dissertation. Finally, the fourth section puts forth the 
dissertation’s general layout.  
Chapter 2 is a literature review of some of the literature on the media coverage of Islam 
in the Egyptian press, TV, and cinema.  
Chapter 3 introduces my methodology, which includes: 1) a description of the data 
collection procedures; 2) an explanation of data analysis; and 3) a description of the data 
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sampling. It also explains the elements of this methodology in detail and why it is essential to this 
type of study.  
Chapter 4 discusses Critical Discourse Analysis with a focus on Fairclough’s three-
dimensional approach.  
Chapter 5 scrutinizes the processes that involve the production and consumption of the 
text (discursive analysis) and investigates the broader social practice to which the discourse on 
Islam in Egypt belongs (social practice). It discusses the media system in Egypt since the 1950s 
with the aim of revealing the dynamics of the relationship between media and the state. It answers 
questions such as: “Who owns the media in Egypt?” “To what extent is the Egyptian media 
controlled by the regime?” “How did the mainstream media system develop over the years?”  
Chapter 6 presents an in-depth analysis of the textual data (textual analysis).  
Chapter 7 discusses the dissertation’s findings.  
Chapter 8, the conclusion, consists of five sections: the first section is a summary of the 
dissertation; the second, third, and fourth sections discuss the three main research questions; and 
the fifth section discusses the limitations of the dissertation and implications for future studies.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction                                                                                                                      
 This section is part of a broader study that examines the phenomena of the manufacturing 
of culture and knowledge pertaining to the notions of “Islam” and “Muslims”—two non-static 
terms that are signifiers for an undeterminable and diverse array of notions in existing 
manifestations of societies and individuals. It explores the ways in which print and visual media, 
as tools of mass communication, become an effective means of exercising hegemony.                                             
 Given that television broadcasting is the most popular media forum in Egypt, and one 
of the more fascinating technologies that manufactures national culture due to its key role in both 
the socio-political and cultural realms (Abu Lughod, 2005), this chapter examines the role it 
plays in producing new meanings and creating a new place for “Islam” in Egyptians’ everyday 
life. It is argued that television shows have deliberately constructed a hegemonic discourse about 
Islam that goes far beyond the usual rhetoric of incompetence of political Islam, suggesting that 
Islamic teachings are inherently incompatible with the values of contemporary Egyptian 
society. It led to crafting an image of “Islam” whose fundamental values clash with those of 
the society at large. The Egyptian intelligentsia, as seen in the role of producers and directors of 
media houses, dominate and determine how this production of cultural tropes takes form, and is 
reinforced to exercise and transform power by shaping societal perceptions.                                            
 This chapter is a review of the scholarly literature on the representation of “Islam” in 
Egyptian media. It reviews what has been presented in studies on the media coverage of “Islam” 
in the Egyptian press, Television broadcasting, and cinema. Although there are plenty of sources 
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that discuss and examine the media systems in Egypt, studies examining the media 
representation of Islam in Muslim countries are relatively scarce. Most studies are more 
concerned with the coverage of “Islam” in Western media rather than in countries with a Muslim 
majority (Perreault, 2010).  
2.2 Review of the Literature on the Egyptian Media’s Portrayal of “Islam” 
This section provides a review of previous scholarly studies conducted on the way 
“Islam” and “Muslims” are portrayed in the Egyptian media. Most of the existing literature tells 
us a lot about how “Islam” and “Muslims” are covered in the West and how this coverage shapes 
people’s perceptions of “Islam” and “Muslims” while leaving us with insufficient information on 
how Islam is covered in Muslim countries (Perreault, 2010). This constitutes a noticeable gap in 
the literature. To find literature on “Islam” in countries with Muslim majorities such as in the 
case of Egypt, one needs to turn to studies conducted in the Muslim world because with a few 
exceptions, most of the studies in the West do not focus on this subject.  
However, assuming that the media coverage of “Islam” in Egypt is more associated with 
positive or even neutral values is not always accurate. Despite the fact that most Egyptians 
regard “Islam” as a major part of their identity, a significant amount of the available literature 
that examines the coverage of “Islam” in the Muslim world agrees that Islamism and Islamists 
are often represented negatively in Egypt (El-Haddad, 2013; Pasha, 2011; Dahmash, 2008). The 
media in Egypt construct negative images of Islamism and Islamists and represent them as the 
“Other” within their fellow Egyptians (El-Haddad, 2013). 
2.2.1 “Islam” in the Egyptian Press 
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El-Haddad’s study (2013) examines how both private and state-owned Egyptian 
newspapers framed the Egyptian Islamic movements in the wake of the January 25th Revolution.7 
According to the study, focused on four well-circulated Egyptian newspapers, Islamism and 
Islamists were mostly associated with negative values and were framed as anti-democratic, 
violent, polarized, and anti-revolutionary.  
Another unpublished study, conducted by Talaat Pasha (2011) under the title “Islamists 
in the Headlines: Representations of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Media”, also found 
that state-owned newspapers continuously associate Islamists in general and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in particular, with violence. In addition, the newspapers frame them as illegal 
entities and as a threat to both Egyptian and Western interests (Pasha, 2011). Pasha’s 
unpublished dissertation examines how the Egyptian state newspaper Al-Ahram represents 
Islamists in its headlines from 2000 to 2005. His study also examines whether the coverage of 
Islam reinforces exclusion and otherness of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to serve the 
regime’s political interests (Pasha, 2011). Pasha argues that Al-Ahram’s headlines consistently 
used an exclusionary approach in its coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood, which reinforced its 
image as the “Other” to the majority of “Egyptians.” To emphasize this approach, the newspaper 
frequently used the terms “them” versus “we” or “the few” versus “the majority.” Meanwhile, 
Muslim Brotherhood members were depicted as bullies and thugs and as undemocratic, and were 
called “elements” and “banned.” Pasha’s study suggests that Al-Ahram’s exclusionary approach 																																																								7	The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 started in 25 January 2011, on a national holiday to commemorate the police 
forces as a statement against police brutality, lack of freedom of expression, and the state of emergency law. 
Unprecedented demonstrations spread across Egypt’s cities and were inspired by the success of the Tunisian popular 
uprising. Demonstrators called for the immediate oust of President Mubarak and for an end to corruption, poverty, 
unemployment and dictatorship. Hundreds of demonstrators were killed and injured as a result of Mubarak’s regime 
violent tactics against protestors. On 11 February 2011, Mubarak was forced to step down turning over to the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). In 30 June 2012, following a series of elections, Mohammad Morsi 
of the Muslim Brotherhood was sworn in as Egypt’s first democratically elected president (“Egypt Uprising,” 2019). 	
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toward the Muslim Brotherhood is connected to the government’s stance, which is driven by the 
regime’s fear of the Muslim Brotherhood’s significant influence in politics as well as the 
considerable social and financial assistance it receives from the populace. Pasha emphasizes that 
the exclusionary discourse against Islamists in Al-Ahram is an expansion of the Western 
Orientalist discourse. He states, “while the old Orientalist discourse was between the East and 
the West and focuses on “Islam” and “Muslims” in general, the new Orientalist discourse has 
replaced “Muslims” with Islamists and “Islam” with Islamism” (Pasha, 2011, p. 263). Pasha 
argues that both old and new Orientalist discourses were used to serve and protect the interests of 
colonization in the Muslim world, but while the old discourse was directly used by the colonizers 
themselves, the new discourse is used by the Arab regimes, which Pasha considers to be the 
gatekeepers and servers of Western interests in the region (Pasha, 2011).  
Surprisingly, a number of other studies argue that Western media coverage of “Islam” is 
more neutral than that of the Egyptian media. According to a study conducted by Dahmash in 
2008, the International Herald Tribune’s representation of the Muslim Brotherhood was found 
to be more neutral than Al-Ahram’s coverage. Dahmash (2008) stresses that the International 
Herald Tribune has merely represented the Muslim Brotherhood as an oppositional political 
group that experiences repression just like many other opposition groups in the Arab world. 
Dahmash’s study, which compares the media coverage of Islamic movements in the Egyptian 
newspaper Al-Ahram and the International Herald Tribune, revealed that Al-Ahram’s coverage 
of Islamists is unbalanced as it not only excludes their views from its coverage and represents 
them in a negative manner, it also never depicts them in an impartial manner. The Muslim 
Brotherhood was found to receive the largest share of this misrepresentation as it is continuously 
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framed as violent, and its lapses are underlined and highlighted in a way that distorts its image in 
the eyes of the audience (El-Haddad, 2013, p. 43).  
Moreover, the literature reveals that some reports on the Muslim Brotherhood in 
particular, and Islamists in general, are often patchy and ambiguous. According to Pasha, news 
stories and headlines in Al-Ahram often lack the necessary context needed for a complete image 
of the event, which leaves the audience with little or no information on Islamists, and in a state of 
confusion (Pasha, 2011). Additionally, the absolute exclusion of the voices and views of the 
Muslim Brotherhood from news reports is regarded as one of the major problems in the Egyptian 
elite-press in its coverage of Islamists. Pasha and El-Haddad agree that whereas the Egyptian 
press relies totally on governmental officials, opposing perspectives are evidently absent from 
reports in most of these newspapers (Pasha, 2011; El-Haddad, 2013). This misrepresentation is 
apparent through the lack of distinction drawn between different Islamic movements. Egyptian 
media neglect this part and deliberately represent all Islamic movements and parties as one entity 
without any distinction between their ideologies or various points of views. El-Haddad (2013) 
states that media in general, not just in Egypt, ignore the diversity among Muslims and depict 
extreme religious interpretations of Islam to be synonymous with Islam itself.  
Furthermore, some media analysts maintain that “Islam” in both the Western and Muslim 
world’s media is commonly perceived and often discussed through politics. They argue that this 
approach is particularly apparent in the Egyptian media where Islamists in general and the 
Muslim Brotherhood in particular, play a key role in politics and constitute a challenging 
competitor to the national ruling party (Perreault, 2010; El-Haddad, 2013). In an unpublished 
thesis study conducted by Perreault (2010) on the coverage of Islam in English-language 
Egyptian media, he found that of the 86 articles he examined, “government” was the main topic 
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in 63 articles and “politics” in 38 articles (p. 75). This is despite the fact that Islam permeates 
every realm of Egyptian life not just in the domain of politics, but also in entertainment, on the 
streets, in religion, etc. (Perreault, 2010). This political approach in covering Islamists has led 
some media analysts to link the anti-Islamist approaches that often dominate most of the elite 
media’s coverage on “Islam’ to the distinctive political role of Islamists.  
El-Haddad’s study (2013) reveals that the overall coverage of Islamism and Islamists in 
Egypt has intensified in the years after the Muslim Brotherhood reached power as has their 
representation within the context of fundamentalism. This is despite the fact that these negative 
attitudes had existed in the elite media long before Islamists gained power (El-Haddad, 2013). 
However, a part of the literature demonstrates that the significantly increased news coverage of 
Islamists indicates a continuity of the Mubarak regime’s control of the media. El-Haddad and 
Elmasry posit that the Egyptian press is used as a propaganda tool or a political mouthpiece for 
the regime to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood and polarize the Egyptian society against them 
(El-Haddad, 2013; Elmasry, 2012). Furthermore and according to the literature, this biased 
coverage of Islamists creates a growing attitude of hostility and a fear of them in the public, 
which consequently lends more public support to the regime’s aggressive actions against the 
excluded group. Islamophobia is even considered as a possible consequence of the Egyptian 
press coverage on Islamism; however, as the literature indicates, further studies are needed to 
confirm this analysis (El-Haddad, 2013).  
Meanwhile, researchers have debated whether the media coverage of both private- and 
state-owned press in Egypt is biased and inaccurate. Some assert that both private and national 
papers are biased in their coverage of Islamists and that private newspapers are even more biased 
and negative than national newspapers (El-Haddad, 2013). However, others demonstrate that 
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some private newspapers were found to be impartial in their coverage of Islamists as soon as the 
Muslim Brotherhood came to power (Elmasry, 2012; El-Haddad, 2013). 
2.2.2 “Islam” in Egyptian Cinema 
 The number of studies conducted on the way “Islam” is covered in Egyptian cinema is 
relatively small, especially when compared to studies on “Islam” in the Egyptian press. Just like 
the Egyptian press, Egyptian films are also perceived as having a political agenda nurturing an 
ideology that aims to justify the government’s aggressive acts against Islamists. Articles and 
books dealing with the issue of Islam in Egyptian cinema suggest that it is often used as a tool 
serving the interests of the regime; it inflames fear of Islamists by presenting them as terrorists 
and as fundamentalists threatening Islamic and western societies alike.  
 One example is Khatib’s (2006) article “Nationalism and Otherness: The representation 
of Islamic fundamentalism in Egyptian cinema” in which she proposes that Orientalist discourse 
is used in the representation of Islamists in Egyptian cinema. She stresses that the dichotomous 
discourse of “we” versus “them” is extensively used in Egyptian cinema in its representation of 
Islamists, but the only difference between the Western and Arab discourse is that the latter tries 
to exclude a part of itself. Islamists in Egyptian movies are often depicted as being different and 
lacking in good morals that are displayed by the majority of Egyptians. Moreover, they are 
portrayed as irrational and close-minded (Khatib, 2006). Khatib does not seem to see the 
representation of Islamists, whether in Western or Egyptian media, as problematic but rather as a 
sign that both the East and West are not divided in terms of their representation of 
fundamentalists (Khatib, 2006).  
Another study that examines the representation of Islam and Islamists in Egyptian media 
is Bekheet’s article “Framing Islamic Actors in the Egyptian Drama: An Analytical Study.” 
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Bekheet finds that Egyptian movies narrate the story only from the view of the Egyptian 
government while marginalizing and silencing Islamists. Consequently, Islamists have long been 
represented as aliens and as being in conflict with society (Bekheet, 2015). Allagui & Najjar 
(2011), as well as Khatib (2006), align with Bekheet (2015) stressing that the scarcity of 
Egyptian movies depicting Islamists as cultured people and portraying authorities’ aggression 
against them as precautionary measures to protect the society is not a coincidence (Allagui & 
Najjar, 2011; Khatib, 2006). This biased representation of Egyptian movies on Islamists, Khatib 
demonstrates, was designed to distance Islamists from other Egyptians and alienate them in the 
eyes of the larger society. The overall image of Islamists is represented as being different from 
the majority, while non-Islamists are depicted as engaging in daily actions enjoying the various 
pleasures of everyday social life. In many cases, this representation is argued to provoke fear of 
Islamists, creating a gap between them and other Egyptians (Khatib, 2006).  
Another dominant frame in Egyptian cinema is the representation of Muslims’ practice of 
Islam as a consequence rather than a cause. This approach, according to Allagui and Najjar 
(2011), has a strong presence in Egyptian films especially those produced in the 1990s. In these 
films, protagonists are depicted as becoming Islamists accidently rather through a conscious 
choice. Muslims, who are totally disengaged from politics, are also negatively represented in 
Egyptian cinema.  
The above literature review provides an overview of the way “Islam” is portrayed in the 
Egyptian media. Its discussion of the relationship between the government and the media 
suggests that the governnment profoundly shapes the media. This skewed relationship has 
created an irresponsible and biased media in Egypt that only serves the interest of the 
government rather than that of the people; a media that has long been used as a governmental 
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apparatus and a propaganda tool justifying the regime’s policies serving its major interests. What 
exacerbates the problem is that most of the editors-in-chief and journalists who never 
experienced working without censorship, frequently practise self-censorship to stay clear of the 
regime’s wrath and to keep their leaders satisfied.  
Hence, it would be fair to say that scholars agree on the following: the discourse used to 
portray Islamists is an exclusionary kind of discourse. Pasha refers to it as an expansion of the 
Western Orientalist discourse. Most of the literature focused on the media coverage of political 
Islam reveals that the official Egyptian discourse on Islam marginalizes the role of religion in 
Egyptian society despite the fact that the majority of Egyptians regard Islam as a major part of 
their religious and cultural identity (Khatib, 2006). However, none of the reviewed literature 
provided a comprehensive or detailed analysis of the discursive construction of “Islam”, apart 
from politics, in Egyptian society thus leaving much to be addressed.  
Given the influential and powerful role of discourse in shaping people’s thoughts and 
attitudes, this dissertation argues that the Egyptian media contribute to circulating a new form of 
knowledge on “Islam” through its use of the Orientalist discourse. It argues that this hegemonic 
narrative seeks not only to justify the military coup of June 2013, but also to separate Islam from 
the public sphere by creating fear of the religion and attaching notions that are narrow and 
negative in their connotations to the words “Islam” and “Muslims” that are signifiers for an 
undeterminable and diverse array of notions in existing manifestations of societies and 
individuals. Arguably, this form of knowledge is new to Egyptian society despite the fact that 
“Islam” has been represented in a negative way long before the military coup that removed the 
first democratically elected president. However, the literature reveals that while Islamists are 
depicted as aliens and “Others” to the society, the small amount of literature focusing on how 
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“Islam” apart from politics was represented, asserts that “observant Muslims” are depicted as 
being different and less cultured than their non-conservative counterparts (Allagui & Najjar, 
2011).  
In this dissertation, it is argued that in the aftermath of the Muslim Brotherhood’s arrival 
to power, “Islam” in the Egyptian media was constructed as having a clash with “Egyptian-
ness”; it was linked to terrorism and irrationalism, and at odds with modernity and democracy. 
Arguably, Egyptian elites tend to create a consensus that it is time for the religion of the majority 
of Egyptians to step aside and give way to the secularized intelligentsia and policymakers to 
modernize and democratize Egypt. They linked “Islam” to violence, irrationality, and misogyny 
through their use of a form of Orientalist discourse. 
2.2.3 “Islam” in Egyptian Television 
 As mentioned in the earlier sections, there is a great scarcity of research examining the 
ways in which Islam is covered in the Egyptian press and cinema. This scarcity is even more 
evident when it comes to the coverage of Islam in Egyptian television broadcasting. Fortunately, 
there is a very detailed comprehensive study of this subject by Lila Abu Lughod in her valuable 
book Dramas of Nationhood: The politics of television in Egypt (2005), which examines the 
popular television series that have been shown on Egyptian national television during the 30-day 
month of Ramadan (the ninth month of the Islamic calendar). In this book, which examines 
essential concepts such as culture, power, and self-identity, Abu Lughod scrutinizes the 
relationship between what she calls “the Egyptian culture industry” and the “social and 
imaginative lives of diverse people in Egypt” (Abu Lughod, 2005, p. 9). She argues that 
Egyptian television plays a significant role in shaping the public discourse and its cultural, 
religious, and political manifestations. Her case study focuses on the way soap operas reflect and 
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seek to direct the changing nature of Islam, gender relations, and everyday life in contemporary 
times. Abu Lughod highlights the special place that television occupies in society and the role it 
plays as “a key institution for the production of national culture” (Abu Lughod, 2005, p. 7). She 
further contends that Egyptian TV is commonly considered to be a vehicle of “citizen education” 
and as an “agent of public information and education.” 
 Abu Lughod explores the 1990s Egyptian politico-cultural Egyptian-politico-cultural 
crisis between a small fraction of Islamist extremists and the government, and the ways the mass 
media in Egypt exaggerated the problem, divided the nation, and produced a quasi-polarization 
of Egyptian society with the aim to manipulate the masses. Although the mass media labeled the 
crisis as “religious extremism,” for numerous conservative intellectuals, it was a natural outcome 
of the deteriorating socio-economic conditions.  
 According to Abu Lughod, in the wake of the crisis, Egyptian television via its drama 
series began to wage a pedagogical mission that sought to shift the viewers’ perceptions of the 
place and nature of religion in their everyday life. To achieve this goal, she explains, most of the 
staffs of Egyptian television—including writers, directors, and actors—consolidated their efforts 
to counter the problem and exert their pedagogical role in manufacturing a new image of a ‘good 
Muslim’ and a new place for Islam in Egyptian society. Aiming to secularize the society and 
reduce “Islam” to the private domain with no role in public life, religious extremism, as Abu 
Lughod highlights, became the central focus of most of the television series with a new 
representation of “Islam” as a taken-for-granted part of the characters’ identity. Under this new 
mutation, religious and conservative Muslims became categorized and widely portrayed as 
extremists who were aggressive, regressive, and treacherous. Abu Lughod demonstrates that this 
crisis paved the way for Egyptian television to adopt a national mission aiming to counter 
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extremism and terrorism, introducing a new Muslim image, according to which, the good 
Muslim is the one who practises Islam in the privacy of his or her home. Meanwhile, an 
essentialist national discourse started to emerge depicting “Islam” as the religion of the poor and 
the powerless. 
 According to Abu Lughod, this new representation of the religion of the majority of 
Egyptians, which conflates extremism and religiosity, fueled the anger of conservative viewers 
and conservative Muslim intellectuals. They attributed the “unfair” television management of the 
1990s crisis to the basic struggle between secularists who “wish to canonize religion in places of 
worship and refuse to allow it to enter in all aspects of life,” and Islamists “who wish to follow 
the understanding and principles of Islam in all aspects of their life” (Abu Lughod, 2005, p. 170). 
According to Abu Lughod, Muslim thinkers accused secular prominent writers including Usama 
Anwar Ukasha, Tharwat Abaza, Mohammed Fadel, and Waheed Hamed of taking advantage of 
the crisis to wage an attack on religion “vilifying Islam and ridiculing all forms of piety” (Abu 
Lughod, 2005, p. 170).  
Meanwhile, Egyptian television was accused along with the state, of promulgating 
propaganda in service of the government’s mind control campaign. Furthermore, many Muslim 
conservative intellectuals argued that the TV serials and movies broadcasting the issue of 
religious extremism generated a fear of Islam, destroyed religious and moral values, and 
produced doubts about the Islamic faith. They accused the political and intellectual elites of 
failing to engage in a dialogue with Islamists by simply rejecting them. However, Safwat al 
Sherif, Minister of Information at the time, challenged the Islamists’ critiques by responding 
with a polarizing statement that differentiated between a “good” and a “bad” Muslim.  
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 All of the intellectuals of Egyptian TV who participated in this debate were secular, 
advocating for an Islam that is removed from politics and public life. According to Abu Lughod, 
“The TV personnel are part of a minority who claim to be secularists too—that is, they believe in 
a separation between personal piety and the state, a legacy of their intellectual and political 
formation in the Nasserist 1950s and 60s that pushed secular ideals” (Abu Lughod, 2005, pp. 
173-174). One member of this intellectual elite who played a major role in this contentious 
debate was Mohammed Fadel, a prominent TV director in Egypt. When Abu Lughod asked him 
about the TV handling of the issue and whether the media should take part in confronting 
extremism, he responded with full support for the government policy. He said, “today as a citizen 
I don’t feel safe walking in the street. I am even afraid to go to the theatre or cinema. The 
situation has degenerated so much that it can no longer be confronted by art …It is beyond being 
dealt with by words; it has to be dealt with forcefully with repressive security” (Abu Lughod, 
2005, p. 173).  
 At the end, as Abu Lughod highlights, the crisis was contained thanks to the pressure 
exerted by religious professionals such as lawyers and doctors who empathize with the Islamic 
project condemning the state’s attempt to secularize Islam. Under these circumstances, it became 
difficult for the Egyptian government to publicly stand against religion or adopt a secularist 
discourse. In the wake of these widespread sentiments vis-à-vis religion as a private enterprise of 
faith, political and intellectual elites were prevented from taking part in the debate instigated by 
the media. Although they publicly ended the debate, they continued to use a biased discourse on 
“Islam”. 
 Abu Lughod asserts that in these TV series, judgments about a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslim 
were made based on how “Islam” as a religious discourse relates to the concepts of national 
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culture and social responsibility. Egyptian intelligentsia used the political crisis between the state 
and a small faction of extremists to construct “the nation as the basic ground of experience and 
the measure of truth” and to construct Islam as part of this national domain (Abu Lughod, 2005, 
p. 175). In the meanwhile, Abu Lughod argues, the debate between moderate Muslims and the 
elites in the public sphere regarding Islamic extremism made it abundantly clear that there is 
substantial “convergence” and “collaboration” between the state and intellectual elites that is 
based on national interest. 
 In sum, the way Egyptian television dealt with the political implications of this 
contentious issue stimulated a media debate between conservative Muslim thinkers on the one 
hand and government and TV officials on the other, with the latter trying to present and construct 
themselves as the preservers of proper—as opposed to excessive or incorrect—Islam. In this 
uneven debate, the political and intellectual elite was able to gain more space and popularity 
amongst the public than the Islamists. They strategically used mass media as a means to shape 
and mold the way TV viewers should perceive and deal with “Islam”. Unable to access and 
utilize mass media, Islamists reacted strongly by publishing and disseminating their criticism in a 
number of Egyptian oppositional newspapers.  
 Interestingly, this review reveals that manufacturing “Islam” as having a cultural conflict 
with “Egyptian-ness” is not new in Egypt. Attempts to secularize the Egyptian society and create 
a new place for “Islam” in everyday life has always existed among secularized intellectuals and 
political elites in Egypt who have always looked for ways to further their views.  
2.3 Conclusion  
 This chapter reviews how some particular negative notions were attached to the two 
terms “Islam” and ”Muslims,” which cannot truly be grasped in a definition. Almost all of the 
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literature illustrates that since the arrival of President Nasser in 1954 to power, “Islam” has never 
been positively represented in the Egyptian press, cinema, and television broadcasting. Although 
political Islam, and political Muslims specifically, have received the biggest share of this 
misrepresentation, “Islam” and “observant Muslims” have also been the object of some of this 
negative coverage. While “Islam” has been attributed to violence and backwardness and has been 
represented as being at odds with modernity and democracy, “observant Muslims” have been 
depicted as inherently violent, irrational, lazy, and backward.  
 This dissertation argues that the discourse used in both state and private television 
broadcasting seeks to alienate “Islam” and represent it as having a conflict with Egyptian culture. 
To achieve this, arguably, Egyptian intelligentsia uses an Orientalist form of discourse in their 
portrayal of Islam. However, as this review shows, the construction of Islam as the “Other” of 
Egyptian society is not something new to the Egyptian mass media. Attempts to alienate Islam 
and conservative Muslims have occurred under President Nasser, in the 1950s and 1960s, as well 
as in the 1990s, under President Mubarak during his conflict with a small faction of extremists. 
Egypt’s secularized intelligentsia, seeking to secularize the society and marginalize the role and 
place of Islam in Egyptians’ everyday life, have been the leaders of these mass media anti-Islam 
campaigns.  
 The relationship between intellectuals and the industry of culture has been a concern to 
numerous scholars and philosophers. Antonio Gramsci was one of those philosophers who 
questioned their role in the manufacturing of power. He states, “Every relationship of 
‘hegemony’ is necessarily an educational relationship” within which intellectuals play a major 
role in the production, reproduction, and transformation of power (cited in Abu Lughod, 2005, p. 
9). The remaining pages of this dissertation examine the role of the Egyptian secularized 
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intelligentsia in the cultural industry. By analyzing some of the most popular and widely viewed 
late-night TV shows, this dissertation attempts to investigate and elaborate on the ways in which 
various meanings of Islamophobia inform the making of “Islam” and “observant Muslims” in the 
Egyptian mainstream media. It inquires into how the established discourse on “Islam” on 
Egyptian late-night television shows has fueled the so-called “war on terrorism,” meanwhile 
shaping and paving the way for public acceptance of the government’s unprecedented human 
rights violations.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
 The primary focus of this dissertation is to elaborate on the vital role of language in the 
social construction of knowledge and meanings. It explores the ways in which the language used 
in Egypt constructs and reconstructs new knowledge on “Islam” and “observant Muslims” with a 
focus on the role of Egyptians’ self-acclaimed secular liberals in manufacturing this knowledge 
and creating a new place for religion in Egyptians’ everyday life. I argue that secular “liberals” 
in the modern Egyptian nation-state have deliberately constructed a hegemonic discourse that led 
to crafting an image of “Islam” whose fundamental values clash with those of the society at large 
through their control of television, the most popular media form in Egypt. The Egyptian secular 
“liberals” as seen in the role of producers and directors of media houses, arguably, dominate and 
determine how this production of cultural tropes takes form and how it is reinforced to exercise 
and transform power by shaping societal perceptions.  
 In this chapter, the methodological tools used for this dissertation are discussed. It 
includes: 1) a description of the data collection procedures; 2) a description of data sampling and 
analysis; and 3) an explanation of the method of analysis and linguistic tools and why they are 
essential for this type of study. 
3.2 Method of Analysis   
3.2.1 Description of the Method of Analysis (CDA)  
 In order to analyze the research data and answer the research questions posed by this 
study, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was chosen as the method of analysis with a focus on 
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Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model and theoretical approach. CDA is not just a 
method of analysis but also a theoretical and methodological whole and therefore it is used as the 
method and theory of this study (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). The primary focus of this section 
is on CDA as a method of analysis given that the theoretical background is discussed in Chapter 
4.  
 It is important to note that the label ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ is used to refer not only 
to Fairclough’s approach but also to the broader field of discourse analysis, which includes a 
variety of approaches including that of Fairclough (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). In general, CDA 
is a multidisciplinary approach to language whose central focus is to reveal the nature of social 
dominance through analyzing the relationship between language/semiotic, discursive practices as 
well as social and cultural practices. CDA as a network of research emerged in the early 1990s 
and was particularly influenced by a variety of social theories including Foucault, Boedieu, and 
Habermas, as well as Halliday’s linguistic theory (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).  
Yet, CDA still has the distinctive characteristics that differentiate it from other social 
theories and from Discourse Analysis approaches. Unlike other Discourse Analysis, CDA is not 
interested in the study of the relationship between languages and its contexts but rather focuses 
on examining the complex social phenomenon that requires multidisciplinary approaches. 
According to Wodak & Meyer (2009), one of CDA’s characteristics is its problem-oriented 
nature and interdisciplinary approach. Furthermore, CDA as an approach is generally interested 
in highlighting ideologies and power through the analysis of textual data (written, spoken, and 
visual) and exploring the relationship between it and other social, cultural, and cognitive 
dimensions (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).  
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 Another aspect that distinguishes CDA from poststructuralist approaches is its conception 
of discourse as being both constituted and constitutive. Unlike poststructuralist discourse theory, 
in Fairclough’s approach, discourse is seen not only as socially reproducing and changing social 
identities, knowledge, and social relations but also as being shaped by other social practices 
(Fairclough, 1995; Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Fairclough’s CDA approach, which refers to the 
use of language as ‘discourse’ and views, investigates discursive practices—through which texts 
are produced and consumed—as an important form of social practice, which implies that 
discourse has a dialectical relationship with other social elements. By dialectical relationship, he 
means the way discourse is constitutive and constituted. According to Fairclough, the order of 
discourse takes place and is either reproduced or challenged through discursive practices. When 
existing genres of discourse are used innovatively and are mixed with newly invented discourses, 
they can challenge the order of discourse (Lindekilde, 2014). By ‘order of discourse,’ Fairclough 
(2001) means the discursive aspect of the social order. It refers to the way in which social 
practices network together at a particular time and a particular society creating particular 
meanings and a particular order of social relations amongst diverse genres, styles, and 
discourses. In other words, it is the sum of discourse types within a given social domain or 
institution (Lindekilde, 2014). An ‘order of discourse’ refers to dominant and mainstream ways 
of meaning construction, not to oppositional or marginal ones.   
 Fairclough’s CDA approach is mainly concerned with processes of social changes that 
are taking place in late modernity and the ways in which these radical changes shape and are 
shaped by discourse. Fairclough is also concerned with shifts in the relationship between 
discourse and other social and cultural elements within networks of practices (Fairclough, 2001). 
He asserts that the dominant role of discourse cannot be taken for granted because discourse does 
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not have the same significant influence in all social practices. Although it might be important in 
one practice, it might be less critical in another practice; furthermore, its importance may change 
overtime (Fairclough, 2001).   
 Fairclough (1995) defines discourse analysis as a field that “aims to systematically 
explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive 
practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; 
to investigate how such practices, events, and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by 
relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these 
relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony” (p. 
132).  
 According to Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis approach, analysts who want to 
ensure that their discourse analysis is useful need to consider the following conditions: 
1. That it is a multidimensional analysis focusing not only on the detailed characteristics of 
texts but also on discursive and social practices. 
2. That it is a multifunctional analysis seeking to explore the way shifts in discourse 
practices affect and change our knowledge (including common sense and beliefs), social 
identities, and social relations. To achieve this, Fairclough’s approach suggests a 
combination of Halliday’s (1978) theory of language—which “sees language as 
multifunctional, and sees texts as simultaneously representing reality, enacting social 
relations, and establishing identities”—with Foucault’s theory, which focuses on the role 
of discourse in the construction of knowledge and meaning-making (Fairclough, 1992, 
pp. 8-9).  
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3. That it is a historical analysis focusing on two things: 1) the structuring processes in the 
formation of texts; and 2) the ‘orders of discourse,’ which Fairclough defines as the total 
patterns of discursive practices in a given society or institution. To examine processes of 
text-formation, one should focus on ‘intertextuality’ or in other words, to the way texts 
have been constructed through the use of other pre-existing texts. This is in contrast to 
“orders of discourse,” where the focus should be given to discursive changes in relation 
to cultural and social change. 
4. That it is a critical method, which implies revealing causes of and relationships between 
discursive, social, and cultural change.  
  Fairclough contends that a critical analysis of discourse requires an examination of the 
features and types of discourse as well as an explanation for what made the discourse the way it 
is. This can be achieved by analyzing the relationship between texts, discourse processes, and 
their social conditions (Fairclough, 2015). For him, CDA is a “critique of the existing social 
reality (including its discourse) which begins with a critique of discourse” (Fairclough, 2015, p. 
7). Fairclough (1992, pp. 35-36), and Fairclough & Wodak (1997, pp. 271-280) list a set of 
principles for Critical Discourse Analysis as follows: 
1. The object of analysis is linguistic texts, and therefore CDA should analyze texts in terms 
of its heterogeneity in forms and meanings. 
2. Discourse constitutes cultural and social relations as well as systems of beliefs and 
knowledge; thus, it should be studied in terms of its constructive effects.  
3. Power relations are discursive and therefore CDA focuses on the way discursive practices 
of a society shape and are shaped by power relations.  
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4. Discourse is historical and therefore should be studied historically in terms of “shifting 
configurations of discourse types in discourse processes and in terms of how such shifts 
reflect and constitute wider processes of social change” (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 35-36). 
5. Discourse is a form of social action and thus should be studied in terms of its role in 
transforming and reproducing ideologies and practices.  
 In Critical Discourse Analysis, language is both produced and consumed through 
discursive practices. Therefore, it uses a critique of discourse as a point of entry for the critique 
of the existing social reality, which can provide a reason for changing it. CDA explains how 
discourse figures within and contributes to the existing social reality, as a basis for action to 
change (Fairclough, 2015). For Fairclough, CDA is a text-oriented approach that includes three 
reciprocal dimensions that are tied to three separate stages of analysis: 
1. A comprehensive textual analysis (description), which focuses on the object of analysis 
including written, spoken, visual, or verbal texts.  
2. A macro-sociological analysis of social practice (interpretation) that focuses on the 
processes through which the object of analysis is produced and received. 
3. A socio-historical analysis (explanation) that focuses on conditions governing these 
processes.  
 So as seen above, whereas the description stage focuses on the features and properties of 
the text, the interpretation and explanation stages are less determinate. In the interpretation stage, 
the focus of critique is on the cognitive processes of participants. It sees the text as both a 
product of a process of production and as a resource in the process of interpretation. The 
explanation stage is concerned with the relationship between social events and the social 
structures that shape and are shaped by these social events. Therefore, the focus here “shifts from 
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discourse to aspects of the existing society which include the discourse that is critiqued” 
(Fairclough, 2015, p. 6).  
 In summary, CDA tries to understand and interpret how agencies and institutions 
produce, reproduce, and legitimize social injustices. It relays these interpretations to social, 
historical, and political practices. Although power in Critical Discourse Analysis is not viewed as 
“a property possessed by individuals,” discursive practices are seen as contributing to advancing 
the interests of certain social groups (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 63). The aim of CDA in this 
sense is to highlight the role that discursive practices play in the constitution of the social world 
and the maintenance of unequal relations of power. CDA approaches are not politically neutral 
but are somewhat politically committed to social change. CDA researchers explicitly side with 
oppressed social groups while retaining their scientific methodologies (Wodak & Meyer, 2009; 
Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
 Discourse analysis cannot remain within the text; it has to be accompanied by further 
analyses such as the social, historical, and political conditions under which these statements are 
produced. Additionally, it requires analysts to reveal the correlation between texts and social and 
cultural practices. To achieve this, discursive practices are also analyzed with an aim to explore 
the social practices that contributed to the way meanings are constructed and conceptualized.   
 I think Fairclough’s CDA approach perfectly meets the needs of my dissertation for the 
following reasons:  
1) it provides an understanding and analysis of how social phenomenon such as ‘Islamophobia’ 
are discursively constructed;  
2) it provides an explanation of how the mainstream discourse on “Islam” shapes and is shaped 
by processes of social and political changes that are taking place in Egypt;  
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3) it helps to reveal the role of the Egyptian secular intelligentsia in the production of 
Islamophobia by producing an ‘order of discourse’ that shows “Islam” as reinforcing violence 
and terrorism; and  
4) it unveils the ways in which meanings of colonialism and Orientalism influence the ways 
“Islam” is portrayed and represented in Egyptian television. 
3.2.2 Data Collection 
 In discourse analysis, the data could be anything that a researcher could read for meaning, 
including texts, pictures, language, events, and objects. In this dissertation, the data gathered for 
the textual analysis is collected from the most popular and widely viewed TV shows in Egypt, 
including: Amr Adeeb’s Kul Yawm (Everyday) on On E TV channel; Wae' l el-Ibrashi’s al-
‘Ashira Mas'an (at 10:00 pm) on Dream Channel; and Ibrahim Issa’s Mukhtalafun Alayh on 
ElHurra Channel. In addition, I viewed segments from Youssef el-Husseini, on ONTV; the 
Egyptian intellectual and journalist, Khaled Muntaser, on Sky News Arabia; and the Egyptian 
secular writer and thinker, Sayed el Qemy, on Al-Hurra TV. The chapter also analyzes a segment 
of a political speech by Egyptian President el-Sisi and another segment for Ali Gomaa’, Egypt’s 
former Mufti. I retrieved all of the TV talk shows online from YouTube. Given that discourse 
analysis helps to understand how knowledge and meanings are constructed, and how a specific 
social phenomenon such as Islamophobia comes into existence, it is primarily associated with 
small studies rather than broader ones (Lindkilde, 2014). 
 I chose to analyze TV shows because television broadcast is the most popular media 
forum in Egypt, and one of the more fascinating technologies that manufacture national culture 
due to its vital role on both the socio-political and cultural levels (Abu Lughod, 2005). 
According to a face-to-face survey conducted by Gallup in December 2013, television 
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broadcasting was found to be the most common source of news for most Egyptians. Nearly all 
Egyptians (94.1%) use TV to get news at least once a week, and 84.2% use it daily or most days 
a week. The 2013 survey reported that 95.8% of Egyptians watch satellite television through 
individual dishes, while 2.4% only use cable and a shared satellite dish. Meanwhile, 74.1% of 
Egyptians are reported to be interested in political TV programming (Broadcasting Board of 
Governors, 2013). According to Diana Turecek, director of audience research for the Middle 
East Broadcasting Networks (MBN), “Television is king in Egypt. It remains by far the most 
important source of news and information for Egyptians” (BBG Research Series, 2014).  
 Additionally, TV talk shows in particular have been selected for this dissertation due to 
their crucial role in the decision-making process and the influential role of its moderators as 
“arbiters of public opinion and contributors of shaping the political discourse” through their 
introduction of “political clubs” and “political lobbying” to the Egyptian broadcast sector (El 
Issawi, 2014a, p. 69). It is through these talk shows that the regime’s political opponents are de-
legitimized and information from the elite to the public is popularized (El Issawi, 2014a).  
 The rationale behind selecting these particular TV shows of Amr Adeeb, Ibrahim Issa, 
and Wael Al-Ibrashi primarily rests on their ratings and circulation. All of the TV talk shows 
under study are amongst the highest-ranked and most-viewed TV shows in Egypt. According to 
an Ipsos 2016-report, Al-Ibrashi’s show took first place among the most-viewed TV shows in 
Egypt; Adeeb’s show came in fourth place (Matar, 2016). Ipsos is a leading French marketing 
and public research company that conducts worldwide researches on TV ratings. In 2017, MBC 
was found to have the highest rating while Sky News came at the forefront of news 
channels,followed by Extra News Channel. Regarding news, Asharq Channel, an oppositional 
channel aired from Turkey, took fourth place. These results caused a lot of controversy in Egypt 
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because the Egyptian state-owned and privately owned TV channels were not given the highest 
viewership rates, which was seen as harming the marketing interests of these channels. The 
survey results were banned and the company was shut down after complaints from a number of 
satellite channels and companies accusing Ipsos of misleading public opinion by manipulating 
viewership rates (AlHayat, 2017; Egypt Today, 2017). Ibrahim Issa’s TV show was selected for 
two reasons: it is also one of the widely watched shows in Egypt and it focuses on the Islamic 
legacy.  
 The timeframe selected for this dissertation starts on 1 June 2012, which marks the 
arrival of President Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood to power, and ends 2 April 
2018, which marks the end of el-Sisi’s first term in office. The significance of this period stems 
from the unprecedented escalation in anti-Islam discourse and human rights violations. These 
transgressions include arbitrary arrests, torture and killings of detainees, disappearances, 
suppression of civil liberties, and governmental and societal restrictions on religious and 
academic freedoms and freedom of expression and the press (Human Rights Watch, 2015). 
Moreover, some significant events that contributed to shaping the Egyptian media discourse on 
“Islam” and “observant Muslims” also occurred during this period. On 30 June 2013, the military 
coup took place and the first freely elected president, Mohammad Morsi, was removed from 
office and subsequently detained along with many other members of his cabinet. On 14 August 
2013, Egyptian security forces raided the camps in Raba’a and El-Nahda squares, killing about 
1,000 civilians and injuring approximately 4,000 more. According to Human Rights Watch, the 
raids witnessed one of the most massive killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent 
history (Human Rights Watch, 2015). These events, among others, have helped to reinforce the 
anti-Islam discourse among political and intellectual elites, as I will demonstrate through this 
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dissertation. 
To collect the sample, I used a non-random sampling technique which means that 
samples were selected intentionally in a way that allows the researcher to deeply focus on and 
examine certain phenomenon or issues (Flick, 2009). The rationale behind the intentional or non-
random sampling is due to the fact that they are the most telling and most relevant in addressing 
the research questions.  
3.3 Data Sampling  
This dissertation carefully analyzes a sample of 24 non-randomly selected episodes from 
between June 2012 and June 2018: seven episodes from Adeeb’s shows, seven from Issa’s show, 
seven from el-Ibrashi’s show, one episode from el-Husseini’s show, one for Muntaser and one 
for El-Qemni. The unit of analysis is the episode or segments of the episode. After collecting the 
corpus of statements gathered from selected TV shows, each statement was given a number that I 
can refer to in the analysis according to its date or chronological order, starting with statements 
that chronologically occurred earlier. For example, a TV episode that was aired in 2012 will 
come before another TV show that took place in 2014.  
3.3.1 Tools of Analysis  
 Drawing on Fairclough’s three-dimensional model and theoretical approach, I look at 
how meanings and knowledge of “Islam” and “observant Muslims” are constructed. I combine 
three essential analytical dimensions: textual analysis, discursive analysis, and socio-cultural 
analysis. I begin with an in-depth analysis of the textual data (the visual and spoken data from 
the Egyptian TV shows under study, i.e., textual analysis). Then I scrutinize the processes that 
involve the production and consumption of the text (discursive analysis) before investigating the 
broader social practice to which the discourse on Islam in Egypt belongs (social practice).  
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3.3.1.1 Textual analysis 
 At the level of textual analysis, I drew on Fairclough’s (1992) proposed tools of analysis 
to investigate the linguistic features of the analyzed data with a focus on: 1) lexicalization, 2) 
grammar, 3) metaphors, and 4) ethos. To analyze lexicalization, I examined wordings and 
alternative wordings, addressing questions such as: “What particular words 
(verbs/nouns/adjectives) are used and why these particular words were used and not others?” 
“What keywords were used in the texts?” “How were topics selected?” “What ideological or 
cultural significance do texts have?” “Is there an intertextual relation between the wording of the 
analyzed texts and if so, how?” This served to highlight how meanings of “Islam” and 
“Muslims” were constructed through word-selection and by making some topics more salient 
than others.  
 To analyze grammar features, I examined three elements: ‘transitivity,’ ‘modality,’ and 
‘themes.’  
• Transitivity was examined for: the choices made in voice (active or passive); the use of 
nominalization with a focus on agency, main problem, and causes and solutions of the 
problem: and the ways of attribution of responsibility. Agency was examined in order to 
answer the question of “who did it” and ‘who or what caused the problem or who 
provided the solution.” The use of passive forms (three demonstrators were killed) or 
nominalization (the killing of demonstrators) emphasizes and normalizes the action and 
obscures the subject or the “doer” of the action.  
• Modality was examined to analyze the degree of speakers’ affiliation with their 
statements. According to Fairclough (1992), modality could either be subjective (when 
speakers’ affiliation is made explicit such as “I think it is hot”) or objective (when 
50	
speakers’ affiliation with statements is left implicit, as in “it is hot”). Objective modality 
implies more power because it reflects a statement where speakers represent their 
perceptions as universal ones. I addressed questions such as: “What modality features are 
most frequent in the analyzed texts?” “Are modalities mostly objective or subjective?”  
• Themes were also examined through an investigation of the thematic structure of the 
analyzed texts and whether they have a pattern and if so, why. These served to investigate 
the interpersonal functions of the language and to reveal how social identities and social 
relations between discourse-participants are portrayed and constructed in texts 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 64).  
• Metaphors and the symbols that were used were examined, as well as the reasons for 
using these particular ones and not others, in order to explore the ideological and cultural 
elements that determined the selection of these particular metaphors and the effect it 
could have on the audience. The features of interactional control were also examined 
through an investigation of the interactional organization between participants. I posed 
questions such as: “How were turns distributed between participants?” “Did all 
participants have the same degree of control?” “Who was setting the agenda and how?” 
“Were participants monitored and if yes, by whom?” “Were participants’ utterances 
evaluated and if yes, how and by whom?” “How were topics changed?”  
• Ethos (YES) features were examined to explore how selves or social identities are 
constructed through language. Ethos is constituted of various features including verbal 
and non-verbal ones. It could be analyzed by examining not only the ways in which 
participants talk, but rather through “the cumulative effect of their total bodily 
disposition—the way they sit, their facial expression, their movements, their ways of 
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responding physically to what is said, their proxemics behavior” and so on (Fairclough, 
1992, p. 167).  
In sum, to analyze the linguistic features of the data, each episode was examined for the 
following set of factors:  
• What particular words (verbs/nouns/adjectives) are used?  
• Why these words are used and not others? 
• What person (subject pronoun)? 
• What tense?  
• Who/what is the agent?  
• What styles of composition and argument are used? (Is it spoken language composition, 
everyday conversation, political and other interviews, or academic style of composition?)  
• What type of metaphors and symbols are used? Why these particular ones? 
• Who/what is portrayed as the main problem? What is identified as the primary 
cause/solution of the problem?   
• Are modalities mostly objective or subjective? 
• How were turns distributed between participants?  
• Did all participants have the same degree of control?  
• Who was setting the agenda and how?  
• Were participants monitored and if yes, by whom? 
Textual analysis served to answer my first research questions:  
1) What are the dominant narratives constructing “Islam” in the Egyptian mainstream media 
between June 2012 and April 2018?  
o How is “Egyptian-ness” represented in the mainstream media?  
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o How is the ‘war on terrorism’ portrayed?  
o How is the struggle to defend Egypt’s values and civilization portrayed?  
o How are processes of modernization and democratization of Egypt represented? 
3.3.1.2. Discursive analysis  
  The discursive dimension was analyzed in order to see “the social practice as something 
which people actively produce and make sense of on the basis of shared commonsense 
procedures” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 72). Fairclough’s approach focuses on the way texts are built 
out of previous texts and the way new texts reproduce or generate new conventions by 
restructuring existing ones. He states, “there are specifically ‘socio-cognitive’ dimensions of text 
production and interpretation, which center upon the interplay between the members’ resources 
which discourse participants have internalized and bring with them to text processing, and the 
text itself, as a set of ‘traces’ of the production process, or a set of ‘cues’ for the interpretation 
process” (Fairclough, 1992, p.  80). 
 A significant feature of Fairclough’s framework is its focus on deconstructing the 
processes of production and consumption while exploring the way these processes are socially 
constrained by the nature of social practice which they are parts of. This being said, I focus on 
three things: 1) the way the text was produced; 2) the way it was interpreted; 3) and whether the 
text has reproduced or contested social practices. I explore whether the different discourse types 
analyzed in this dissertation are heterogeneous and if yes, how. To do that, I focus on topics and 
intertextuality to examine how both producers and consumers draw on the already existing 
discourses and genres to generate, consume, or interpret the text. “Intertextuality is basically the 
property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated 
or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth” 
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(Fairclough, 1992, p. 84). In other words, “intertextuality refers to the fact that whenever we 
speak we produce the words of others, we constantly cite and recite expressions, and recycle 
meanings that are already available” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 46 in Fairclough, 1992, p. 84). 
 Fairclough demonstrates that there are two types of intertextuality: 1) “manifest 
intertextuality,” where “specific other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text;” and 2) 
“constitutive intertextuality” or “interdiscursivity” which refers to “the heterogeneous 
constitution of texts out of elements (types of convention) of orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 
1992, p. 85). In other words, whereas “manifest intertextuality” focuses on texts that are 
explicitly drawn upon in the constitution of the text under analysis, interdiscursivity or 
“constitutive intertextuality” examines discourse conventions to explore whether new discourses 
have been added to the already existing discourses. Fairclough emphasizes the relationship 
between intertextuality and hegemony, revealing that the productivity of texts is conditional and 
constrained by power relations because the public space is not equally available to everyone and 
hence intertextuality cannot itself, in this case, be accountable for these social practices or 
changes. However, interdiscursivity is part of the social analysis; at this level of discursive 
analysis, the focus is only on intertextuality.   
 In order to fully understand a text, one needs to relate it to other texts and social 
practices. Therefore, I pose questions such as: “What texts are drawn upon and how?”  
‘Are the texts under analysis responding to or incorporating other texts?” In addition, I try to 
reveal whether texts under analysis are explicitly or implicitly drawing upon existing texts by 
discussing elements of manifest intertextuality, textual reproductions, and textual 
transformations. For the production of the text, I address questions such as: “How was the text 
produced and through what media?” For consumption, I address questions such as: “Who is the 
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audience (who reads the text)?” “How do audiences interpret the text?” “How was the text 
received?”  
Given these points, each episode is examined for the following set of factors:  
• What texts are drawn upon and how?  
• Are the texts under analysis responding to or incorporating other texts? 
• Are the texts under analysis explicitly or implicitly drawing upon existing texts? 
• How was the text produced and through what media?  
• Who is the audience (who watches the TV shows)?  
• How do audiences interpret the visual text?  
• Does the text have a certain acceptance? 
• What type of information is presupposed in the textual data?  
• How do these presuppositions affect the image of Islam and Muslims?  
I then checked the relations between the collections of statements to examine whether 
they have a certain acceptance. Finally, I identified the situation out of which these statements 
emerge.  
These techniques enabled me to answer my second research question:  
2) In what ways does the contemporary discourse on Islam found in the Egyptian 
mainstream media during the research time period reinforce or challenge the Western 
Islamophobic discourse about Islam?   
 The power of discursive analysis is that it can help reveal how modern internal 
Islamophobia in Egypt is born of colonial epistemological narratives, which assumes the 
superiority of Western civilization and relates “Islam” to backwardness, violence, and terrorism. 
Moreover, discursive analysis highlighted the significant role of Egyptian secularized 
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Islamophobes in reproducing and circulating colonial narratives on “Islam”. Examining whether 
the discourse used on late-night TV shows reproduces or challenges “the order of discourse” or 
the common meanings for Islam helped me explain the radical changes taking place in Egyptian 
society. Using discursive analysis also helped to reveal that the social phenomenon of internal 
Islamophobia is discursively constructed.  
3.3.1.3 Analysis of social practices 
 Finally, discussing the third dimension of this analysis or the social conditions under 
which these statements were produced is also necessary. Fairclough’s framework draws upon 
Gramsci, Althusser, and Foucault to investigate discourse as a social practice but unlike 
Foucault, he discusses discourse within a view of ideology and hegemony. He stresses that 
ideology contributes to the construction of reality including social relations, social identities, and 
the physical world through discursive practices, which play a significant role in producing, 
reproducing, or transforming relations of domination (Fairclough, 1992). Fairclough 
demonstrates that the role ideology plays in a society is more significant when it becomes 
common sense, which implies that hegemony is not stable nor is it complete but is somewhat 
changeable and relevant. He asserts that there is no total convention; rather, there is a high 
degree of agreement upon meanings or social structures, which implies that resistance and 
counter-discourses always exist beside hegemonic discourses.   
 According to Fairclough (1992), this level of analysis seeks to determine the nature of 
social practice to which the discourse under analysis belongs and to lay down the hegemonic 
relations and structures from which this particular discursive practice emerged. It also aims to 
explore how the discourse reproduces or challenges the existing orders of discourse (Fairclough, 
1992). Discursive events, through the use of a new language, can change the orders of discourse 
56	
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). According to Fairclough, social and cultural changes occur only 
when discursive practices are mixed in new ‘interdiscursive’ ways, or in other words when new 
discourses are added to and mixed with the already existing discourses. On the other hand, 
discursive practices mixed in a ‘conventional’ way reflect the stability of the dominant social 
order giving that they retain the same current discourses. This implies that investigation of social 
and cultural changes proceeds by an analysis of the relationship between discursive events and 
the orders of discourse to determine whether new discourses are mixed with the existing ones 
(Fairclough, 1995). Every discursive event “functions as a form of social practice in reproducing 
or challenging the order of discourse,” which implies that broader social practices constitute and 
are constituted by communicative events through their relationship with the order of discourse 
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 70).  
 Given this, I examined whether the text under analysis has affected the order of discourse 
and whether it had an impact on the broader social practices such as power relations, social 
differentiation, etc. (Lindekilde, 2014). Meanwhile, the selected data were examined for the 
following set of questions: 
• Are the texts under analysis explicitly or implicitly drawing upon conventions? 
• Has the visual text affected the order of discourse?  
• Has the ongoing discourse on Islam impacted the broader social practices such as power 
relations, social differentiation? How? 
• Was the discourse on Islam shaped by the broader social, political, and historical 
practices? How? 
• Was the ongoing discourse on Islam affected by ideological and hegemonic practices (the 
existing system of knowledge, social relations, and social identities)? How? 
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 To make sense of the data collected, I examined the social and political conditions under 
which these particular statements rather than others appeared, and the relationship between the 
actual statements and the contextual discursive events behind them. I also investigated whether 
the emerging themes are part of any discursive event. Then, I identified the situation out of 
which these statements emerged.  
 Examining the way visual texts shaped and were shaped by broader social practices 
helped to answer my third research question:  
3) How can internalized Islamophobia, if any, in the Egyptian media be explained and 
justified? 
o What are the political and social influences shaping it?  
o Who is benefiting from its circulation? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
  
 This chapter lays down the theoretical framework used in this dissertation and the reasons 
why it is appropriate in explaining the phenomenon under investigation. This will enable us to 
see why the phenomenon exists and how it connects to the society at large.  Critical discourse 
analysis is the lens through which the phenomenon of “internal Islamophobia” is examined in 
order to answer the questions arising from this exploration. This section aims to answer the 
following questions: “What is Critical Discourse Analysis as defined by its scientists and 
theorists, and as seen by other analysts and critics?” “What makes CDA and particularly 
Fairclough’s approach suitable and relevant to this dissertation?” It also discusses the criticisms 
that have been levied at this theory. In so doing, we bring to light how Egyptian secularist self-
acclaimed liberals and policymakers use language to construct a new “knowledge” through 
meanings for “Islam” and “Muslims.”  
4.1 Origins of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)  
 Critical discourse analysis emerged in the 1970s but developed through a network of 
scholars in 1990s, with some prominent linguistics scholars including Norman Fairclough, Teun 
van Disk, Ruth Wodak, and Teo van Leeuwen. They developed discourse analysis as an 
approach to the study of written, verbal, and visual texts (Van Dijk, 1995; Wodak & Meyer, 
2001). Critical discourse analysis emerged not only from critical linguistics, semiotics, and 
poststructuralist discourse theory, but also from contributions of philosophers such as Antonio 
Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Karl Marx, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Pêcheux, Stuart Hall, and Michel 
Foucault, among others. Although most of the works focus on text, language, or discourse in one 
way or another, they do not clearly and systematically deal with discourse structures. It was the 
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contributions of linguistics in critical linguistics and social semiotics, primarily in the United 
Kingdom and Australia, that gave a more comprehensive view of discourse structures, 
specifically the analysis of the structures of text and image (Chilton, 1985; Fairclough, 1989; 
Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge & Kress, 1988; Kress & Hodge, 1979 as cited in Van Dijk, 1993).  
 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), or Critical Linguistics (CL) as it was first labeled, 
came at a time when little attention was given to production and interpretation of text and its 
relation to social structures. It wasn’t until the late 1970s and 1980s that attention to text in 
relation to societal structures began to emerge in the works of a group of scholars from different 
scholarly backgrounds including Van Dijk, Fairclough, and Wodak. These works later developed 
into what became known as Critical Linguistics (CL) (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). By the end of the 
1980s, CL developed as a linguistic analysis approach that has its particular aims, perspectives, 
methods, and research interests. According to Kress (1990), the label CL was first used to refer 
to this linguistic analysis approach in the 1970s but by the 1990s, it was replaced by the term 
CDA, which was used more consistently when CL scholars started to focus on discourse analysis 
and semiotics (as cited in Wodak & Meyer, 2001). 
 Interestingly, despite the different scholarly backgrounds among the CDA/CL scholars, 
they had a great deal in common. They shared an interest in the analysis of power, ideology, and 
history and relied significantly on Hallidayan systematic functional grammar (Wodak & Meyer, 
2001). It is important to point out that CDA is not a school or field; rather, it is a “critical 
approach, position, or stance of studying text and talk” (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 1).  
 Accordingly, it could be said that CDA, as is the case for many other theories or 
approaches, was born from the womb of other linguistic, philosophical, and socio-political 
theories and approaches and grew up and developed to become an independent entity with 
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distinctive qualities that distinguish it from other theories and methods. CDA has been 
particularly influenced by structuralism and poststructuralism, but it is considered closer to 
poststructuralism than structuralism because it undermines the traditional understanding of truth 
and maintains that the objective reality is impossible to know. However, CDA is still different 
from poststructuralism in many ways, including its focus on the investigation of complex social 
phenomena rather than the relationship between language and its contexts, as well as its 
refutations of the idea of “no reality outside the language.” CDA emphasizes that discourse is not 
only constitutive but also constituted.  
 Unlike poststructuralist discourse theory, in Fairclough’s approach, discourse is seen not 
only as socially sustaining—through reproducing and changing social identities, knowledge, and 
social relations—but also as being shaped by other social practices (Fairclough, 1995; Jorgensen 
& Phillips, 2002). As the following paragraphs of this chapter attempt to illustrate, Fairclough 
asserts that social structures are products of both discursive and non-discursive elements. 
Another difference between CDA analysts and poststructuralists is their stance on the analysis of 
the texts given that a text-oriented analysis of written and spoken language is essential for an 
analysis of discourse (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Discussing the CDA discipline and looking at 
its aims, principles, criteria, and goals, as conceived by its proponents, as well as its criticisms, 
will clarify the key differences and similarities between it and other linguistic paradigms. 
 4.1.1 What is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)? 
 CDA does not represent a particular theory or approach but rather a variety of versions 
(Van Dijk, 2015; Fairclough, 2015) and thus, differences between these versions are not only 
expected but also inevitable. However, contribution to a specific school, discipline, or discourse 
theory is not the critical interest of CDA but rather the social issues that it aims to have a better 
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understanding of, through discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1993). As mentioned earlier, the CDA 
movement is a product of the works of a number of thinkers including Roger Fowler, Wodak, 
Fowler et al., Norman Fairclough, and Van Dijk. Despite the common features among all of 
them that identify their approaches as belonging to the same movement, there are significant 
differences between them concerning ideology, theoretical perspective of discourse, as well as 
their methods for the empirical analysis of language (Jorgenson & Phillips, 2002). Part of this 
similarity is reflected in the keen interest of all CDA approaches in supporting and backing 
dominated and oppressed peoples by revealing the hidden role played by language in sustaining 
and reproducing social power in a way that only advances the interests of the powerful. 
According to CDA theorists, discourse functions ideologically and thereby they give great 
attention to discursive practices—within which texts are produced and consumed—as well as to 
the role of these discursive practices in advancing the interests of dominant groups (Jorgensen & 
Phillips, 2002). 
 Van Dijk (1995) defines CDA as “a special approach in discourse analysis which focuses 
on the discursive conditions, components, and consequences of power abuse by dominant (elite) 
groups and institutions. It examines patterns of access and control over contexts, genres, text and 
talk, their properties, as well as the discursive strategies of mind control” to explore how 
discourse functions and power abuses are expressed and naturalized (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 24). Van 
Dijk (1995) posits that CDA is part of a more extensive critical studies’ chain that focuses on 
relations of power and inequality and how they are produced and reproduced through discourse. 
It is a multidisciplinary and a problem-oriented approach that aims to uncover the role ideologies 
play in the production of inequality and dominance through language. CDA questions the ways 
in which discursive means shape individuals’ minds for the interest of those who have power, 
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while also dealing with discourses of resistance against inequality and domination, given that it 
does not perceive the recipients of texts as passive in their relation to what they read, hear, or 
watch (Kress, 1989 as cited in Wodak & Meyer, 2001). Although the role of counter-ideology 
and resistance is crucial to CDA theorists, they often prefer to focus on the discourse of elites to 
uncover their hidden ideologies (Van Dijk, 1993). Perhaps more so than any other analysts, CDA 
analysts are not concerned with disciplinary problems of describing discourse structures. Their 
primary interest is on issues that threaten the lives of people and their wellbeing (Van Dijk, 
1993; Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002; Fairclough, 1992).  
Unlike other political studies of discourse, CDA defines itself as an approach that is 
politically committed to social change, and therefore it clearly takes the side of the dominated 
and oppressed. Its aim is not only to describe and explain, but also to produce enlightenment and 
create awareness of how language contributes to the domination of some individuals by others 
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002; Fairclough, 1995). Central to critical discourse analysts is their 
intention to display their aims, views, principles, and perspectives not only in their analysis but 
also within the society at large. In other words, they want to explicitly take a socio-political 
stance rather than being neutral, given that their word is considered as ultimately political. 
Although not in each stage of theory formation and analysis, their work is admittedly and 
ultimately political. CDA is critical because it aims to achieve change through critical 
understanding by revealing the hidden ideologies of the elites and increasing awareness among 
those who are suffering from social inequality, injustice, and dominance (Jorgensen & Phillips, 
2002). Thus, their success is measured by their effectiveness and their contribution to change. 
Unsurprisingly, for many scholars who believe that taking an explicit political stance 
conflicts with objectivity and academic goals, they regard such a stance as politically biased and 
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scholarly subjective. However, to defend their political position, CDA analysts assert that all 
scholars have ideological commitments whether explicit or implicit. According to them, the 
intellectual and scholarly institutions are already part of the social and political life, and therefore 
CDA scholars should not only be regarded as social and political scientists but also as social 
critics and activists  (Van Dijk, 1995; Van Dijk, 1993).  
 According to CDA theorists, creating awareness of the role of language in disseminating 
the ideology of the powerful and legitimizing the abuse of power by elites, could be detected 
through a detailed analysis of written or verbal text, and context (Fairclough, 1992a; Jorgensen & 
Phillips, 2002; Van Dijk, 1995). Furthermore, an understanding of the nature of social power and 
dominance is crucial for CDA because it gives an insight into how discourses contribute to the 
reproduction of such social power (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). According to Van Dijk (1993), 
power involves not only control—such as the control of one group over other groups—but also 
action and cognition, given that one powerful group may limit the freedom of action of others, 
while influencing their minds. Therefore, a cognitive interface of models is needed for a CDA 
analyst to be able to explicitly relate power and discourse given that modern power is primarily 
cognitive, and is enacted and reproduced through language by strategic ways that aim to change 
the mind of others in one’s interests. Changing the mind of others is primarily achieved through 
text and talk, and thereby textual analysis is as important to CDA as understanding the social 
representations of the social mind that connect the individual and the social (Van Dijk, 1993).  
 Perhaps more so than any other CDA approaches, Van Dijk’s approach gives 
considerable attention to the cognitive process and how dominant discourses become part of the 
personal cognition and actions of people. He emphasizes knowledge, attitudes, or ideologies 
shared by recipients. However, Fairclough’s approach is primarily concerned with processes of 
64	
social change occurring in late modernity and how these radical changes shape and are shaped by 
discourse. He is also interested in the way people willingly adopt dominant discourses, and the 
way these discourses mysteriously influence and shape the way they think and act. Fairclough 
uses a critique of discourse as a point of entry for the analysis of the existing social reality, which 
can provide a reason for changing it. He explains how discourse figures within and contributes to 
the current social reality, as a basis for action to change (Fairclough, 2015).  
 Fairclough’s approach is linguistically influenced by Halliday’s systematic functional 
grammar but is theoretically influenced by poststructuralist thought (Foucault, Bourdieu, and 
Bakhtin). Critical discourse analysis, according to Fairclough, is defined as an “analysis of the 
dialectical relationships between discourse (including language but also other forms of semiosis, 
e.g., body language or visual images) and other elements of social practices” (Fairclough, 2001, 
p. 231). He posits that in his approach, analysts should mainly focus on: the growing radical 
changes in contemporary social life; how discourse is formed within processes of change; and 
how the relationship shifts between semiosis and other social elements within networks of 
practices. On these grounds, it could be said that Fairclough is primarily concerned with shifts in 
the relationship between discourse and other social and cultural elements within networks of 
practices (Fairclough, 2001).  
 According to Fairclough, discourse is an essential social practice that plays a significant 
role in reproducing and changing knowledge, social relations, and identities, but is at the same 
time shaped and produced by other social structures (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Thus, 
discourse in Fairclough’s sense has a dialectical relationship with other social structures. For 
him, discourse is just one element among other social aspects that can internalize the other 
elements without being reducible to them. He asserts that the dominant role of discourse cannot 
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be taken for granted because it does not have the same significant influence in all social 
practices. Although it might be critical in one practice, it may be less critical in another practices, 
and furthermore, its importance may change over time (Fairclough, 2001).   
 In Fairclough’s approach, every instance of discourse or language in use is viewed as a 
communicative event that comprises three dimensions: it is a text; it is a discursive practice—
that involves both the production and consumption of texts; and it is a social practice 
(Fairclough, 1992). An analysis of all three dimensions is required for a discourse analysis, 
which Fairclough distinguishes as follows:  
1) Description refers to the analytical part of the process that deals with the study of texts, and it 
is necessary for an understanding of how discursive processes function linguistically within 
particular texts and how social practices are influenced by power relations (Fairclough, 1992). 
However, critical discourse analysis cannot remain within the text; Fairclough posits that 
focusing exclusively on the analysis of the text is not sufficient for discourse analysis given that 
it keeps the links between the text and the other social processes ambiguous.  
2) Interpretation refers to the analysis of discursive practices, which are analyzed with an aim 
to explore the social practices that contribute to the way meanings are constructed and 
conceptualized. In Fairclough’s view, discursive practices through which language is both 
produced and consumed are regarded as an essential form of social practice, “which both 
constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 
2002, p. 61). Thus, an analysis of discursive practices is required in Fairclough’s approach to 
shed light on how people construct a rule-bound world in everyday practices. To achieve this, he 
focuses on how both authors (producers) and receivers (consumers) of texts draw on pre-existing 
discourses and genres in their production and interpretation of texts (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).  
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3) Explanation is concerned with the analysis of the broader social structures and practices 
under which texts are produced, which is central to Fairclough’s approach (Fairclough, 2015). It 
requires analysts to reveal the correlation between texts and social and cultural practices to shed 
light on the hidden role of the dominant discourses in reproducing or changing the dominant 
ideologies of the dominant groups over others. Ideology in Fairclough’s sense is based in 
language and is used by social groups to dominate today’s society through the establishment of 
meanings that contribute in producing, sustaining, and changing the relations of power 
(Fairclough, 1992). Not all discourses, in Fairclough’s approach, are equally ideological given 
that some discourses have more impact than others. This implies that only dominant discourses 
participate in sustaining and changing power relations that are regarded as ideological 
discourses. Furthermore, Fairclough understands ideology as a social practice that contributes to 
the construction of meanings in everyday life (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).  
 It is to be noted that Fairclough’s three dimensions are interdependent, which necessitates 
moving backward and forwards between the three different types of analysis rather than 
following a linear order. In other words, analysts need to examine the three levels of analysis 
“simultaneously” and not “sequentially” (Janks, 1997, p. 330). 
 4.1.2 What is the Meaning of “Discourse Analysis”?  
 The term ‘discourse’ has various conflicting definitions, formulated from a variety of 
disciplinary and theoretical perspectives. In social theory, discourse is used to refer to the ways 
knowledge and meanings are constructed and the way different pre-existing discourses are 
combined to construct a new discourse. In this sense, discourses are viewed not as an individual 
activity or as only reflecting social relations, but also as formulating them (Fairclough, 1992).  
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 As stated above, focusing on the social functioning of language is not new. Amongst 
other scholars and philosophers, two Marxist theorists—Antonio Gramsci (1971) and Louis 
Althusser (1971)—have emphasized the importance of discourses for social and cultural 
changes. They view discourse as a way of using ideology to justify and naturalize the status quo 
in a society (Fairclough, 1992, p. 6). However, Gramsci views discourse as a way to legitimize 
and naturalize the status quo in a particular society by turning it into an accepted “common 
sense.” In Althusser’s approach, it contributes to the establishment and naturalization of social 
identities and social roles given to individuals in a society.  
 Foucault aligns with both Gramsci and his teacher, Althusser, in according language a 
central role in meaning-making and subsequently in creating social change. For him, the word 
“discourse” refers to the way knowledge about a particular topic is represented and constructed 
through a group of statements, ideas, or patterned way of thinking (Lupton, 1992). According to 
Foucault, discourse produces, reproduces, and is produced by the social system through forms of 
domination, selection, and exclusion. It is concerned with the analysis of how a topic has been 
constructed within society; and it is a historical analysis of the development of a specific form of 
knowledge. What distinguishes the Foucauldian discourse analysis from other critical discourses 
is that it views discourse as a system of representations involving the production of the 
power/knowledge dichotomy through language. Unlike Marxist analysts, Foucault challenges the 
idea that power is exercised through the elites; he sees power as pervasive and dispersed. He uses 
the term “power/knowledge” to suggest that power is constituted through accepted forms of 
knowledge, scientific understanding, and truth. For him, every society has its “general politics” 
of truth, which are situated in the types of discourse(s) used and accepted in this society as well 
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as the systems, mechanisms, and procedures that determine its true and false statements 
(Foucault, 1998).  
 For Foucault, discourse plays a significant role in the construction of social identities 
including material objects and social subjects; for him, subjects are effects of discursive 
formations. He argues that discursive practices draw upon other practices and are therefore 
defined by their relationship with others. Foucault’s approach focuses on the role of discursive 
practices in the construction of knowledge. His archeological method approach (1972) has two 
central theoretical perceptions of discourse:  
1) discourse as constituting society: from this perspective, discourse is viewed as 
contributing to the construction, reproduction, and transformation of the objects. It 
centers on the role of discourse in constructing the objects of knowledge, identities and 
social subjects, and social relationships (Fairclough, 1992). 
2) discourse practices as interdependent: Foucault refers to this as “intertextuality” of texts. 
It focuses on the relationship between the existing types of discourse practice and pre-
existing ones; it views discourse as shaping and transforming historically pre-existing 
texts while also being transformed by it. Linguistic analysis or the analysis of written and 
spoken language is not central to Foucault’s approach (Fairclough, 1992).  
 Fairclough takes up Foucault’s position and thus places the question of the impact of 
discursive practices on the construction of social subjects, objects, and concepts at the forefront 
of his three-dimensional approach. For him, discourse is “a practice not just of representing the 
world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning” 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 64). However, Fairclough found Foucault’s stance on excluding active 
social agency to be inadequate and hence advocates for a dialectical approach, according to 
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which, social subjects are viewed as being shaped by discursive practices without losing their 
capability to reshape and reconstruct these practices (Fairclough, 1992). He critiques Foucault’s 
work for failing to recognize the role of resistance and possibilities of change brought about 
through struggles, and for overstating the extent to which people are controlled by power. For 
Fairclough, “constituted subjects are not merely passively positioned but are capable of acting as 
agents, and amongst other things, of negotiating their relationship with the various types of 
discourse they are drawn into” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 61). This is not to say that Foucault 
disagrees with the concept of power causing resistance; however, the totality of Foucault’s work, 
according to Fairclough (1992), reveals that resistance for him does not present a real threat 
because power generally contains it (Fairclough, 1992).  
  Another significant difference between Foucault and Fairclough’s works is with regards 
to texts and textual analysis. Foucault’s discourse analysis neglects linguistic and discursive 
analysis of texts; he reduces practice to its structures or, in Foucault’s terms, ‘the rules of 
formation.’ Linguistic analysis, or the analysis of written and spoken language, is not central to 
Foucault’s approach. This does not imply that Foucault does not talk about practice; rather, he is 
interested in practice but with a focus on structures as being accountable for what can happen. 
However, Fairclough’s approach advocates that textual analysis should go in conjunction with 
discursive practices and social analysis (1992). He maintains that one cannot reach conclusions 
about practices without analyzing its real occurrences including texts because practices have 
properties of their own. By ‘practice,’ Fairclough is referring to people’s sayings, writings, and 
actions. Thus, Fairclough finds Antonio Gramsci's concept of power (1971) to be superior to 
Foucault’s conception.  Whereas the latter neglects practice and the role of modes of resistance 
in transforming structures, Gramsci views hegemony as “an unstable equilibrium built upon 
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alliance and the generation of consent from subordinate classes and groups, whose instabilities 
are the constant focus of struggles” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 58). Given this, Fairclough’s discourse 
analysis also differs from Foucault’s approach in that Fairclough’s method uses the concept of 
ideology; he posits that critical discourse analysis is an ideological critique. The effectiveness of 
Gramsci’s concept, according to him, is due to its capability to conceptualize and investigate the 
ideological and political dimensions of discursive practice. 
 Given this, Fairclough’s approach draws upon the works of Antonio Gramsci, Louis 
Althusser, and Michel Foucault (Fairclough, 1992). He combines methods from various branches 
of linguistics (grammar, vocabulary, semantics) as well as social theory (Fairclough, 1995). 
Fairclough views discourse as a social practice that not only participates in the production and 
reproduction of other social practices but also reflects them (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). As 
well, Fairclough recognizes that language has always been relevant in social life, and he 
considers that the social functioning of language has shifted considerably in the past few 
decades. He stresses that one can see this shift in “the increasing salience of discourse in social 
transformations” and the parallel concern to control this discourse as part of the control of 
cultural and social change” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 8). He states, “Many of these social changes do 
not just involve language, but are constituted to a significant extent by changes in language 
practices; and it is perhaps one indication of the growing importance of language in social and 
cultural change that attempts to engineer the direction of change increasingly include attempts to 
change language practices” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 6).  
 Therefore, for him, the analysis of texts “should not be treated in isolation from the 
analysis of discourse practices and sociocultural practices” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 19). His concept 
of discourse analysis focuses on investigating social change. It is a three-dimensional approach 
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according to which any discursive event is viewed as having the following dimensions: a textual 
dimension, a discursive practice dimension, and a social practice dimension. For him, any 
instance of discourse is understood as “being simultaneously a piece of a text, an instance of 
discursive practice, and an instance of social practice” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 4).  
 4.1.3 Critics of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)  
 Just as many other promising movements or schools of thought whose works were 
evaluated and critiqued from both within and outside, Critical Discourse Analysis has received 
similar treatment. Over the years, CDA has been criticized, and some of its assertions were 
questioned particularly regarding its methodology, theories, and aims. Below is a summary of the 
major criticisms that CDA has faced: 
 1) Critiques of CDA’s aims: CDA’s explicit political stances and enlightenment goals 
were widely criticized by some scholars who depicted the paradigm of being subjective in its 
analysis (Widdowson, 1995a; 1995b; 1996; Hammersley, 1997; and others). According to 
Widdowson (1995a), CDA’s work is “an exercise in interpretation” and thus “invalid as an 
analysis” (p. 159). He claims that the conceptual confusion in the field of CDA “makes suspect 
some of the principles and practices of critical discourse analysis, and calls into question the 
validity of the notion of authentic language currently prevalent in language pedagogy” 
(Widdowson, 1995a, p. 157). According to these critiques, choosing a particular political 
standpoint rather than reaching a result that is based on investigation of data and facts is believed 
to be unsystematic and problematic because people have different political views and thus if 
researchers decide to base their works to fulfil political functions rather than interpreting 
phenomena, then a sound justification would be a must (Hammersley, 1997).  
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2) Critiques of method: In addition to the emancipatory goals of CDA, most of CDA’s 
critics focus on what they call methodological shortcomings which they believe exist on the level 
of how data is interpreted, mainly referring to the analysis of ‘reader-response’ (Stubbs, 1997; 
Widdowson, 1998). Most of the criticism has been focused on the way data is obtained. 
According to CDA, researchers can investigate and explore social relations through a careful 
examination of language, which produces, reproduces, and reflects these social relations. 
Widdowson (1998) criticized this by asking how can one reach conclusions about ideology in the 
text by examining lexical items and grammatical features. What makes this problematic and 
biased, to Widdowson, is not the question of analyzing ideology through text-examination but 
rather what he regards as a non-rigorous analysis of the text. He argues that CDA’s reliance on a 
small random corpus of data and its unserious examination of texts (by focusing on some 
linguistic features and ignoring others) renders the resulting analysis biased and impressionist. 
To fix this problem, critics suggest that CDA analysts should give more attention to the way 
language data is obtained by analyzing a larger sample of language and being more systematic in 
analyzing the text.  
 CDA’s thinkers defended their explicit standpoints by stressing that all scholars have 
ideological commitments and that the intellectual and scholarly institutions are already part of 
social and political life. By extension, therefore, CDA scholars should not only be regarded as 
social and political scientists but also as social critics and activists (Van Dijk, 1995; Van Dijk, 
1993). Fairclough replied to these critics through his 1996 published paper titled “Notes & 
discussion: A reply to Henry Widdowson’s ‘Discourse analysis: a critical view.’ ”  As the title 
indicates, his response is particularly directed to Widdowson given that his criticisms were the 
73	
sharpest. My focus here is on Fairclough’s response because he is the author of the theory and 
method of analysis on which this research is based.  
 On the question of CDA’s subjectivity, Fairclough stresses that having an explicit 
political position does not affect the validity of the research and its impartiality, neither does it 
contradict with the analytical nature of the movement because CDA is not a political party that 
adopts particular views but rather a movement that takes the side of the dominated and oppressed 
regardless of their political views and standpoints, and thus its political commitments and 
strategies of intervention are widely different. He posits, “Practitioners of CDA are indeed 
generally characterized by explicit political commitments. They are people who see things wrong 
with their societies, see language as involved in what is wrong, and are committed to making 
changes through forms of intervention involving language” (Fairclough, 1996, p. 52). In this 
light, a researcher may be a rightist, and still advocate an oppressed or dominated left-wing 
movement or person, according to Fairclough. Central to CDA analysts is the role they should 
play in changing society by raising awareness of the way in which hidden discourse advances the 
ideology of the powerful.  
 Furthermore, Fairclough emphasizes that science and social science have political 
priorities and positioning because this is something that cannot be inevitable. He states, “… we 
are all - including Widdowson - writing from within particular discursive practices, entailing 
particular interests, commitments, inclusions, exclusions, and so forth” (Fairclough, 1996, p. 52). 
In his response to Widdowson’s accusation that CDA is not an analysis in support of a theory but 
rather an interpretation in favor of a belief, Fairclough posits that Widdowson’s view of analysis 
is very narrow. He stresses that CDA is an analysis given that it has a systematic analytical 
procedure and it applies systematically to different types of data (Fairclough, 1996).  
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 4.1.4 Strengths and Limitations  
 This section highlights the strengths and weaknesses of Critical Discourse Analysis and 
discusses its appropriateness to this study. Much of CDA’s persuasive force derives from its 
ability to bring together social and linguistic analyses of discourse, and more specifically its 
interpretation of how discursive practices are produced and consumed. Pulling together these 
levels of analysis enables analysts to explore the role that ideology and power play in society as 
well as how and why language-in-use contributes to this role. 
 From the point of view of the researcher, CDA’s emphasis on the analysis of the text—
which is absent in poststructuralists’ analyses including Foucault’s works—is believed to be 
necessary not only for the investigation of the features and characteristics of the discourse, but 
also for a full understanding of the social and discursive dimensions, which go together with the 
textual analysis. Because the text is the direct object of a discourse, examining the ways in which 
text-producers select their words, sentences, and metaphors reveals a lot about their aims and 
ideologies especially when examined in relation to the broader social and political practices 
within which they are produced and consumed. This is not to say that focusing only on textual 
analysis—as in many qualitative analyses—would be sufficient; rather, it is the examination of 
all of the three dimensions of discourse that gives Fairclough’s framework its force. Textual 
analysis only could work well for an examination of the quality of journalistic works but not for 
an analysis of the role of discourse in constructing meanings and social realities.  
 Another factor that considerably strengthens the CDA paradigm is that it does not 
consider the ‘subject’ as passive; even though it gives power to the systems, it does so without 
dehumanizing or downgrading the subjectivity of recipients. Within its analysis of the discursive 
practices, it gives special attention to how recipients consume the discourse. However, from my 
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point of view, the great attention that CDA gives to the discourse of powerful people while 
ignoring the discourse of ordinary people or counter-discourses is problematic, despite its noble 
aims of emancipation by uncovering the hidden meanings in the elites’ discourses. It is 
understandable that dominant discourses have more power and more influence in shaping the 
minds and views of the public. However, would not the inclusion of counter- or resistant- 
discourses of dominated and oppressed people complete the picture, by providing a more 
comprehensive understanding of the variety of existing discourses and the ways they are 
perceived, received, and consumed? Wouldn’t the button-up discourse help in achieving the 
same goal of emancipation by uncovering the role of counter-discourses in resisting the 
dominant discourse? This researcher finds the aims and principles of CDA approaches in 
enlightening the public by uncovering the hidden role played by the language to sustain and 
reproduce the ideology, to be motivated by a commendable sense of social justice. However, if 
the research of CDA thinkers is mainly addressed to academics, it begs the question as to how it 
will enlighten the general public if their research is not directed to or involves the broader 
audience that it wishes to emancipate. 
 4.1.5 Why is Critical Discourse Analysis Appropriate for this Dissertation? 
 Discussing the appropriateness of Fairclough’s framework is necessary here for a full 
understanding of the relationship between the theory used in this dissertation and the actual 
research, as well as the way the theory helps to answer its questions and concerns. Thus, this last 
section poses the following question: “What are the reasons that make CDA appropriate to this 
dissertation?”  
 Given that my research is concerned with the making of social meanings, Fairclough’s 
three-dimensional CDA approach has been particularly useful in this regard because it:  
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1) provides a framework for an understanding and analysis of how social phenomenon such as 
‘Islamophobia’ is discursively constructed;  
2) makes it possible to provide an explanation of how the dominant discourse on “Islam” both 
shapes and is shaped by processes of social and political changes that are taking place in Egypt;  
3) allows this study to move beyond the description and interpretation of the role of language in 
Egyptian society, to an understanding of how and why language plays this role by revealing the 
hidden connection between ideological and discursive practices; and  
4) aids in unveiling the ways in which meanings of colonialism and Orientalism influence the 
way “Islam” and “Muslims” are portrayed and represented in Egyptian television.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCURSIVE AND SOCIAL PRACTICES 
5.1 Egyptian Media: A Historical Overview 
 Deconstructing the processes of production and consumption and exploring the way these 
processes are socially constrained—by the nature of social practice which they are parts of—is 
significant to discourse analysis. However, this dissertation does not focus on consumption; 
rather, it focuses on the processes of production or in other words on the institutional and 
organizational practices that affect and control the production of texts giving that the encoding of 
texts varies due to the variation in editorial procedures of each media institution.  
 This chapter, departing from Fairclough’s framework, discusses discursive and social 
practices. It reviews the media system in Egypt since the 1950s and reveals the dynamics of the 
relationship between the state and media with the aim of highlighting the role of media in 
sustaining or changing social practices as well as constructing the shared commonsense 
procedures. It analyzes the aspects that shape the media coverage of news and answers questions 
such as: “Who owns the media in Egypt?” “To what extent is the Egyptian media controlled by 
the regime?” “How did the mainstream media system develop over the years?” “In what ways, if 
any, did satellite TV channels and social media affect social and political aspects in Egypt?” The 
chapter opens with a historical overview of the Egyptian press, followed by a review of the 
history of broadcasting.  
 Given that the analysis of social practices includes an examination of the social, political, 
and historical factors involved in the process of production and an interpretation of social 
phenomenon, this chapter also sheds light on the ways in which media function as an ideology 
carrier.  
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 5.1.1 The Egyptian Press 
 As indicative of any totalitarian regime, the Egyptian government appears to be no 
exception in the need to control the media and channel it to serve its political interests.  
According to Rugh (2004), this control over the media has begun since print media was first 
introduced to Egypt by the French expedition in 1798, but distinctly increased in the twentieth 
century. The first newspaper in Egypt was a French paper published by Napoleon Bonaparte—
who introduced the printing press to Egypt—under the title of The French Courier and was 
addressed to the French forces not to the natives. In 1827, the Egyptian government published 
the first two Egyptian newspapers (Journal al Khadyu and Al Waqa’al Masriya) which were 
meant to promulgate the government’s policies and to propagate whatever the regime wanted the 
public to know. This indicates that from its introduction in Egypt, the press has been used as a 
tool that serves the political interests of the rulers—and this continues to the present day (Rugh, 
2004).                                                                                                                                            
 However, governmental control over the media particularly intensified after World War 
II when many countries in the Middle East including Egypt gained their independence from 
colonial rule. Protecting the newly independent countries from external threats or internal 
conspiracies was the claim that Arab governments constantly used to justify their control over 
the media (Rugh, 2004). This is not to say that the Egyptian press has never experienced 
freedom. According to Khamis, the relationship between regimes and print media has also 
witnessed periods of diversity of opinions and freedom of expression particularly under the 
Ottoman control and British colonization, but this freedom has often been restricted and oriented 
towards serving the interests of the rulers (Khamis, 2011).                                                                                   
 After the 1952 revolution, this diversity started to vanish and a large number of 
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newspapers became identical in their content and journalistic style; this was particularly true 
after President Mohammad Naguib founded Dar al-Tahrir, a publishing house owned by the 
government (Chiba, 2009; El Zahed, 2012; Rugh, 2004). When President Gamal Abdel Nasser 
came to power by overthrowing and detaining President Naguib, he took firm measures to 
control the press. In addition to creating a single political party, he politicized, nationalized, and 
monopolized the press including magazines. Political parties that were controlling the press were 
no longer allowed to run newspapers; as well, private publishing houses mostly owned by non-
Egyptians were all nationalized (Amin & Napoli, 1999). Meanwhile, Nasser intensified 
censorship and muzzled mouths; a single dominant official discourse prevailed, and voices that 
had once criticized governmental policies or exposed corruption were barely heard in the 
Egyptian press (El Zahed, 2012; Khamis, 2011; Elmasry, Basioni & ElKamel, 2014; Rugh, 
2004). In 1960, a new law was issued, according to which ‘permission’ from the National Union) 
was required before publishing any newspaper. This same law nationalized the four large private 
printing houses and its newspapers, and assigned the National Union the responsibility of 
appointing the board of directors of these newspapers (Rugh, 2004; Chiba, 2009).               
 However, this situation changed under President Sadat (1971-1981) who lifted the 
censorship imposed by Nasser and allowed press diversity and criticism of the government. To 
embellish his image in front of the international community, President Sadat allowed 
oppositional political parties to emerge in 1976 and to publish newspapers that expressed their 
oppositional political views. This included the major opposition parties, the socialist party, el 
Ahrar; the rightest party, el Wafd; and the leftist party, el Tajamo’a el Watani (Amin & Napoli, 
1999; Elmasry, 2012; Rugh, 2004 ; El Zahed, 2012). Further, religious conservatives were 
allowed to issue their magazine, al Da’wah wal I’tisam, which Nasser had suspended. “In the 
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course of moving the country away from its political dependence on the Soviet Union and 
toward democratization, he (Sadat) also instituted policy reforms that began to open up the 
economy to domestic entrepreneurs and the West” (Amin & Napoli, 1999, p. 179).                                                
 This policy was reflected on the media during the rule of the two presidents who 
followed Nasser. Sadat’s era was less restrictive than his predecessor in terms of freedom of 
expression, but he was always cautious to keep the media under his control (Amin & Napoli, 
1999; Elmasry, Basioni & ElKamel, 2014). To achieve this, Sadat established two councils: the 
Supreme Press Council in 1975, which was in charge of issuing licenses to all publications; and 
the Shura Council, which—according to a law issued in 1980—was given the legal ownership of 
the major publishing houses and the authority to appoint their board members (El Zahed, 2012; 
Rugh, 2004). This step ensured the regime a full sway over the press by giving the two councils, 
which were controlled by the regime’s party, a licensing authority and financial control over both 
national and independent newspapers (Black, 2008).                                                                       
 In 1981, Mubarak came to power after Sadat’s assassination. In 1982, he allowed the 
establishment of political parties and permitted them to resume publishing their newspapers. 
Numerous changes took place during his era, particularly over the last 20 years of his rule. The 
most significant of these changes were the penetration of the Internet and social media, the 
emergence of private satellite television, and the emergence of independent newspapers 
(Mabrook, 2010; Rugh, 2004).                                                                                            
 However, the history of independent papers in Egypt stretched back to the 19th century 
long before Mubarak’s rule. Egyptian newspapers were essentially private until Nasser 
nationalized them (El Issawi, 2014a). Wadi al-Nil (which appeared in 1867) and Al-Ahram (in 
1876) were among the first few private newspapers to be founded in Egypt. However, they 
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vanished after the 1952 Revolution and then resumed in 2004 after about 50 years of 
discontinuity (Khamis, 2011). Independent papers are different from oppositional papers, in that 
they are owned by private people and do not follow or support any political party. Mubarak also 
allowed both Copts and Muslims to have their own religious publications, which were banned by 
Sadat in 1981 (Rugh, 2004). By 1993, Egypt had 263 licensed newspapers of all kinds including 
the following five opposition newspapers owned by political parties: Mayo; al-Ahali; al-Wafd; 
al-Sha’b; and al-Ahrar (Amin & Napoli, 1999). Further, the reduction of censorship and the 
economic changes under Mubarak opened the door for the magazine press to evolve in front of 
the high demand of the audience. According to Vatikiotis(1991), by the 1980s, more than 300 
publications of all types and categories had been published including those focusing on 
feminism, political reform, religious conservativism, and secular liberalism (as cited in Amin & 
Napoli, 1999). In addition to Arabic publications, the state also licensed a wide range of English- 
and French-language newspapers and magazines.                                                                    
 These changes in press ownership led some media analysts to argue that the Egyptian 
press under Mubarak experienced both democratic and anti-democratic practices (Goldschmidt, 
2008). This is despite the fact that these changes did not have a real effect on press freedom, 
whether for state-owned papers or private papers. The presence of editors-in-chief appointed by 
the Shura Council in the newsrooms of national newspapers introduced a new approach of 
censorship as these editors-in-chief were loyal to the regime that appointed them and 
subsequently were very careful never to surpass the red lines (El Issawi, 2014a). On the other 
hand, private media outlets were owned and controlled by wealthy businessmen who were in a 
codependent relationship with Mubarak and subsequently loyal to him and his regime (Abdulla, 
2014). This loyalty was seen throughout the pages of the majority of these private papers.  
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In addition, Mubarak took a variety of actions to maintain his control over the media 
content including censorship, emergency law, law of shame8, penal codes, and press licensing 
laws (Elmasry, 2011; Elmasry, Basioni & ElKamel, 2014; Rugh 2004). The emergency law not 
only allowed Mubarak to censor all forms of expression, it also allowed the government to 
punish any journalist who stepped out of line. According to the literature, Egypt is considered 
one of the few countries that permit the arrest of journalists for defamation. This is even though 
the Egyptian Constitution guarantees freedom of the press (Mabrook, 2010). Additionally, the 
Penal Code’s article 185 allows the regime to punish anyone who insults a public official either 
by a maximum of one year in prison or a heavy fine up to 10,000 pounds (Elmasry, Basioni & 
ElKamel, 2014; Mabrook, 2010). This defamation punishment was then expanded to two years 
in prison or an outrageous fine of 20,000 pounds (Mabrook, 2010). Mubarak also passed another 
law prohibiting any criticism—let alone attack or insult—of the president and his family or of 
the armed forces. Breach of these laws was considered a threat to national security and allowed 
the regime to ban newspapers as well as arrest journalists and political opponents without trials. 
These violations of journalists’ rights were common under Mubarak. Human rights organizations 
documented many of the violations including the arrest of 175 journalists between 1996 and 
1999 under the guise of endangering national security (El Zahed, 2012; Elmasry, 2011).  
As a result of these red lines that no editor or journalist in the national, private, or 
independent media could cross under any condition, many journalists were discouraged from 
criticizing political elites and were forced to practise self-censorship to protect themselves from 																																																								8	Following the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1979, President Sadat faced excessive criticism 
both at home and in the Arab region. To control domestic pressures and criticism, Sadat instituted a series of 
measures including—what he called—the Law of Shame, a code that was used to punish his political opponents 
under the claim of protecting Egyptian national values. Insulting the dignity of the state and offending the sensibility 
of the public by publishing ‘insulting images or words’ were regarded as shameful crimes. Upon conviction, a 
person can be subject to imprisonment or prohibition from leaving the country.  	
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getting into serious trouble with the regime and to protect their publications from being banned 
(El Zahed, 2012; Elmasry, 2012). According to El Issawi (2014a), self-censorship has become an 
engrained habit among most of the Egyptian journalists who see themselves as serving the 
interests of the ruling elites rather than serving the Egyptian peoples. On the other hand, the three 
state-owned national papers (Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar, and Al-Jumhuriya) continued their full 
support of the regime while occasionally criticizing its policies in order to seem unbiased in front 
of the international and national communities (Rugh, 2004; Ibrahim, 2012). Mubarak’s regime 
not only had control over the press inside Egypt, but also over the import of print media from 
abroad. For example, newspapers from abroad were not allowed to enter Egypt without 
permission, which enabled the government to impose its restrictions on all imported print media.  
This historical overview indicates that although Sadat and Mubarak’s eras witnessed 
more press diversity than Nasser’s era, they both continued to exercise control over the media 
through laws, intimidation of journalists, and the banning and shutdown of newspapers (Rugh, 
2004). Under Nasser, the media was transformed into a tool that only serves the interests of the 
regime and voices its discourse (El Issawi, 2014a). There was absolutely no freedom of 
expression in this era as no one was allowed to criticize or oppose the president or his regime. 
This continued until Sadat came to office and gradually broke the control of state-owned media, 
and then introduced private media to Egypt (El Issawi, 2014a). Sadat allowed some freedom of 
expression and then retook it in his last year (Rugh, 2004). Under Mubarak, the privately owned 
independent press was introduced and allowed to function in Egypt (El Issawi, 2014a). However, 
he passed laws to restrict their freedom of expression and ensured his control over the press 
(Rugh, 2004). Under his rule, approximately 500 newsprint publications and broadcast entities 
existed in Egypt and the government controlled most of them fully or partly (Perreault, 2010, 
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p.12). Mubarak’s regime exercised control to varying degrees over the content of most of these 
publications (Perreault, 2010, p.121; Rugh, 2004).  
However, having full control over the content of the private press was not as easy for the 
government, especially after the introduction of the Internet and social and mobile media 
(Khamis, 2011). This is not to say that oppositional and independent newspapers have more 
influence than national papers; however, they did add diversity to the content and journalistic 
style of Egyptian press by focusing on the everyday problems of ordinary Egyptians. Yet, they 
have never been exempted from governmental restrictions and control. According to media 
analysts, these newspapers experienced a lot of financial problems throughout the years, which 
forced its owners to rely on governmental financial support and consequently to avoid criticism 
of the regime (Rugh, 2004; Ibrahim, 2012). The government took advantage of this financial 
dependence to control these newspapers and keep their critics within acceptable limits.  
However, some oppositional newspapers with better financial sources were able to 
criticize the government to a certain extent, and thus discussed more diverse issues not brought 
up by national newspapers. Yet, they were not overly critical of the government and were extra 
cautious not to be seen as critical of Mubarak and his family (Elmasry, 2011). This further 
deteriorated the state of the press over the ruling years of three different Egyptian presidents, 
which led some media experts to call the media system in Egypt from 1952-2011 a “one man 
show” (Khamis, 2011). However, it was also referred to as a “transitional system” because of its 
instability and the different superficial shifts that have occurred throughout its pages since the 
Revolution of 1952 (Rugh, 2004). According to El Zahed (2012), the Egyptian press is 
considered transitional because its content reflects both subordination and freedom of expression.  
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When the January 25th Revolution took place in 2011, Egyptians had a lot of hope that it 
would bring positive change and freedom to the media, but people’s expectations vanished as 
political repression continued and policies that silenced journalists were augmented during the 
difficult time of transition (El Issawi, 2014a). The Egyptian press has witnessed a difficult 
political transition in the wake of the Revolution of January 25th as a result of the hasty political 
changes that took place in the country at that time. These swift changes put Egyptian journalists 
in a difficult position, as they were incapable of coping with the openness of media in the wake 
of the revolution or to practise their profession without restrictions, given that Egyptian 
journalists in both the national media and the private media had never worked independently 
from the political sphere (El Issawi, 2014a).  
In the meantime, the revolution also made the subjugated position of the Egyptian press 
abundantly clear, particularly after the ousting of Mubarak. The sudden change of attitudes 
particularly in national newspapers was scandalous and ironic. Their coverage of Mubarak’s 
overthrow was criticized precisely because all three of the major newspapers had chosen to align 
with the regime throughout the 18 days of the revolution but not with the people. Then when 
Mubarak was removed from power on February 11th, the editors-in-chief of these newspapers 
found themselves in a very complicated situation as it was no longer possible for them to ignore 
what was going on in the Egyptian streets while staying loyal to their removed master. Hence, 
they unexpectedly decided to drop their previous declarations and positions in favor of Mubarak 
and switch to the side of the demonstrators (El Zahed, 2012). On February 12th, Al-Ahram 
congratulated the Egyptian people for the ousting of Mubarak; its headline on that day read: 
“Downfall of Mubarak Regime: Congratulations Egyptian People” (El Zahed, 2012).  
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Al-Ahram’s swift shift was not the only change that happened within the Egyptian media 
field at this time. In the wake of the revolution, other dramatic changes took place in the country 
(Khamis, 2011). While the national press lost much of its credibility as a result of its 
contradictory stance during the revolution, social media and some independent newspapers on 
the other hand, were viewed as more reliable among Egyptians because of their explicit stand in 
favor of the people and the distinguished role it played in mobilizing people and emphasizing 
their problems and demands (El Zahed, 2012).  
This reprieve lasted till Egypt came under the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF). At this time, neither the national press nor the private press was “messing” with 
the SCAF; for journalists, this has always been a red line that they cannot cross with any kind of 
criticism. Therefore, most of the journalists continued to practise self-censorship, to keep 
themselves away from serious troubles in light of the severe repression that was inflicted by the 
Egyptian forces. Those who decided not to be intimidated by this red line and chose to challenge 
the discourse of the SCAF were harshly punished; this included bloggers, talk show hosts, and 
television presenters who were arrested or fired from their work under the guise of insult to the 
military. The SCAF also took other measures against the press in the wake of the revolution. 
This included the closure of the Al Jazeera office in Egypt and the bullying of female protestors 
by forcing them to undergo astoundingly demeaning virginity tests as a punishment for their 
protest against the military (El Issawi, 2014a).  
When President Mohammad Morsi came to office on 30 June 2012, his rule witnessed “a 
hostile relationship between the so-called liberal private media and the new Brotherhood 
government. It also witnessed a high level of diversification of viewpoints in state media 
platforms” (El Issawi, 2014a, p. 41). Morsi was the fifth Egyptian president, but the first 
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president in the country’s history to come to power via democratic elections. He ruled Egypt 
from 30 June 2011 to 3 July 2012 when he was removed from office as a result of a military 
coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the army chief general.  
Although Morsi’s presidential term was brief, some media experts argue that the 
Egyptian press had more freedom during his era because many of the previous restrictions on 
media freedom were eliminated in accordance with the 2012 Egyptian constitution. This 
constitution banned all forms of censorship on Egyptian media except in times of war and 
required a court order for the banning of any media outlet. In addition, the constitution 
established two independent bodies: the first was in charge of supervising media owned by the 
state and the second was tasked with regulating private media (Doss, 2012). Rayman (2013) also 
asserts that studies on newspaper content suggest that under Morsi, the Egyptian press witnessed 
more freedom because many previous restrictions on media operations had been abolished (as 
cited in El-Haddad, 2013, p. 66). Morsi’s decision to ban detention of journalists without trials 
was also seen as a progressive step toward press reform (El Issawi, 2014a).  
However, some other media experts criticized Morsi’s media policies and described him 
as no different from his predecessors (El-Haddad, 2013). They accused him of appointing 
editors-in-chief to national media outlets who sympathized with or were loyal to the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Mabrook, 2010). They called this “Akhwanat” or “Brotherhoodization” of the 
media, claiming that the Muslim Brotherhood was planning to control most of the Egyptian 
institutions to implement their Islamic and conservative ideas and policies (El Issawi, 2014a; 
Elmasry, 2017). These critics intensified their efforts after President Morsi was overthrown in 
2013 as a result of the military coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who became Egypt’s sixth 
president in 2014.  
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 However, currently under el-Sisi’s rule, both state-owned and private media embrace a 
propagandist tabloid style emphasizing sensational narratives demonizing oppositional voices 
and critical opinions (El Issawi, 2014b). This stance is coupled with a continuing tendency to 
vilify not only the Muslim Brotherhood but also the activists of the January 25th revolution 
while ignoring the regime’s human rights violations and any efforts to counter them. Both the 
state and private media have portrayed the military coup as a national rescue operation aimed at 
saving the country from the Muslim Brotherhood, which was labeled a terrorist group. This 
situation has made it difficult for any counter-discourse to find a place for itself in the 
mainstream media. By embracing a propagandist style, the independent media has nullified the 
distinction between state and private media and “lost its main raison d’etre, that of providing 
different and diversified media narratives” (El Issawi, 2014a, p. 61). Since then, except for a few 
soft voices, no criticism of the media or the regime has been heard. Both private and national 
newspapers returned to their old habit of self-censorship while resuming their service of the 
regime and not the people (Abdulla, 2014), leaving space for social media to play its role as the 
only platform that allows diversity and counter-discourse (El Issawi, 2014a).  
5.1.2 Egyptian Broadcasting 
 Egypt had the most powerful and influential radio broadcasting in the Arab world; it 
began broadcasting in May 1934. At the time, many Egyptians regarded radio as a major source 
of entertainment and information and was more popular than the press due to the high rates of 
illiteracy. This popularity urged Nasser to use the medium as a means to reach not only 
Egyptians but also Arab audiences in the region. In 1953, the Voice of the Arabs (Sawt el-Arab) 
began broadcasting, and its programs played a significant role in promoting Nasser’s socialist 
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ideology (Nasserism) and establishing him as the leader of the Arab region inside and outside 
Egypt (Chiba, 2009).  
 The first Egyptian television broadcast occurred in 1960. Since the beginning of 
broadcasting, it has been clear that the medium will be used to serve the regime’s interests. The 
broadcast began with verses from the Qur’an followed by a speech by President Nasser, a clear 
sign that the television would be under the control of the state (Napoli, 1995 in Amin & Napoli, 
1999). However, using the various mediums of the media as propaganda tools was not new to the 
government; ever since the country gained its independence from British colonization in 1952, 
Egyptian rulers have recognized the media’s significant influence in mobilizing the people and 
shaping their views (Abdulla, 2014). And because television has been deemed more powerful 
and influential than both the press and radio (Amin & Napoli, 1999), the government highly 
relied on it in shaping public opinion and establishing consent. In the name of national 
development, a top-down media policy was adopted in Egypt and the government was allowed 
full control over both radio and television (Chiba, 2009). As with newspapers—which were 
nationalized under Nasser and turned into mouthpieces for the regime—Nasser’s government 
monopolized the broadcast sector and ensured that it served its political needs and agenda. Both 
radio and television were used as means to reach Egyptians, and “evoke enthusiasm for the 
social, political, and economic changes he (Nasser) was fighting” (Abdulla, 2014; Rugh, 2004, p. 
188).  
 On July 1960, the first Egyptian channel (Channel 5) began broadcasting; this was 
followed by Channel 7 in 1961. Whereas the first channel focused on educational and 
developmental programs, Channel 7 focused on religious and entertainment programs. On 1963, 
a third channel (Channel 9) was established for foreigners living in Egypt, but it didn’t last for a 
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long time; it ceased broadcasting shortly after the war with Israel in 1967 (Chiba, 2009). At this 
time, programs from the Soviet Union replaced US and British programs in the aftermath of the 
breakdown of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the two countries. However, after the war 
of 1973, the Egyptian government changed its international orientation toward the West under 
Sadat; this led to an intensive resumption of Western programming, particularly from the US, on 
Egyptian television (Amin & Napoli, 1999).  
 In 1970, one month before his death, aiming to extend the government’s control over 
radio and television, Nasser established the state-owned Egyptian Radio and Television Union 
(ERTU) as the control and regulatory body of all terrestrial channels. In 1979 under Sadat, and 
1989 under Mubarak, the Minister of Information was granted absolute power over the 
organization by appointing him as the chair of the ERTU’s general assembly, the main body 
supervising the institution. The Minister of Information was also assigned the responsibility for 
appointing the institution’s high officials and employees to ensure their loyalty to the regime 
(Abdulla, 2014 & El Issawi, 2014a). Moreover, the ERTU was financially dependent on the 
government, which was enough to maintain this loyalty and eliminate any chances of freedom of 
expression (Abdulla, 2014). Through the ERTU, the Egyptian government was able to supervise 
and control the content of all the Egyptian terrestrial TV channels; subsequently, Egyptian 
viewers only have been exposed to TV programs that explicitly reflect the government’s views 
(Chiba, 2009). Given  this, there is sufficient evidence that indicates that through the 1970s and 
1980s, the Egyptian government was significantly influencing people’s views and perceptions 
through its control of the ERTU. This situation continued until 1990 with the appearance of 
satellite TV channels. Prior to this, Egyptian viewers had been unable to watch TV channels 
other than state-controlled national TV stations that echoed the government’s views.  
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 The 1990s witnessed a television revolution in Egypt as major developments took place 
including the introduction of CNN, the launch of Al Jazeera, and the advent of the Internet 
(Abdulla, 2014; Rugh, 2004). As with print media, Mubarak’s regime provided television media 
with more freedom than that of Nasser and Sadat. Unlike Nasser, the media under Mubarak’s 
rule was not “acting in a way consistent with some ideological position …” but was rather 
“reacting reflexively to various political pressures of the moment such as the perceived need to 
protect the high, the mighty, and their relatives …” (Amin & Napoli, 1999, pp. 186-187). Under 
Mubarak’s rule, a new policy of “open window” was adopted, which allowed the people to 
purchase or rent satellite dishes and subsequently access broadcasting programs from Western 
countries (Amin & Napoli, 1999, p. 183). This is not to say that the structural or ownership 
patterns of state-controlled terrestrial television in Egypt changed or developed. It is true that the 
number of state terrestrial channels extended by 2001 from two channels to eight after the ERTU 
established six more local digital channels between 1999 and 2001; however, these channels 
remained under the government’s full control (Rugh, 2004).  
 However, the launch of private satellite TV ventures and the introduction of cable 
television—which provided diverse alternative sources of news—represented a challenge to the 
monopoly exercised by Egyptian television. Before then, Western international radio broadcasts 
in Arabic—which included the BBC, Voice of America, and Radio Monte Carlo—were the only 
alternative sources of news for Egyptians and most of the Arab world, particularly at times of 
crises (Rugh, 2004; El Issawi, 2014a). Aiming to broadcast Cable News Network International 
(CNNI) in Egypt, cable television—a subscription TV system—was introduced to the country in 
1990 when the Egyptian government agreed to establish Cable News Egypt (CNE) in 
cooperation with CNNI (Amin & Napoli, 1999). When CNN presentation began in 1991 through 
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its live coverage of the Gulf War, its new style and format changed the expectations of the 
viewers who were used to a formal, less-captivating style of the newscast that was read by 
broadcasters and centered around meetings of the president and officials. Faced with the fear of 
losing its viewership, the Egyptian broadcast changed the style and format of its news programs 
and adjusted to the attractive production style of CNN (Amin & Napoli, 1999).  
 On the other hand, the availability of direct-home broadcast services, as well as satellite 
broadcasting, allowed Egyptian viewers to watch European and US programs. The flow of 
Western information in Egypt, a society where social values derive from religious traditions, 
raised worries and concerns among gatekeepers of what was seen as a cultural invasion of 
Western cultural products. To counter the influence of Western broadcasting on Egyptian 
culture, Egypt launched the Egyptian Space Channel (ESC), the first satellite TV channel in the 
Arab world, in 1990; this was followed by Nile TV International, an English-language network. 
However, they derived the content of its political programs from the content of Egyptian 
terrestrial channels (Abdulla, 2014; Amin & Napoli, 1999; Rugh, 2004).  
 The introduction of satellite broadcast and cable television was coupled with another 
major broadcasting development in 1996 when the first around-the-clock Arab news channel, Al 
Jazeera, was launched. Founded by the Emir of Qatar, the channel was highly credited for 
broadcasting the first Arab talk shows and bringing professional television journalism to the 
Arab audience. In a market desirous of news that did not echo the government and promote its 
ideology, Al Jazeera became the alternative to news programs for many Egyptian viewers 
because of its extensive news coverage, its current affairs and commentary programs, and its 
political programs that discussed sensitive and controversial issues that other Arab channels 
would not dare to touch, let alone cover in any in-depth way. Not only were Egyptian viewers 
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drawn to Al Jazeera, but the all-news satellite channel became the Arab world’s most widely 
watched newscast. With its coverage in Arabic, centered on Arab interests and concerns, it 
became even more appealing to Arab viewers than the CNN broadcasts (Rugh, 2004). Al 
Jazeera’s availability changed the region’s television landscape by introducing a level of freedom 
of speech on TV that was previously unheard of in most of the Arab world and therefore was 
considered the only politically independent television station in the Middle East (Rugh, 2004).  
 However, with the introduction of satellite television, Egyptian viewers were exposed to 
alternative sources of news, making it impossible for state television to continue concealment of 
information. This situation encouraged Egypt to launch its new NileSat 101 in 1998 followed by 
NileSat 202 in 2000, despite its extremely high cost, estimated at $158 million, a step that 
enabled the country for the first time to broadcast and produce its own channels. Currently, the 
Nile TV broadcasts from the satellite include Nile Drama, Nile News, Nile Sports, Nile Culture, 
Nile Children as well as other educational channels (Amin & Napoli, 1999). 
 Other Arab satellite channels followed the ESC including the Middle East Broadcasting 
Corporation (MBC), which was launched from London in 1991 but moved to Dubai in 1998. 
MBC was owned by two Saudi businessmen, Sheikh Salih Kamel, and Shaikh Walid Ibrahimem, 
both of whom have ties with the Saudi royal family, which suggests that the “royal family 
quietly supported this MBC venture financially for political reasons, in order to support a pan-
Arab media channel which would be friendly to Saudi Arabia” (Rugh, 2004, p. 212). Unlike the 
Egyptian channel, MBC was the first privately owned broadcasting channel in the Arab world 
but was followed by other Arab private satellite channels. One such channel was the ART, which 
was founded by Saudi Prince, Walid bin Talal—one of the wealthiest people in the world and a 
close relative of the king—and Sheikh Salih Kamel in 1994 after he sold his share of MBC.  
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In the same year, a Saudi group of businessmen established the pan-Arab satellite TV 
channel, “Orbit.” In 2003, aiming to compete with Al Jazeera, Sheikh Salih Kamel—together 
with other Arab businessmen from Saudi Arabia and Lebanon—launched an all-news channel, 
named Al-Arabia (Rugh, 2004).  It was CNN’s coverage of the war on Iraq that helped the Arab 
governments to recognize the influential role that satellite television could play in shaping the 
Arab world’s views and perceptions. Some Saudi media moguls made it clear that they were 
more concerned about promoting their ideologies than making financial profits when they 
founded their private satellite channels. Being pioneers of private entertainment broadcasting did 
not deter these same media tycoons from investing in private conservative religious channels. In 
1998, Saudi billionaire businessman, Salih Kamel, the owner of the ART channel, founded the 
religious satellite channel, Iqraa, the most widely watched Arab religious TV station. A few 
years later, in 2006, Iqraa was followed by another private religious channel, Al-Risalah. The 
fact that Saudi media moguls own the two most widely viewed private religious channels, 
suggests Saudi’s religious hegemony in the region (Elouardaoui, 2013). In 2006, another Saudi 
businessman, Mansur Bin Kadsah founded Al-Nas religious satellite channel in Egypt. The 
channel began as an entertainment channel and then shifted its focus to religion, a few months 
later.  
 This dissertation’s findings show that Saudi businessmen have pioneered the 
establishment of private channels because they had the financial means to set up such expensive 
projects and because they recognized the power of these channels vis-à-vis their private interests. 
However, despite its media-pioneer role in the Arab region, Egypt was not at the forefront of 
Arab countries in terms of private satellite channels. Private satellite channels were not allowed 
in Egypt until 2000 because the Egyptian government did not want any kind of competition in 
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broadcasting (Amin & Napoli, 1999). However, even after allowing private channels, private 
licenses were only granted to wealthy businessmen who had close ties with Mubarak’s regime.  
The first private satellite channel to be established in Egypt, in 2001, was Dream 
Television, owned by the prominent businessman Ahmad Bahghat, a real estate investor. Dream 
TV was followed by El-Mehwar in 2002, which is owned by Hassan Rateb, a cement business 
tycoon, and Al-Hayat, owned by el-Sayed Badawi, the head of al-Wafd political party. The 
liberal television station OnTV, established in 2008, was co-owned by Nagib Sawiris, an 
important business tycoon investing in media, but he sold it out when President Morsi came to 
power (El Issawi, 2014a; Rugh, 2004). These channels provided some of the most popular 
evening talk shows in the Arab world enabling Egyptian viewers to rely on alternative sources of 
news that discussed sensitive political matters although in a restrained way (Rugh, 2004). This 
has helped create a more diversified and less monotone discourse, although in a way that first 
and foremost serves the interests of the wealthy owners of these media outlets and voices their 
perceptions (Abdulla, 2014; El Issawi, 2014a).  
In sum, it could be said that despite the fact that the private satellite TV channels in 
Egypt, as well as those in the Arab world, have played a role in providing diversified voices and 
providing some outlet within the state control, these channels did not affect the democratization 
process (Elouardaoui, 2013). Due to the state’s censorship laws, as well as the impact of the 
close ties between the TV private channels and the ruling regimes whether in Egypt or Saudi 
Arabia, the level of neutrality of these channels in relation to news coverage is very questionable 
(Elouardaoui, 2013). “Instead of being an agent for democratization, the nascent bourgeoisie 
[particularly the business owners] in Egypt has become, in fact, a major foundation of support 
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for an authoritarian regime” (Abdel-Khalek and Al Sayyid, as cited in Elouardaoui, 2013, p. 
107).  
According to Gouda Abdel-Khalek and Mustapha K. Al Sayyid (p.107), media moguls 
were one of the main social groups in Egypt that showed support to the ousted regime of 
Mubarak during the revolution, which was due to their close ties with Mubarak and the ruling 
National Democratic Party. Through their private channels, they propagated a discourse that 
vilified the al-Tahrir demonstrators, portrayed them as “foreign agents”, and depicted their 
demands as conflicting with Egypt’s economic and political interests, and leading to instability 
and lack of security. However, attempting to regain credibility, after the ousting of Mubarak, 
these channels had no option other than shifting from the propaganda voice of Mubarak’s regime 
to the protestors’ side; they opened their airways to protestors including the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the youth-focused activism groups (Elouardaoui, 2013). This situation did not last for long. 
After the arrival of President Morsi to power, both state and private media started propagating an 
anti-Islam discourse creating a media war between the Islamic pro-Brotherhood camp and the 
self-acclaimed liberal anti- Brotherhood camp (El Issawi, 2014b). “Many private news owners, 
many of whom were sympathetic to Egypt’s ancien régime, enthusiastically embraced anti-
Brotherhood politicians and analysts, and news professionals uncritically adopted anti-
Brotherhood narratives” (Elmasry, 2017, p. 197).  
One of the main critical anti-Brotherhood-government platforms was Bassem Youssef’s 
satirical TV show, El Bernameg. “Youssef’s programme frequently ridiculed the government 
with direct criticism of these alleged plans to sell off national interests for the sake of regional 
connections, especially with Qatar” (El Issawi, 2014a, p. 59).   
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 This situation reveals the extent to which these businessmen have been using these TV 
stations to shape public opinion for the regime’s interest. It also suggests that Egyptians’ views 
of the world are significantly influenced and shaped not only by the state but also by the 
Egyptian and Arab elites and businessmen who own these channels, especially in a country such 
as Egypt where television is regarded as the most influential medium. It is true that television 
broadcasting has lost ground to the Internet; yet, with the high rates of illiteracy, Egyptian 
television continues to have an excellent penetration, much better than that of newspapers and 
remains an important source of entertainment, culture, and information (Amin & Napoli, 1999; 
Mabrook, 2010).  
 The Internet was introduced to Egypt in 1993, providing people with a new democratic 
and decentralized tool; its use became so widespread that its impact surpassed that of satellite 
channel (Abdulla, 2014). With the Internet, Egyptians were able not only to access a vast amount 
of information and international news sources, but also to become news producers through social 
media and blogs. The introduction of the Internet makes it difficult for Egyptian businessmen 
and policymakers to have a firm control over information on the one hand, and makes it 
impossible on the other hand for the government to censor or control information due to the 
unlimited access to information and quick spread of news through email and, later, social media 
(Abdulla, 2014).  
 Generally speaking, satellite television offered Egyptian viewers the chance, for the first 
time, to see the world through non-Egyptian-state lenses. It was a shift from state-centered 
broadcasting to regional television with multiple languages and multiple subjectivities (Elseewi, 
2017). However, this review reveals that despite the fact that the introduction of satellite 
broadcasting to Egypt in the 1990s has decentralized and denationalized the Egyptian media, and 
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has introduced the viewers to alternative sources of news and information, this did not result in 
major changes in the role the media plays in society as a source of news, culture, and 
entertainment. Nor did it result in major changes in the policy of the Egyptian government in 
using the media as a tool of public mobilization and propaganda. Although the state media 
continues to serve the regime rather than the people, private satellite broadcasting serves to 
advance the economic, political, and cultural interests of the Egyptian and Arab businessmen 
who own them and the interests of their allies (El Issawi, 2014a).  
 This chapter has discussed the institutional and political restraints that have an impact on 
the production of Egyptian media narratives with an emphasis on notions of hegemony and 
power. The discursive and social dimensions have been analyzed on the ground “of seeing social 
practice as something which people actively produce and make sense of on the basis of shared 
commonsense procedures” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 72). Thus, in addition to the examination of the 
linguistic dimension of the visual data, the next chapter (six) aims to discover what genres and 
discourses were drawn upon in producing the text, and what traces of them are there in the text? 
It also tries to explore whether the different discourse types analyzed in this dissertation are 
heterogeneous and if and if yes, how. 
5.2 Conclusion  
 This chapter shows how the Egyptian government has realized, ever since the 
introduction of the press to Egypt, the pivotal role of media in the mobilization of the masses and 
the manufacturing of culture and knowledge. Specifically, the television broadcast, the more 
popular media form in Egypt, was regarded as a key tool of ‘citizen education’ and ‘public 
information’ (Abu Lughod, 2005, p. 10). Therefore, controlling and dominating the mass media 
in general and television broadcasting in particular was a permanent concern for Egypt’s rulers. 
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Even when the state allowed the introduction of private media, it was careful to issue laws and 
restrictions ensuring the subordination and loyalty of its owners. As a result, the Egyptian media 
institution, both governmental and private, has always been in the service of the ruling authority 
and the elite businessmen rather than the Egyptian people.  
 A good example of this state hegemony over the media is evident in the Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, which reviews how some particular negative notions were attached to the two terms 
“Islam” and “Muslims,” which cannot truly be grasped in a definition. Almost all of the literature 
illustrates that since the arrival of President Nasser to power, Islam has never been positively 
represented in the Egyptian press, cinema, and television broadcasting. Although political Islam, 
and political Muslims specifically, have received the biggest share of this misrepresentation, 
Islam and Muslim conservatives have also got a portion of this negative coverage. While Islam 
has been attributed to violence, and backwardness and has been represented as being at odds with 
modernity and democracy, Muslim conservatives have been depicted as inherently violent, 
irrational, lazy, and backward.  
 This dissertation argues that the discourse used in both state and private television 
broadcasting seeks to alienate Islam and represent it as having a conflict with Egyptian culture. 
To achieve this, arguably, Egyptian intelligentsia uses an Orientalist form of discourse in their 
portrayal of Islam. However, as this review shows, the construction of Islam as the “Other” of 
the Egyptian society is not something new to the Egyptian mass media. Attempts to alienate 
Islam and conservative Muslims have occurred under President Nasser, in the 1950s and 1960s, 
as well as in the 1990s, under President Mubarak during his conflict with a small faction of 
extremists. Egyptian secularized intelligentsia, seeking to secularize the society and marginalize 
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the role and place of Islam in Egyptians’ everyday life, have been the leaders of these mass 
media anti-Islam campaigns.  
 The relationship between intellectuals and the industry of culture has been a concern to 
numerous scholars and philosophers. Gramsci was one of those philosophers who questioned 
their role in the manufacturing of power. He states, “Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is 
necessarily an educational relationship” within which intellectuals play a major role in the 
production, reproduction, and transformation of power (cited in Abu Lughod, 2005, p. 9). The 
remaining pages of this dissertation examine the role of the Egyptian secularized intelligentsia in 
the cultural industry. By analyzing some of the most popular and widely viewed late-night TV 
shows, this dissertation investigates and elaborates on the ways in which various meanings of 
Islamophobia inform the making of Islam in the Egyptian mainstream media. It inquires into 
how the established Egyptian late-night television shows’ discourse on Islam has fueled the so-
called “war on terrorism,” meanwhile shaping and paving the way for public acceptance of the 
government’s unprecedented human rights violations.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
 6.1 Overview  
 The discussion in Chapter 5 on social and discursive practices concludes that the 
Egyptian media institution has always been in the service of the ruling authority and elite 
businessmen rather than the Egyptian people. Even when the state allowed the introduction of 
private media, it was careful to issue laws and restrictions ensuring the subordination and loyalty 
of its owners. As a result, “Islam” has never been positively represented in Egyptian press, 
cinema, and television broadcasting since President Nasser came to power. Although political 
Islam, and political Muslims specifically, have received the biggest share of this 
misrepresentation, “Islam” and “observant Muslims” have also got a portion of this negative 
coverage—as the literature illustrates (Chapter 2).9  
 This chapter explores the ways in which meanings on “Islam” and “observant Muslims” 
are linguistically constructed in the national discourse of post-military coup Egypt and whether 
the analysis yields a similar conclusion to that of the discursive and social analysis. I drew on 
Fairclough’s (1992) proposed tools of analysis to investigate the linguistic features of the 
analyzed data with a focus on: 1) lexicalization; 2) grammar; and 3) ethos. The chapter begins 
with an analysis of the textual data with the aim of exploring how lexicalization, grammar, and 
ethos were used in the TV shows under study to construct meanings on “Islam.” The focus of 
																																																								9	This chapter is based in part on the previously published book chapter listed below:  
   El Zahed, S. (2019). Internalized Islamophobia: The making of Islam in the Egyptian media. In E. Baurakli & F.  
   Hafez (Eds.), Islamophobia in Muslim majority societies (pp. 137-160). London & New York: Routledge. 
 		
102	
this chapter is to discuss and answer the first research question and sub-questions posed by this 
dissertation:  
1) What are the dominant national narratives constructing “Islam” and “observant Muslims” 
in the Egyptian media between June 2012 and April 2018?  
o How is “Egyptian-ness” represented in the mainstream media?  
o How is the struggle to defend Egypt’s values and civilization portrayed?  
o How are processes of modernization and democratization of Egypt represented? 
 In the following section, I highlight instances in post-Arab Spring Egypt where “Islam,” 
despite being the religion of the majority of Egyptian citizens, is depicted as static, irrational, and 
uncivilized by Egyptian self-acclaimed liberals. I demonstrate different cases where Egyptian 
secular “liberals” and members of the ruling class propagate rhetoric that shows a deep 
internalization of Western Orientalism and Islamophobia. 
6.2 Dominant Narrative on “Observant Muslims” 
 In its persistent attempts to build its “modern” identity, post-colonial Egypt has gone 
through various stages since the late 18th century that involved reviewing and changing many of 
its common cultural, social, and religious concepts, customs, and narratives. This was 
accompanied by arguments and disagreements between the “secular liberal” movement and the 
“progressive Muslim” voices over the role Islam should play in society in light of these changes. 
Since then, Egyptian “liberals” have always stressed that they are the guardians of the 
“modernizing process” in the Egyptian modern nation-state, which according to them can only 
be achieved by imitating the Western secular model that separates state from Church.  
 Attempts by “liberals” to “modernize” and thus marginalize the place of “Islam in the 
society had begun long before the Arab Spring; nevertheless, its effects proved limited because 
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of Egyptians for whom religion is a constantly renewed source of aspiration. However, with the 
technological advances, growing media impact, and conducive political conditions, these 
attempts have reappeared and reasserted themselves in the period following the Arab Spring— 
but with a fierceness unparalleled in the past, particularly after the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
declaration to run for elections and el-Sisi’s call for religious reformation.  
Since then, the question of the Muslim identity of the Egyptian population and the place 
of Islam and Islamic culture in Egyptian society has become the focus of intense national debate 
among Egyptian secular Western-oriented elites. They established a new national narrative to 
construct the main features of Egypt’s new post-Arab Spring identity. For the greater part, the 
post-military coup national narrative has revolved around the political myth of the “two nations” 
according to which the country has been divided into two groups: 1) the “us” group, consisting 
of Egyptians who support the military regime and who agree that Islam should not be practised 
in the public sphere; and 2) the group of “they” or “observant Muslims” who are excluded from 
the first group and hence have no rightful place in the political arena. The centrality of the “two-
nations” narrative in the public sphere has led to the establishment of a post-Arab Spring 
exclusionary national discourse in which “Islam” and religiously “observant Muslims” in 
general, and political “Islamists” in particular, are: prohibited from playing any significant public 
role; and presented as the main obstacle to Egypt’s stability, security, and modernization. 
Meanwhile, the Western rational scientific approach has been introduced as the only way to fulfil 
the national end.  
 To construct this particular understanding of the “two nations,” the Egyptian secular 
“liberals” and the ruling elites have increasingly used Islamophobic themes in their 
representation of “Islam” and “Muslims,” which has significantly influenced the construction of 
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the new national discourse on Islam. In this section, I highlight the core features of the Egyptian 
post-Arab Spring discourse of the “two nations” and the de-Egyptianization of Muslims, and the 
ways in which Egyptian Islamophobic knowledge was established with the aim to otherize 
observant Muslims and exclude “Islam” from playing any significant role in Egypt’s national 
identity formation.  
 6.2.1 The National Narrative of the “Two Nations” 
 This new national narrative of the “two nations” excludes “observant Muslims” and 
downplays the role of “Islam” as a constitutive element of Egyptian national identity by 
presenting the religion of the majority of the population as an “outsider” within Egypt and as a 
foremost reason for Egypt’s decline and deterioration. It is in the context of this narrative that the 
image of Egypt as a liberal and secular civil state has been established in the public discourse.  
This narrative has the following three dominant discourses: “observant Muslims” are 
considered to be the “Other” in Egyptian society; Islam creates problems, reinforcing terrorism 
and backwardness; and the Muslim legacy is shameful and fabricated. Along with a number of 
other sub-discourses, these three discourses constructed “Islam” as a static, violent, and primitive 
religion that causes problems on a global scale by radicalizing its adherents and reinforcing 
ignorance, irrationality, and superstitions among them. In addition, it depicts religiously 
observant Muslims as an entity that is “ignorant,” “primitive,” “irrational,” “aggressive,” “lazy,” 
and “enemies of art, life, and beauty,” and as such seeks to distract the society from its 
civilizational mission by rejecting the Western rational approach and adhering to the Islamic 
model. Together, these Islamophobic discourses—as discussed below—constructed “Islam” as a 
violent religion that is incompatible with modernity, science, reform, and co-existence with 
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others and thus constructed an Islamophobic environment in which people with any affiliation 
with Islamic identity are finding it increasingly difficult to be engaged in Egyptian society. 
 6.2.2 “Observant Muslims” as the “Other”  
 After the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of the Muslim Brotherhood announced its 
intention to run for elections, an uncharacteristic and evident surge surfaced in the Egyptian state 
and on private TV channels with regards to their preoccupation with the subject of Islam. This 
surge increased following the arrival of President Mohammad Morsi to power in June 2012. 
Although knowledgeable Islamic scholars and experts were excluded from the picture, secular 
“liberals” were unrestrictedly allowed to speak for Islam. Since Morsi’s first day in office, the 
main and only concern of the media with its various forms was the Islamic affiliation and 
religious thought of the head of state and the possible impact these could have on the state. 
Meanwhile, the supporters of President Morsi were portrayed as the “low-class and close-minded 
conservative people” and discussions around the president’s plan to give them the lead and 
control of the country in place of the elites and middle-class people circulated over the popular 
media (Sybrotherterrorism1, 2012). Thus, constant messages that warned Egyptians of the dark 
future of their nation under the Islamic-oriented president and his supporters (i.e., religiously 
observant Muslims) became the favored subject of discussions and debates in the media.  
 In the same vein, a new narrative of “two nations” was constructed through their 
representation of the religiously observant Muslim as “the Other” who does not look, speak, or 
think like Egyptians. All this with the aim of influencing public opinion such that it would 
become more accepting not only of the military coup against the first democratically elected 
president, Mohammad Morsi, but also of the massacre of the opponents of the coup d’état at 
Raba’a and El-Nahda squares. According to this particular narrative, Egyptians were divided 
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into two groups: “Egyptians” and “the other” (i.e., pro-Morsi group). This divisive narrative 
aided in the turning of diversity and difference of opinion within Egyptian society into 
polarization by excluding not only politically engaged Muslims from the society but also average 
observant Muslim Egyptians and portraying them as the “Other.”  
 A noteworthy example could be seen in Adeeb’s show Al Qahira El-Yawm aired on El-
Yawm Channel. Al Qahira El-Yawm is one of the most popular talk shows in Egypt and the Arab 
world. One of the pioneers, it has been on air for 20 years broadcasting five days a week for 
three hours every day. It has millions of viewers in Egypt and the Arab world. The program 
monitors the latest important news and daily events in various fields, whether political, 
economic, artistic, or social. It also discusses the latest and most important news in the press 
through a special section for the press. The program is broadcast at 9:30 pm (Cairo time) on Al-
Yom TV, which is part of the Orbit Showtime network.  
 Adeeb’s television show is pertinent to this dissertation because it is considered one of 
the most influential programs that helped promote the “two-nation” narrative—in other words, 
the de-Egyptianization of observant Muslims. In 2012, it launched a particularly vile campaign 
against what he called the “other” people. In an episode aired on 1 August 2012, Adeeb clearly 
otherizes and demonizes the people who support President Morsi as the class “unleashed.” He 
says, 
 Revolution always brings new classes in the place of old classes… Nowadays, I could 
 say that we had a revolution because there is a new class that has indeed replaced the old 
 class. It was the middle class and upper middle class that used to rule Egypt. I am now 
 saying that there is a new class that was unleashed ... There is a class that wasn’t allowed 
 to enter certain areas. The class that now exists is someone else who looks different. A 
 decision was made to unleash this class because it is the victorious-class in this 
 revolution. ...The question now is who should decide the fate of the country? Is it the mob 
 or the elite? What will happen is that many of these people will be given the decision of 
 the fate of the  country, in the coming times. In other words, we are lagging because the 
 mobs are the ones who rule …This is dirty! The country is getting dirty. Nobody will 
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 control them, and their numbers will increase; the religious trend will increase. ...  The 
 country is lagging. The whole world is progressing, and you (observant Muslims) are 
 returning backward. Your experience is lagging and bitch. You are heading to darkness 
 and garbage. (Sybrotherterrorism1, 2012)  
 
 6.2.3 Egyptians Who Support President Morsi as “the Class Unleashed” 
 As shown in this segment, which was aired only two months after President Morsi’s 
inauguration, Adeeb went on to represent liberal Egyptians and to put the Egyptian people on 
notice that Egypt’s safety and security cannot be compromised by a group of irrational and 
primitive observant Muslims just because they won the elections. Adeeb, who for the first time 
speaks freely of a sitting Egyptian president, gave rhetoric to what the country is going through, 
a situation that, according to Adeeb, is a direct result of the arrival of the Islamic-oriented 
president and his decision to allow the mob to lead the country. “The question now is who should 
decide the fate of the country? Is it the mob or the elite?” he asks, and then went on to stress that 
the country is lagging because the mobs are the ones who rule. 
6.2.4 A Call of the self-acclaimed “Liberals”  
 Adeeb’s remarks suggest that Egyptian society is divided into two sets of hierarchal 
social categories, with Morsi and his followers belonging to the lower class and members of 
other anti-Morsi groups—assumedly the liberals—belonging to the upper and middle classes. 
Adeeb asserts that not many Egyptians understand what works for the good of the country 
because the majority of the people who voted for Morsi are illiterate. Only the enlightened few, 
including himself, understand and foresee the possible ramifications of an Islamic-oriented 
president on a state such as Egypt. “The majority of Egyptians do not mind or even wish to be 
beaten with a large baton thinking that this is God’s right,” Adeeb stresses in reference to 
President Morsi’s supporters suggesting that Sharī’ah (Islamic law) would be applied soon. For 
him, this entails Egyptian people being beaten with batons.  
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What Adeeb is trying to say here is that democracy is not for Egyptians because they are 
illiterate and live below the poverty line and thus do not know what serves their interest. They 
need guardians such as the elites to represent them, decide for them, and undoubtedly control 
them because these people—if left without direction—favor being led with a baton because this 
is the only language they understand. Egyptians, according to him, are not yet ready for for 
democracy and thus should not be allowed to decide and govern. Determining, leading, and 
controlling should be relinquished to the elites with the few enlightened as the sole trustees.  
Therefore, Adeeb believes, the new president and his mob should be removed from 
power even if he came to office by democratic elections. Ruling the country is the business of the 
elites, not the crowd, according to this liberal who believes that when the mobs take control, they 
lead the country to disaster, and this is precisely what is taking place in Egypt under President 
Morsi. “The question now is who should decide the fate of the country, the mob or the elite”? 
“What will happen is that many of these people will decide the fate of people in the coming 
times.” “Are they the ones who will decide? Yeah! Everyone who wants something will do it.” 
“Will we allow the mob to control us?” Adeeb asks and swiftly answers his rhetorical questions. 
“These people” have to be stopped and controlled; otherwise, they will proliferate and become 
uncontrollable, Adeeb advocates. 
 Using words and phrases such as “unleash,” “uncontrollable,” “increasing numbers,” and 
“the religious trend will increase,” suggests that the situation will not stop there, but will get 
worse especially with the rise of Muslims who do not wish to follow the principles of Islam in all 
aspects of their life. Meanwhile, Adeeb’s use of the metaphor “unleash” for any people, let alone 
one’s fellow citizens, is nefarious to say the least. The word is entangled with a web of images; 
most of all, it evokes the barbarism of the primitives one reads in Orientalists’ texts. Even the 
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rationale is being repeated: of the uncouth and uncivilized people who need to be made civilized, 
as sub-humans lacking the ability and hence the right to self-determination.  
Adeeb’s words imply that observant Muslim Egyptians should be leashed and controlled, 
as they indeed were under the dictatorship of the former military regimes, but it was the arrival 
of President Morsi to office that caused them to be unleashed. It also suggests that it was the 
elections that: 1) brought this class out of its regular places, thereby evoking the image of a race 
hidden from sight, or restrained in places commensurate with their status as lower-class, 
uneducated beings; and 2) proliferated this class of people into the restricted domain of the upper 
class that belongs to the progressive and the sophisticated intellectual Egyptians. If it had not 
been for the elections, Adeeb asserts, this class would not have ventured into these areas and 
spread throughout the society. What Adeeb says also suggests that there was a “decision” or 
maybe a plan contrived not only to replace the elites and middle-class people with observant 
lower-class Muslims but also to enable this class of people to impose their control over the 
society. 
 A number of things in Adeeb’s statement demand reflection and inquiry. First, who is the 
group of people that he refers to as the “mob”? Who do they represent and why? Interestingly, 
Adeeb provides a detailed description of how the mob looks and acts and spends a great deal of 
time asserting that they represent the “religiously observant Muslims” or President Morsi’s 
supporters. However, he does not provide a clear definition of who the “mob” is or who are these 
“religiously observant Muslims” that he is referring to here. Is he referring to a specific Islamic 
movement or to all religious Muslims who chose to support the practice of Islam both in private 
and public spheres? Rather than acknowledging the differences, Adeeb decides to turn a blind 
eye to such a diverse community that cannot be easily characterized and lumps them all under 
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one title which is also a derogatory one. Painting them with a single stroke of ugliness and 
malice, he deems it sufficient to refer to them as “they,” “the mob,” “these people,” “this new 
class,” and the “Islamic trend.” Otherwise, they are simply characterized as a Muslim collective 
entity or unity that represents a great risk to “us” (the enlightened Egyptians).    
 6.2.5 President Morsi’s Supporters as Religiously “Observant Muslims” 
 In his description of these “other,” Adeeb constructs an ugly and disgusting image of the 
people supporting President Morsi—or the “mobs,” as he likes to call them. They are the “other 
people” who “look different”; they are “filthy,” “bullies,” “thugs,” “aggressive,” “uncontrolled,” 
and thus pose both a physical as well as an intellectual threat to “us” (enlightened Egyptians) 
because they are irrational, narrow-minded, and primitive beings. Although Adeeb’s program 
was televised only two months after President Morsi’s inauguration, his rhetoric suggests that in 
this short duration President Morsi and his mob have created unprecedented state chaos, 
disorder, and turmoil. Adeeb shares a story of watermelon vendors who he claims have spread in 
one of Egypt’s areas causing a state of chaos, filth, uncleanness, and disorder and creating fear 
and horror among the peaceful upper-class people who are not familiar with these bullies and 
thugs. No one, including cops, can control these watermelon vendors or their customers because 
they are aggressive and dangerous thugs who can cause harm to anyone who confronts them. 
“Cops have families and thus prefer to avoid being stabbed by a group of these people,” Adeeb 
furiously stresses while choosing to disregard that it is the police who have been bullying the 
Egyptian people for over 50 years under successive military regimes. Also, one may ask the 
following question: “Haven’t these vendors always been a part of Egyptian society, especially 
prominent for instance on a bridge in an area like el-Manial that is not considered to be an upper-
class area?” Why then is Adeeb not only hyperbolizing and dramatizing the state of matters, he is 
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also linking occurrences that are not related, i.e., the proliferation of watermelon vendors and 
violence.   
 Secondly, what is also worth noting here is that the people supporting President Morsi, or 
the “mob” as Adeeb likes to depict them, are assumed to be observant Muslims. And he 
explicitly highlights this dominant characteristic shared by them in this particular televised 
episode. Contrary to this false characterization of this diverse group of people, those supporting 
President Morsi were not only limited to religiously observant Muslims but those Muslims who 
may be deemed non-observant followers. Amongst the numerous false assumptions made by 
rhetoric such as that held by Adeeb, one significant presumption is that religiously observant 
Muslims are low-class people. The reasoning seems to be as follows; apparently, according to 
him, all of the people who support President Morsi are identified as practising Muslims; such 
Muslims are illiterate, hence living below poverty, therefore the lowest class of society. 
Essentially, the underlying assumption is that Islam is inherently lacking in anything worthy. It 
lacks rational deliberation or any higher thought, and therefore is only followed by impoverished 
illiterate people who follow out of mere submission to authority, without making a reasoned 
deliberate choice. In other words, a direct link is made between Islam and low social, cultural, 
and economic conditions; the rhetoric asserts that one perpetuates the other. 
 Adeeb then goes on to blame the January 25th Revolution for bringing such reactionary 
people to power and leadership, saying the Revolution added nothing to the society other than 
replacing the old residents of the presidential palace with new people. Adeeb stresses 
sarcastically that the only difference between the first president (Mubarak) and the second man 
(Morsi) is that the first one was aware of the value of this palace, while the latter “cannot 
distinguish between the silver vase and a pot with two handles” implying that President Morsi 
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belongs to the low class and thus cannot recognize the value of a silver vase. However, Adeeb 
decides to completely ignore the truth and the most significant difference between the two men: 
Mubarak, the one he refers to as belonging to the elites, was a dictator who controlled the 
country along with his corrupt authoritarian regime for 30 years against their will, whereas Morsi 
was brought to office through the power of ballet boxes by the will of the people. Apparently, 
according to Adeeb, it is the president’s class that determines his eligibility to rule, and not 
democracy or people’s will.  
It should be stressed here that religiously observant Muslims in Egypt belong to all strata 
of society, not to a single class; in fact, a large number of them are intellectuals, university 
professors, teachers, or employed people. President Morsi, to whom he refers as someone who 
doesn’t know the difference between a silver vase and a pot, is a university professor and a Ph.D. 
graduate of University of Southern California (USC) in Mechanical Engineering and has taught 
at California State University and worked at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) before 
returning to Egypt. 
 6.2.6 De-Egyptianization of Political Muslims 
 In general, the Egyptian popular media (including its prominent protagonist Adeeb) 
persistently framed the political situation as a confrontation between the irrational observant low-
class Muslims who aim to Islamize the society and the patriotic Egyptian elites who support 
modernity, democracy, and civilization. The media create the dichotomy by reducing all of 
Morsi’s supporters (regardless of their different styles, classes, and affiliations) to a monolithic 
entity that “looks different” from other Egyptians whom he refers to as “us”. Through statements 
such as “you have nothing to do with anyone” and “do whatever you want but stay away from 
us,” Adeeb emphasized the otherness of observant Muslims by depicting them as outsiders and 
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as a single religious subject that does not belong to Egyptian society. Such rhetorical devices of 
“othering” observant Muslims continued to be used in the media, not only in Adeeb’s show but 
in the majority of the state and private TV shows.  With dehumanizing overtones, this 
divisiveness is blatantly loud in utterances such as: “these are not us” “who are those people?” 
“who do they represent?” “they all look alike” “they are not Egyptians” “we are not these 
people” and “who is listening to you?” Such is the rhetoric used by Khaled Abu Bakr, Adeeb’s 
co-host, in depicting Morsi’s supporters, on 10 June 2012, on the same TV show Al Qahera Al 
Yawm, where he emphasized the same secular-religious reductionist binary in Egyptian society 
(Ramadan, 2013). 
 6.2.7 “Intellectual Garbage” 
 Adeeb then goes on to emphasize the inevitable dark future of Egypt under President 
Morsi and his supporters. “We are heading to darkness and garbage,” Adeeb foresees, and in 
another passage, he holds that “we are heading toward intellectual garbage, not just street-
garbage” (Sybrotherterrorism1, 2012). Words and phrases such as “darkness” and “intellectual 
garbage” suggest that a conflict exists between Islam or observant Muslims on the one hand and 
enlightenment, modernity, and civilization on the other hand. The selection of these words refers 
to the backwardness and irrationality of observant Muslims who are still unable to understand 
that secularism leads to modernity just as religion leads to “darkness” and “middle ages.” Hence, 
in order for Egypt to be modern and civilized, it must separate the state from the church or more 
precisely from Islam.  
 “I am not trying to frighten people from religion, but am only indicating that the rise of 
the religious trend would open the door for everyone to do whatever they want,” Adeeb asserts. 
He then goes on to discuss the attitude of a Salafist Member of Parliament (MP), who announced 
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that he asked the president not to meet a Copt or a woman, stressing that this is because they 
(observant Muslims) see them (Copts and women) as garbage. Adeeb then asked, “Did I invent 
this story?” “No. They are ruling now and will continue to rule” (Sybrotherterrorism1, 2012). 
Adeeb went on to share another case of a man who told him that males and females should 
provide an ID to be able to walk together in the streets because otherwise it would be impossible 
to verify their marital relationship. A time will arrive when a male would not be permitted to 
walk out in the street with a female without an ID that proves their relationship, a furious Adeeb 
warns, stressing this irrationality and insanity will only increase. “How is this even allowed?” 
“How can we go back to the beginning of creation?” he asks.  
 The assumptions that Adeeb left unaddressed include why he held all “observant 
Muslims” accountable for this anonymous individual; why should the views of a Salafist MP 
represent those of all “observant Muslims”; and why should the president or anyone else be 
responsible for the MP’s deviant misunderstanding or extreme views and questionable 
statements? What all these people (observant Muslims) have in common, according to Adeeb’s 
report, is their Islamic orientation. This reductionism implies that observant Muslims should be 
identified as a monolithic entity with one and the same understanding of all facets within these 
inexplicably complex physical and metaphysical realms. Hence they should be judged and 
condemned due to the erroneous views of the few, regardless of their own diverse 
understandings, knowledge, cultural and social backgrounds, attitudes, and so forth.  
 “Do not approach Christians and do not approach women; do not get close to anyone and 
do not oppress the powerless people, and you absolutely have nothing to do with me or anyone 
else,” Adeeb angrily warns Morsi and the people who support him, without pointing to any 
single case in which women or Christians have been oppressed under President Morsi. “Religion 
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didn’t say this,” stressed Adeeb as if President Morsi has indeed targeted Egyptian women and 
Christians (Sybrotherterrorism1, 2012). What Adeeb says suggests that President Morsi’s 
religious thinking urges him to oppress the “Other” in general and women, Christian minorities, 
and the powerless in particular. Also, by selecting words and phrases such as “do not approach” 
and “do not get close to,” Adeeb suggests that President Morsi is certainly planning to harm and 
oppress Christians and women. Using the imperative form in “do not,” suggests that Adeeb is not 
only the human rights advocate and guardian of these “threatened” minorities, but that he also is 
in a dominant position of moral and intellectual superiority that empowers him to stop the 
president. 
 With all of the negative common characteristics given to “observant Muslims”, it could 
be said that speaking of Islam and Muslims allows one—as Said (1997) suggests—to 
automatically overlook time and space and eliminate all political complications and moral 
restraints. The way Adeeb’s statements treat Islam or observant Muslims indicates that Islam is 
an outdated abstract that belongs to the Middle Ages and the “beginning of creation” as he says, 
and thus conflicts with modernity and civilization. He speaks of observant Muslims not only as a 
monolithic entity in the current times, but as one that for all times insists on living in the past.  
 A complete exclusion of Egypt’s grim political and social situation during the 30 years of 
corruption under Mubarak’s military and authoritarian regime is another noteworthy aspect of 
Adeeb’s statement. With his blatant call for a return to power for the powerful elites and his 
discussion of the future of democracy, modernity, and civilization under the Islamic trend, he 
completely disregards any analysis of human rights violations, police brutality, unemployment, 
poverty, and pervasive corruption under the military regimes that ruled Egypt over the past 50 
years. Moreover, Adeeb’s categorical rejection of the Islamic model suggests that the Western 
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model cannot be changed or replaced under any condition, even if it has failed to bring 
democracy, freedom of expression, or modernity to Egypt. 
 6.2.8 Supporters of President Morsi as the “Enemy”  
 It was not long before Adeeb’s call for the return to elite-control came true. On 13 July 
2013, a military coup led by the defence minister, and now President, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, 
removed President Morsi and “ultimately gave rise to precisely the kind of authoritarianism 
Egyptian revolutionaries had been railing against in January 2011” (Fahmy & Faruqi, 2017, p. 
1). As a reaction to President Morsi’s removal, the opponents of the military coup organized two 
massive sit-in protests in Raba’a and El-Nahda squares demanding the reinstatement of the 
elected president. One month later, on 14 August 2013, the Egyptian security forces raided the 
two camps, opening fire on peaceful pro-President Morsi protestors killing hundreds, maiming 
and injuring thousands of them in what was later described by Human Rights Watch as one of 
the most massive killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013).  
 Commenting on these horrifying massacres, Egypt’s former Mufti, Sheikh Ali Gomaa’, 
depicted President Morsi’s supporters as the country’s enemies who deserve to be ‘shot in the 
heart.’ Al Jazeera TV Channel broadcast a leaked video clip showing Gomaa’ speaking to an 
audience of the military and police including General el-Sisi, then Egypt’s Defence Minister as 
well as Mohammad Ibrahim, the Minister of the Interior, along with his senior armed forces 
commanders and aides where he said,  
 Know that you are on the right path and do not allow anyone to confuse you or blur 
 your vision. You are walking in the way of God, and this is what we all seek... They 
 lie and kill, and this is all they know…. There is a difference between killing and 
 fighting. You are the knights of the country; you are the fighters, and they are the 
 murderers… One may ask about the blood. We didn’t cause this... Kill 100 to prevent the 
 killing of a thousand. Who created this problem? It is the dogs of hellfire... These are the 
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 Kharijites …we have to cleanse our city and our Egypt of these bastards. They do  not 
 deserve our Egyptian-ness. They shamed us, and thus we should disown them to defend 
 our land, people, faith, religion, history, and civilization…we do not know them and do 
 not listen to them because God has blinded their hearts.  
 It was determined for us that security comes before faith...because there is no faith where 
 there is a lack of security ...Yes, we know the sanctity of blood, but what can we do if 
 the stinky people have gathered against us? They smell bad in appearance  and inward…. 
 They say legitimacy. What legitimacy? ...What legitimacy is this that allows them to 
 kill people...  
 So what do we do? We fight, and we do not kill. They are the ones that exposed 
 themselves to this and for this, those tyrants, the Kharijites, if just one bullet is 
 released on their behalf, or from them, or people that are around them and not 
 necessarily with them, or was on their side, then shoot them in the heart and don’t  you 
 dare sacrifice your members or soldiers for the sake of those Kharijites. Don’t let their 
 religiosity fool you. The religion, God, His messenger, the believers, and the people are 
 all with you, and the angels support you from heaven. Don’t ever hesitate to do this for 
 the sake of Allah. (IslamicEgyptNews, 2015) 
  
 The cooperation of official religious figures with ruling regimes is not new or unexpected 
in Egypt, given that it is the Egyptian President who appoints the Mufti. Gomaa’ himself was 
appointed by the removed president Hosni Mubarak in 2003 and continued in his position until 
2013. However, what is shockingly frightful and abhorrent here is the aggressive and violent 
language of Gomaa’ and his blatant incitement and justification of the mass murder of unarmed 
protestors while describing their murderers as ‘blessed.’ He said, “blessed are those who kill 
them,” in reference to the army who killed the unarmed demonstrators. His speech has three 
critical points, which appear to have come after the massacres of Raba’a and El-Nahda squares 
where nearly a thousand of the military coup-opponents who called themselves ‘defenders of 
legislation’ were brutally killed.  
First, Gomaa’ divided the Egyptian community into two camps: ‘we’ versus ‘they’ with 
the former referring to patriotic Egyptians and the latter to the opponents of the coup from 
President Morsi’s supporters. He depicts the early group as ‘God’s knights’ and the ‘courageous 
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fighters’ who defend their homeland and their people against the traitors while describing the 
latter as hypocrites, murderers, treacherous criminals, and a foul-smelling lot.  
Second, Gomaa’ excludes the opponents of the military coup from Egyptian society by 
casting them as non-Egyptians and not deserving to be part of the community because they 
destroy the country and thus ‘shame us’ (Egyptians). He says, “they do not deserve our Egyptian-
ness,” and “we must protect and defend ‘our Egypt’ from them.” Not only is Gomaa’ 
promulgating a self-created otherness and de-Egyptian-ness of the pro-Morsi protestors, but he 
also casts them as enemies of the country and enemies of Islam whose killing is lawful in the 
sight of God and Prophet Mohammad. Accordingly, in making their killing lawful, a mufti who 
is an Islamic jurist par excellence is not only throwing those of opposing political views out of 
the realm of Islam, he is stressing that the protestors be killed without any hesitation along with 
their supporters and anyone who agrees with them because it is in the path of God. 
 Furthermore, to keep Egypt secure, Egyptians should disown, dispossess, and amputate 
them from the society, according to the former Mufti. The former Mufti explicitly urges the 
killing of protestors by the army and civilians alike when he says, “Kill them in the heart” and 
“spread out this strategy between soldiers, neighbors and all whom you know.” Later in the 
speech, Gomaa’ asked the military not to be fooled by the religiosity of the other group because 
the support of God, the prophet, the believers, and the people is all they need. They are liars and 
treacherous deceivers; they are the ‘Kharijites’10 of our time who show faith and fear of God in 
front of the people while hiding treachery and evil in their hearts, stresses Gomaa’. To prove his 
point, the former Mufti claims that he had heard them (in reference to the Muslim Brotherhood) 
repeating over and over that they would take over the government and destroy democracy. 																																																								10	Recently, the term “Kharijites” has been used in reference to Muslims who deviate from ideal norms of behavior 
while still being called Muslims. 	
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However, in this context, Gomaa’ ignores that the Muslim Brotherhood had been democratically 
elected to rule Egypt and not by illegitimate means, and that during their short tenure they did 
not exhibit undemocratic tendencies. More importantly, Gomaa’ disregards the fact that 
authoritarian military regimes have ruled Egypt in the past 50 years and that the January 25 
Revolution mainly sought to end authoritarianism and human rights violations. So, what 
‘democracy’ is the former Mufti referring to here? Also, why is he regarding ‘democracy’ as the 
only model that Egypt should follow? Is anyone who calls for an alternative model to be 
considered an enemy of the country? These are some of the questions that Gomaa’ left 
unanswered in the leaked video clip that was broadcast by Al Jazeera Channel.    
 Third, to give the army the ultimate moral absolution, the former Mufti stresses, “Stand 
your ground. God is with you, and the Prophet Muhammad is with you, and the believers are 
with you … Numerous visions have proved that the Prophet is with you. May God destroy them! 
May God destroy them! May God destroy them! Amen!” (Osman, 2014) 
6.3 “Islam” as the Source of Problems 
 This narrative of ‘two nations’ has continued, but has taken a new form after the 2013 
military coup d’état and the overthrow of the first democratically elected president. The battle 
turned from a political one against the Islamic-oriented president and his followers to a social 
and cultural conflict with Islam itself. Thus, the popular media discourse shifted from “no place 
for religiously observant Muslims in politics” to “no place for an Islamic identity in Egyptian 
society” or, in other words, the transference from the “separation of church and state” to the 
“separation of church and society.” This was evident in the fierce media campaign against Islam, 
observant Muslims (including scholars, sheiks, and muftis), and Islamic legacy and civilization. 
For the first time in Egypt’s history, the Islamic identity has been alienated and excluded from 
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the predominantly Muslim society. Islam is reduced to a range of negative connotations, depicted 
as a static, violent, and problematic religion that radicalizes its followers and reinforces 
backwardness. Religious Muslims have been excluded and they have been portrayed as 
“primitive” and “backward,” and the Islamic heritage has been disfigured and undermined in an 
unprecedented manner. In addition, Islamic symbols and institutions have not escaped this 
campaign, as the following pages reveal.  
 6.3.1 Islam as Reinforcing Terrorism  
 This discursive pattern, which noticeably casts Islam as violent and uncivilized, is an 
example of a series of narratives that began long before the 2013 military coup but weren’t 
received with recognition and approval. In the aftermath of the brief rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood-linked Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in 2012, the discourse of ‘terrorism’ was 
aggressively stressed and was attributed not only to the political stance of certain Islamist groups 
but also linked to Islam. At this time, the Egyptian ruling elite, political figures, and secularized 
intelligentsia—who were agitated by the arrival of the FJP’s President Morsi to office—used the 
mass media expansively to circulate their hostile debates on Islam with the aim of justifying the 
military coup and its human rights violations. To further strengthen this narrative of terrorism, 
they used two additional sub-discourses: ‘terrorism as exclusively Islamic’ and ‘Islamic history 
as bloody.’ 
 A noteworthy instance of this discourse is el-Sisi’s televised speech in 2015 to Egyptian’s 
top religious leaders at Al Azhar University at the anniversary of the Prophet (el-Mawlid al-
Nabwi) where he said:  
I am referring here to the religious clerics. We have to think hard about what we are 
facing—and I have, in fact, addressed this topic a couple of times before. It’s 
inconceivable that the thinking that we hold most sacred should cause the entire 
umma [Islamic world] to be a source of anxiety, danger, killing and destruction for 
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the rest of the world. Impossible! That thinking—I am not saying ‘religion’ but 
‘thinking’—that corpus of texts and ideas that we have sanctified over the centuries, 
to the point that departing from them has become almost impossible, is antagonizing 
the entire world. It’s antagonizing the entire world! Is it possible that 1.6 billion 
people [Muslims] should want to kill the rest of the world’s inhabitants—that is 7 
billion—so that they may live? Impossible! (Volokh, 2015) 
 Relying on the ‘we’ versus ‘they’ binary discourse, el-Sisi here is polarizing the world 
into two camps: ‘dangerous Muslims’ and ‘endangered others.’ This inexplicable exclusion of 
the entire Muslim nation from the remainder of the ‘world’ with its entirety casts Muslims as the 
‘other,’ the ‘outsider,’ and the ‘enemy’ of the remaining world. In this context, every single 
person among the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims (including moderates, non-practising, or even 
seculars) wants to kill ‘the others’ and thus is ‘a source of anxiety, killing, and destruction’ to the 
whole world. The question arises, other than their Islamic identity, is there any other 
characteristic that is common to all these people? Thus, what el-Sisi says suggests that the 
‘Islamic identity’ represents a source of danger and problems to the modern world that cannot 
live in peace with the presence of the persistent menace of Muslims.  
 El-Sisi’s speech, which came in the aftermath of the military coup and the massacres of 
his political opponents in Raba’a and El-Nahda squares, was more than an attempt to justify the 
political and human rights violations against revolutionary Egyptians. It wasn’t a ‘war on terror’ 
but rather a war on Islam, Islamic legacy, and Muslim identity. If el-Sisi’s ‘war on terror’ and 
call for a religious reformation or “revolution” as he calls it, is mainly targeting Muslim 
extremists, why then is he including the Muslim ummah (nation) in their absolute entirety as 
enemies to the “world” in his call for a “religious revolution”? Why is he depicting the “war on 
terror” as a war against the entire Muslim nation rather than against radicals or extremists?         
 Furthermore, el-Sisi argues that it is the Islamic ‘thinking’ or ‘the corpus of texts and 
ideas’ that Muslims have been carrying throughout the centuries that have turned “Muslims” into 
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a source of destruction. He did not specify which ‘corpus of texts and ideas’ he is referring to. 
His words suggest that the entire Islamic intellectual legacy, since the seventh century onwards, 
including the hadith, Sirah, Islamic history, Islamic philosophy, and Islamic sciences, have only 
given the world ugliness. This is despite the fact that Muslim rationalists have highly 
sophisticated discussions on the philosophical notion of beauty and ugliness (al husn wa’l qubh) 
that is morally beautiful or beneficial and morally corrupt or harmful for the societies. This belief 
would mean that intellectual giants such as Avicenna, Averroes, Jaber Ibn Hayyan, Ibn al 
Haytham, Ibn al Arabi, al Farabi, and all other Muslim scholars through the centuries have left 
nothing to the world but a call for violence.                                                                          
 To rid the world from this menace and to save the ‘entire world’ from the Islamic threat, 
el-Sisi is calling for a ‘religious revolution.’ He puts it thus: “I say and repeat again that we are in 
need of a religious revolution. You, imams, are responsible before Allah. The entire world, I 
repeat it, the entire world is waiting for your next move … because this umma is being torn, it is 
being destroyed, it is being lost—and it is being lost by our own hands.” (Volokh, 2015)  By 
stressing that the Muslim umma is being torn and destroyed by Muslims’ “own hands,” el-Sisi is 
neglecting and eliminating all political and historical aspects that have played a major role in the 
decline of the Muslim world since the late 18th century. Meanwhile, his use of the present 
continuous in “being torn,” “being destroyed,” and “being lost,” casts the Muslim ummah as 
being in a continuous state of loss and decline, which neglects the leading role of the Islamic 
civilization through the Middle Ages. On the other hand, the recurrent use of the absolute in 
words and phrases such as the ‘entire ummah’, the ‘1.6 billion Muslims’ or ‘the world’s 
inhabitants’ does not only ‘otherize’ the totality of Muslim community over the ages by 
representing them as being at war with the entire ‘world,’ but also depicts them as an everlasting 
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adversary of Western or non-Muslim values and identity, which implies a clash of values or 
civilization between the two camps. Moreover, el-Sisi’s recurrent use of words such as 
‘inconceivable,’ ‘impossible,’ ‘antagonizing’ and ‘we are in need’ suggests the existence of an 
enormous problem that needs to be taken into consideration. 
 However, el-Sisi’s call for religious reformation found a deep resonance within several 
secular intellectuals, political elites, and religious figures who took turns criticizing fundamental 
Islamic aspects of faith while pushing their personal agendas. Thus, anti-Muslim rhetoric that 
portrays Islam as a perpetual adversary of the world’s identity has intensified enormously. A 
remarkable instance occurred on 22 March 2016 when Amr Adeeb, on his live show Al Qahira 
El-Yawm, on Al-Yawm TV channel, commenting on the terrorist attacks in Brussels, blamed 
Islam for terrorism. He argued that neither ISIS, nor Al-Qaeda or Islamists, but solely Islam, 
should be held accountable for these acts of terror, stressing that terrorists around the world 
adopt their ideologies from Islam. When his co-host, Rania Badawi, told him that these terrorist 
assaults are committed by a group of Muslim individuals and not by the religion, Adeeb invited 
her to look at the history stating that it was Muslims who killed Hussein, the grandson of the 
Prophet Mohammad, and three of the righteous (rashideen) caliphs while performing their 
prayers. He asked sarcastically, “Who killed them? Was it Belgium or Britain or maybe the 
CIA?” Adeeb then asked her why we do not hear about Jews or Christians shooting innocent 
people anywhere in the world, and why Muslims are the only perpetrators of these crimes? 
(Coptic Eagle, 2016)                                                                                                                       
 In this context, Adeeb is not merely pointing to Islam as being the source of terrorism 
throughout history but is also claiming that terrorism is exclusively Islamic. This is emphasized 
through his use of words such as ‘solely,’ ‘neither,’ and ‘the only’ in his depiction of Islam and 
124	
Muslims. Also, by connecting these terrorist attacks to Islamic history and inviting his co-host to 
‘look at the history,’ Adeeb explicitly blames Islam as a source of violence since its early days 
and says that Muslims have been the sole perpetrators of terrorist acts since the birth of the 
religion, despite the long history of non-Muslim violence. As usual, the solution he suggests is 
that ‘we must confront ourselves’ and ‘look at ourselves’ with ‘we’ referring to Muslims (Coptic 
Eagle, 2016).  
 Adeeb’s rhetoric here signifies an example of the internal Islamophobic and Orientalist 
discourse on Islam and Muslims by representing the religion as a menace to the entire modern 
world, including Muslims themselves. What he says suggests that Islam has never been able to 
co-exist with others nor has it ever succeeded in living peacefully without causing violence, 
killings, and bloodshed. Islam, according to him, has a conflict not only with Western values but 
all praiseworthy moral values because it is inherently violent even with its own adherents. 
Another instance is seen on 19 June 2017, after the vehicular attack by a non-Muslim on 
Muslims outside a London mosque, when the Egyptian TV host Youssef Al-Husseini on ONTV 
said:  
 In all the previous vehicular attacks, at least in 2016 and 2017, the ‘heroes’ were, 
 unfortunately, Muslims. Also, then people wonder why they hate us. Why do they 
 hate us? If they didn't, there would be something mentally wrong with them. We use 
 weapons all the time, slaughter people all the time, flay people all the time, burn people 
 alive all the time, run people over all the time, and plant explosive devices and car 
 bombs all the time. Why do you still expect them to love you? (Volokh, 2015) 
By changing the question from ‘why did they kill us (Muslims)?’ to ‘why do they hate 
us?,’ Al-Husseini victimizes the oppressor and criminalizes the victim. Meanwhile, his statement 
suggests that attacks against Muslims are justifiable because ‘they’ (the world) have the right to 
hate ‘us’ (the Muslims) or otherwise ‘there would be something wrong.’ So their hate is rational 
and justifiable mentally because ‘we slaughter them.’ By using words and phrases such as 
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‘slaughter,’ ‘use weapons,’ ‘flay,’ ‘burn alive,’ ‘run over’ and ‘plant,’ Al-Husseini is insinuating 
that Muslims are not only extremely violent but are also skilful and professional in using their 
violence. His use of the present continuous tense with words such as ‘all the time’ in verbs such 
as ‘slaughter,’ ‘flay,’ or ‘burn,’ indicates that Muslims are perpetually killing their ‘others.’ 
Furthermore, by using the indefinite word ‘people,’ Al-Husseini suggests that Muslims’ 
terrorism has no limits; they kill anyone and everyone at all times. He portrays it as a war 
between ‘them’ (the Muslims) and ‘people.’ 
 To give terrorism in Islam an exclusive and historical reality, and to add to the Islamic 
history a tradition of bloodshed, Al-Husseini later questions whether Muslims have ever 
contributed anything to the West other than slaughter and massacres. Then he adds, “It’s true. 
That’s what the Turks did in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries” (Memri TV, 2017). By 
casting the hatred of Muslims by the West as the norm, Al-Husseini is emphasizing two 
significant beliefs: first, the existence of a conflict between Islam and Western values; and 
second, the Islamic identity has no place in the modern age. To him, all Muslims worldwide have 
a static violent identity; thus, hating, rejecting, and having no place for them in the contemporary 
world are the only appropriate reactions they deserve. What Al-Husseini says here reflects a state 
of self-hatred that has spread among Westernized elites in Egypt’s dominant Muslim society. 
 6.3.2 The Myth of “Islam” as a Threat to its Adherents 
 Another common discourse regarding Islam that is propagated among media persons, 
secular intellectuals, and political elites is ‘Islam threatens even Muslims.’ According to this 
rhetoric, Islam is regarded as a source of problems that create troubles for the entire world 
including its adherents. 
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 Another significant instance is an episode from Amr Adeeb’s Kul Yawm TV show, which 
aired on the privately owned and widely watched Egyptian news network ONTV on 8 April 
2018. Speaking of the Syrian regime’s chemical attacks on Douma, Adeeb projected the attack as 
a religious or specifically Islamic attack, rather than a political attack by the Syrian authoritarian 
regime against its people. He said: 
At the end of the day, there is a tragedy, a disaster. At the end of the day, there is a 
human massacre, by all levels. Such a thing does not occur elsewhere except in the 
Arab and Muslim world. In this world where the earth planet exists, and billions of 
people live, such dirty tragedies, which are humiliating to humanity, do not happen 
anywhere else in the 21st century except for the Arab Muslim countries. Therefore, 
we Arabs whether Muslims or Christians need to take a look at ourselves. Honestly, 
we have become a source of shame for ourselves. Honestly, it does not matter who is 
behind the attack. You say: It's the regime, the opposition, the Al-Nusra Front, ISIS. 
Say whatever you want, but ultimately, we have become a source of shame! We are a 
source of shame! We are a source of shame for the world and humanity, by what we 
are doing to ourselves. Nowhere else in the world do people do to themselves what 
we are doing to ourselves. Such thing has become beyond belief and beyond 
tolerance. It seems that we have within us things that are not merely wrong but also 
horrifying. We have to confront ourselves and realize that besides all the talk about 
international interests, imperialistic conspiracies and so on, we have become a source 
of shame for ourselves by what we do to ourselves. I’m serious. Honestly, we have 
reached the lowest level in terms of humanity. We have reached a level that is 
beyond any expectation because what we are doing to ourselves is beyond all 
standards. 
(ON Ent, 8 April 2018)  
 
 Adeeb’s use of ‘we’ versus ‘they,’ or ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ is a very transparent Orientalist 
discourse, with ‘we’ referring to Arab Muslims and ‘they’ referring to the remainder of the 
world. This suggests that, just like el-Sisi and Al-Husseini, Adeeb also sees the world as divided 
into two camps: Muslims, and the remainder of the world—again implying that Muslims are 
different in essence from everyone else on the entire planet.                                                
 Moreover, he portrayed them as a ‘source of shame,’ and as ‘bringing shame to 
themselves, the world, and humanity.’ Adeeb did not clarify as to why all Muslims should be 
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blamed for this tragedy, or why they should be held accountable for a crime they were not 
responsible for. He severs the story from its larger context and conveniently reduces it to look 
more like a religious problem rather than a political conflict. It is true that both the attacker and 
the attacked are Muslims; nonetheless, the victims have been killed for political reasons. 
Furthermore, Adeeb’s inability to connect what he calls ‘filthy tragedies, which are humiliating 
to humanity’ to the Syrian authoritarian regime—which is backed by Russia, Iran, and some 
other Arab regimes, including Egypt—is not only a blatant logical fallacy but a complete 
distortion of facts. Not only did he avoid discussing the identity of the attacker, but he also 
defended the Syrian regime by claiming that it has no reasons to attack Douma.  
 Adeeb argues that the problem is caused by things that ‘we’ (Muslims) seem to have 
within ‘us,’ things that are not merely wrong, but also horrifying. By horrifying things that exist 
only within the ‘Arab and Muslim world,’ Adeeb is undoubtedly pointing to Islam even if he 
didn’t say it explicitly this time. He left it ambiguous and up to the viewers to draw a conclusion, 
but he made it very clear that it is something that exists solely among Muslims. What Adeeb says 
here suggests that Islam presents a threat not only to the West or non-Muslims but also to 
Muslims by reinforcing violence and terrorism among them. It is Islam itself that has to be 
blamed according to Adeeb as he stated it clearly in the previous discursive unit when he said 
that ‘people adopt their violent ideology from Islam’ (Memri, 2016). By saying this, Adeeb is 
changing and hence expanding the rhetoric from ‘Islam as conflicting with the West’ to ‘Islam as 
conflicting with the modern world.’ Casting the religion of the majority as endangering everyone 
including its people and causing them to kill each other suggests that Islam in general and the 
Muslim identity, in particular, have no place in today’s world. Thus, Adeeb calls on all Muslims 
to try to figure out what causes them to become a ‘shame on humanity.’ 
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 To address and eradicate this problem, he suggests that Muslims need to confront 
themselves and, rather than blaming this on ‘international interests’ or ‘imperialistic 
conspiracies,’ they should realize that ‘they have become a source of shame.’ Interestingly, in his 
enthusiastic attempt to prove that violence and terrorism are exclusively a Muslim phenomenon, 
Adeeb overlooked the following examples of horrific atrocities: the thousands of Bosnian 
Muslims killed, injured, raped, and tortured in the 20th century by their Croatian Christian 
neighbours; the persecution, killing, and imprisonment of Palestinian civilians in the 20th and 21st 
centuries at the hands of the Israeli Jewish government; the continued ethnic cleansing of 
Muslims at the hands of Buddhists in Myanmar (Burma); or the continued human rights 
violations against Muslims in Kashmir by the Hindu Nationalists.  
 A look at the words and phrases used in the previous discursive units shows an excessive 
use of exclusive words such as ‘nowhere,’ ‘does not happen anywhere in the world,’ ‘except in 
the Arab and Islamic world,’ ‘do not occur elsewhere,’ which suggests that terrorism is an 
exclusively Islamic phenomenon. By polarizing the world into ‘Muslims’ versus ‘others,’ and 
exclusively attributing terrorism to Muslims, this discourse propels a causal relationship between 
Islamism and terrorism and subsequently portrays Islam as the sole generator of terrorism. This 
particular understanding flows from connecting Islam or Muslims with words and phrases such 
as ‘a source of anxiety,’ ‘a source of shame,’ ‘a source of killing and destruction to the rest of the 
world,’ ‘a shame upon ourselves and humanity,’ ‘filthy tragedies,’ and ‘humiliating.’ The 
linguistic construction of Islam or Muslims as having a clash with the modern era is further 
enhanced through the repetitive use of phrases and sentences suggesting that Islamic thought has 
created a worldwide dilemma and that the world is waiting for Muslims to reform these inherent 
reprehensible characteristics.  
129	
 6.3.3 The Myth of Islam’s Opposition to Modernity   
 Despite the irrefutably long and sophisticated history of Islamic sciences, the role of 
Muslims in science has been downplayed not only by Western Orientalists but also from within. 
This trend, which gained momentum in the past decades, has enabled the construction of an 
image of Islam as a backward religion that has contributed and continues to contribute towards 
the decline of Muslims all over the world. Speaking of the Qur’an’s scientific i’jaz (miraculous 
nature) to Sky News Arabia on 20 April 2018, Khaled Montaser, an Egyptian intellectual and 
journalist, projected Muslims as ‘lazy’ and in need of someone to reassure them, and Islam as a 
religion that ‘paralyzed’ those who ‘feel inferior.’ He states:  
This (Qur’an’s scientific miraculous nature) is a human construct for those who feel 
inferior and feel the huge gap that exists between them and the West. What is the 
solution? Can we become like the West? They ask themselves. However, it requires a 
very long time and effort, and they are lazy – lazy in mind, lazy in body, and lazy in 
all aspects. Therefore, the solution is to say that every existing or newly invented 
thing in the West has already existed in the Qur’an and the Hadith. (Sky News 
Arabia, 2018) 
 The previous statement reveals that not only did Montaser use the colonial binary 
division of ‘they’ and ‘the West,’ he also attributed all the negative traits and characteristics to 
‘they,’ which refers to the Muslims and did not use any adjectives to depict the ‘West.’ This is 
simply because the ‘West,’ according to him, is the opposite of the Muslim world. His use of 
phrases and questions such as the ‘huge gap,’ ‘what can we do?’ or ‘can we become like the 
West,’ emphasizes the superiority of the Western model and suggests that it has no alternatives. 
Moreover, according to him, the ‘scientific-miraculous’ nature (i’jaz) serves as an anaesthetic or 
a sedative for the Arabs and the Muslims to make themselves feel superior. By using words and 
phrases such as ‘sedative,’ ‘anesthetic,’ and ‘making them feel superior,’ Montaser echoes the 
Western theory of the clash of civilizations by suggesting that Muslims’ backwardness and 
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ignorance created an inferiority complex among Muslims that led them to envy the West for their 
civilization and rationality. Their only reason to study the i’jaz of the Qur’an is to overcome this 
inferiority complex and prove that they ‘are superior’ and ‘the best.’   
 Meanwhile, Montaser’s use of words such as ‘delusion’ and phrases such as ‘we are at 
the tail end of the nations’ and ‘lowest level of humanity’ suggests that Islam reinforces 
particular types of actions and attitudes such as ‘ignorance,’ ‘laziness of body,’ ‘laziness of 
mind,’ ‘undemocratic means,’ ‘superstitions,’ and so on particularly when he attributes Muslims’ 
laziness in both body and mind to their fatwa-style and their reliance on the Qur’an and Hadith in 
everything they do. Montaser here suggests that whereas the Western model encourages science, 
rationality, and modernity, the Islamic model reinforces laziness of mind and body, irrationality 
and deficiency, and is thus incompatible with modernity. He said that, unlike fatwas, ‘the 
scientist cannot provide’ Muslims with the ‘reassurance’ they need. Asked by his host what 
makes him attribute the ‘backward’ phenomena to the Arabs and Muslims alone, Montaser 
replied that this is because ‘in the Islamic world, superstitions constitute a sweeping current.’ 
 Another profoundly hostile example of the relationship between Islam and science is the 
Egyptian TV host Youssef Al-Husseini, on ONTV, on 19 June 2017, where he was asked what 
Muslims have contributed to the world other than violence. He said: 
What have the Islamic countries contributed to the world? Nothing. What have they 
contributed to the field of scientific research? Two, three, four, or ten scientists in the 
course of 1,435 years? C’mon, man! Let’s forget about 435 years and keep just one 
millennium. Ten important scientists in 1,000 years? (Memri TV, 2017) 
Here, Al-Husseini is blatantly downplaying the role of Islamic sciences, philosophers, and 
scientists over the past 1,435 years. His use of words such as ‘nothing,’ ‘two, three, four, or ten,’ 
and ‘C’mon, man’ is a glaring example of undermining Muslims’ contributions to science and a 
flagrant denial of the enormous intellectual contributions of Muslim scholars over several 
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centuries in many different fields, including algebra, astronomy, geography, physics, chemistry, 
mathematics, medicine, pharmacology, architecture, and linguistics. By using a question-and-
answer format, Al-Husseini gives the impression that he is discussing historical facts, not 
personal views and misconceptions. Straightforwardly, he stressed that the Islamic model has 
contributed nothing to science and subsequently has not provided any good to the world. It has 
only provided ‘terrorism,’ as he emphasized in the previous pages. So, why follow it? Why 
follow a model that is at odds with science and modernity?  
 This aligns with the Egyptian secular writer and thinker, Dr. Sayed el Qemny. In an 
interview aired on Al-Hurra TV on 24 January 2018, he stated that Islam stopped adding 
anything 1,000 years ago. He said: 
This [Islamic] heritage froze a thousand years ago; it froze in the fourth century of 
Islam as it has not moved forward, has not evolved, and has not been renewed since 
then. Therefore, and because it [religion] still constitutes the primary source for the 
thinking of regular citizens, regular citizens do not turn to the natural sciences, 
mathematics and the like to resolve their problems. Instead, they turn to religion. Just 
imagine relying on a religion that stopped a thousand years ago adding anything, 
ended changing anything, and stopped renewing itself.” (Alhurra Channel, 24 
January 24 2018)  
 In this statement, el Qemny is echoing the Orientalist’s claim of a static Islam that has 
been frozen since the fourth century, versus a dynamic West that relies on natural sciences. By 
attributing to Islam words and phrases such as ‘froze,’ ‘stopped adding anything,’ ‘stopped 
changing,’ ‘stopped renewing itself,’ ‘at odds with our times,’ and ‘thinks according to the logic 
of a thousand years ago,’ el Qemny asserts that Islam is incompatible with modernity, 
civilization, democracy, and natural sciences and subsequently is at complete odds with our 
times. Rather, it is a backward religion that froze 1,000 years ago. He added: 
Because the door of ijtihad has been closed since Al Ma’moun’s death, the way 
Muslims think is at complete odds with their time and era, because they think 
according to the logic of a thousand years ago. An entire millennium is no trivial 
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matter because humankind and sciences have tremendously progressed in a way that 
no one could have anticipated. This great progress has made it impossible for 
Muslims to grasp and understand. (Alhurra Channel, 24 January 2018)  
 By using phrases such as ‘Muslims think,’ and ‘they find it impossible to grasp,’ el 
Qemny is representing the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims as a single homogeneous non-progressive 
and underdeveloped entity that lacks the ability to make the right choices. They need someone, 
like el Qemny, to observe them, study them, think for them, and represent them. Furthermore, el 
Qemny here is creating a causal relationship between Islam and the problems of the Muslims by 
claiming that it is Islam itself alone that should be blamed for the backwardness, defeat, and 
regression of the Muslim world. He asks, “we are among the most backward countries in the 
world. Why should anybody conspire against us? They can just leave us to our own devices. Our 
heritage is the best way to bring defeat, backwardness, and regression upon us.” Again, el 
Qemny’s statement is a call for a total displacement of Islam, which according to him ‘has frozen 
a thousand years ago,’ from Egyptian society.  
6.4 The Myth of the Islamic Legacy as Shameful and Fabricated 
 Not only did Egyptian secular intellectuals, ruling elites, and media persons assert that 
there is no acceptable alternative to the Western secular approach, they also added that anyone 
who discusses or opposes the Western approach agreed upon by the Egyptian elite is irrational 
and un-modern. Under this discourse, the Islamic legacy was represented as a sign of violence, 
terrorism, primitiveness, irrationality, and as a source of darkness and decline. This hostile 
campaign has taken on an intensive, sharp, and bold unprecedented form suggesting that the 
hadith, Sirah, or Islamic history that have been documented, transmitted, and communicated to 
Muslims over the past centuries is nothing but lies and falsification of facts in order to enhance 
the image of the caliphate and Islamic civilization that was, in reality, violent, discriminatory, 
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and primitive. This was evident in Ibrahim Issa’s show Mukhtalaf ‘Alayh as well as Amr 
Adeeb’s TV show Raheeq el Kutub with the Egyptian liberal intellectual, Yussef Zeidan. 
 Through the course of Amr Adeeb’s TV show Kul Yawm, namely in the section of 
Raheeq el Kutub, during which the Islamic legacy was discussed and analyzed through a review 
of the long heritage of Islamic and Western books, the liberal intellectual Youssef Zeidan has 
depicted the entire Islamic history as a black history that offered nothing but massacres and 
killings (ON Ent, 7 May 2018). According to Zeidan, Muslims are misguided and deceived, and 
were told myths and lies about their Islamic history, that they took as facts and thus should learn 
their real and shameful history and filter it. Our historical models, as represented by Zeidan, are 
not true models but killers and thugs including Khaled Ibn El Walid, Saladin, Qutuz, and 
Bibbers. As well, Muslim philosophers and scholars such as Avicenna, Ibn El-Nafis, and Ibn 
Hajar were portrayed as promiscuous with character-maligning stories creating images of the 
likes of Ibn Hajar flirting with a beautiful girl he loved inside the vicinity of a mosque. He 
portrayed Averroes as a mere borrower and transmitter of Western philosophy, holding him 
responsible for Muslims’ decline, and saying that he also urged Muslims to kill non-Muslims. As 
for Saladin, Zeidan depicted him as the most despicable person on earth who enslaved Egyptians 
and impoverished them (ON Ent, 5 March 2018). 
 In the same vein, Ibrahim Issa on his TV show Mukhtalaf ‘Alayh has also repeatedly 
invited Egyptians to liberate their minds from the Islamic heritage and the teachings of Muslim 
clerics and scholars. He regarded the Islamic legacy (turath) in its entirety responsible for the 
decline, backwardness, and irrationality of the Muslim world due to its control of the Muslim 
mind. Muslim scholars and clerics whom he refers to as Salafis are the major cause for all 
problems. In one of his episodes, he asked sarcastically, “Who are the so-called ulama’ al-
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ummah (scholars of the nation) and what is the meaning of ulama’ al ummah” (Mukhtalaf ‘alayh, 
28 August 2018; Mukhtalaf ‘alayh, 27 August 2018)? Then he went on to stress that they are the 
ones who controlled knowledge and misled the nation.  
  Issa’s show is merely a call for the liberation of minds from the turath and from what the 
Muslim ulama (scholars) have said. He compared the power of Muslim scholars and clerics 
through the centuries to the power of the church in the Middle Ages, stressing that they seek to 
control the truth and knowledge by claiming that they have answers to all questions even if their 
answers are against humanity and rationality (Mukhtalaf alayh, 21 September 2018). He uses the 
term Salafi11 as a reference to Islamic scholars, clerics, and religious Muslims, and depicts them 
all as enemies of rationality, flexibility, and reform. Issa’s campaign against the Islamic heritage 
is significant because it aims to prove the Islamic approach as archaic and un-modern. By 
stressing that the Islamic model has hindered rationality and halted development and progress 
while reinforcing violence and aggression, Issa implies that ‘Islam’ has no place in modern 
Egypt. He stressed, ‘we don’t need clerics and ulama but rather art and artists to help us progress 
and move forward (Mukhtalaf alayh, 7 September 2018). If Salafis ‘hate art and music,’ and 
‘hate life and beauty,’ what then can help Egypt to develop and progress? Issa asks. Salafis do 
not like arts, stresses Issa, because they open hearts and minds but they only want people who 
hate, obey, and follow (Mukhtalaf alayh, 7 September 2018).   
 Echoing Western Orientalists and Islamophobes, Issa accuses Salafis of objectifying 
women and using them as mere sources of satisfaction while stressing that ‘modernity will not 																																																								11	The term Salafi is now emblematic of a group within the Muslim Sunni community whose adherents claim to 
follow and imitate the first three generations of Muslims. However, there is no one precise definition to the term 
“Salafi”; even the people labeled “Salafis” do not always refer to themselves that way nor are they in agreement 
about who—besides themselves—is a Salafi. The term “Salafism” is therefore hotly contested among adherents to 
this trend, which makes it difficult to say what percentage of Muslims worldwide may be labeled 
“Salafis.” (Wagemakers, 2016) 	
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allow this stupidity.’ More importantly, he labels the so-called “Muslim and Arab mind” as 
irrational and inflexible, emphasizing that the propagation of unfiltered narratives from hadith 
and Sirah is the major reason behind the ‘backwardness’ and ‘stagnation of the “Muslim mind” 
through its reinforcement of irrationality and elimination of mind (Mukhtalaf ‘alayh, 27 August 
2018).   
 6.4.1 Sceptical View of Western Approach Deemed Pro-Terrorism  
 Issa stated with the utmost clarity that anyone who views ‘Islam as the solution’ or the 
‘application of sharī'ah’ as a possible option’ is a terrorist and a Da’ishi (member of ISIS). In 
one of his episodes that was aired on 1 July 2018, Issa posits, 
(Logos such as) The application of the (sharī’ah) law of God’ or ‘Islam is the solution’ 
along with other glamorous slogans we hear a lot from Islamic streams, groups and 
figures seek to stop us from talking, from discussion and ijtihad (independent reasoning). 
As if they (these Islamic streams, groups, movements, and figures) came up with pure 
wisdom and insight just because they came up with these slogans. However, what do they 
provide other than these slogans? (They provide) Nothing but more slogans … (The 
question is) what do the callers of these slogans offer? They all offer nothing but 
bloodshed, takfeer of the people, and division within the Muslim community. I do not 
exclude anyone from them. (Alhurra, 1 July 2018)  
 
This statement merits attention because it not only considers the entire Islamic approach as 
outdated and un-modern, it depicts anyone who questions the Western paradigm as a terrorist 
who only seeks ‘bloodshed’ and ‘division.’ This discourse further suggests that the Islamic 
model holds back rationality by curbing free speech, discussion, and independent reasoning 
(ijtihad), and provides nothing but ‘bloodshed.’ 
 Like all other previous examples, Issa also uses “we” versus “they,” or “us” versus 
“them,” but with “we” referring to Egyptians and “they” referring to religiously observant 
Muslims, which implies that observant Muslims are different in essence from everyone else in 
Egyptian society. According to him, “they” includes anyone and everyone who considers the 
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Islamic model as a potential alternative to the Western so-called scientific approach or who 
advocates the implementation of sharī'ah or return to Islam. He portrays them all “without 
excluding any single one” as offering nothing but “bloodshed” and “division” among Muslims. 
They are followers of a static methodology and are not willing to change, develop, or improve 
their methods or thoughts neither by discussion nor talks or ijtihad, according to what Issa says. 
He made it very clear that he doesn’t exclude anyone and that they all (Islamic streams, groups, 
or individuals) represent one entity, but he does not clarify as to why he attributes violence, 
rigidness, and irrationality to advocates of “sharī'ah” and the “Islamic model.” 
 A report on the implementation of sharī'ah—that includes sharp and disgusting images of 
extremists’ enforcement of sharī'ah in Nigeria, Somalia, and by the Taliban—was then presented 
with total disregard that it only represents the extremist view, not Islam in general. It is true that 
he made it clear that the sharī'ah is much more than judgments and prescribed penalties (hudud), 
but he did not indicate that these groups he refers to—either the Taliban, or those in Somalia or 
Nigeria—are just extremist groups that do not represent the actual Islamic sharī'ah.  
 More importantly, Issa ignored the fact that the Islamic political trends in Egypt, 
especially the Muslim Brotherhood, did not implement sharī'ah nor did they make any attempts 
to implement it during their actual rule. When his Jordanian guest, Ibrahim Ghraybeh, later in the 
episode, pointed this out clarifying that none of the political groups with Islamic leaning—
neither the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, nor the Nahda Party in Tunisia, or the Turkish 
President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan—has ever implemented or even expressed an intention to 
implement sharī'ah , Issa directly interrupted him stressing that all Islamic political groups call 
for the implementation of hudud (prescribed penalties) and “they” all regard looking at women 
as an adulterous act even if it is on TV.  
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 Issa did not clarify the reasons or give evidence for his insistence that “they” all call for 
the implementation of sharī'ah, although reality and facts confirm that this was not the case. 
Using such undocumented arguments and such generalization reveals the extent of complete 
disregard for reality with its complex multidimensionality and human history, not to mention 
logic, or journalistic ethics, of the Egyptian media especially when it comes to Islam and 
Muslims. Meanwhile, does everyone who calls for the return to Islam or the application of 
sharī'ah necessarily have the same understanding as these extremist groups that Issa has 
presented in his show? Should anyone who views the “Islamic model as the solution” or as an 
alternative to the Western scientific model be necessarily cruel, irrational, and a terrorist? He 
then stresses later in his episode, 
I am not asking. I am confirming and stating an absolute fact that no economic progress, 
social justice, human welfare, political freedom or moral discipline has been made in 
such countries that implement sharī'ah. These countries have not progressed, but some of 
them are indeed at the end of the nations. What sharī'ah do we see in these nations other 
than swords and the cut off necks? Why do the masses that resemble the crowds of the 
middle centuries gather joyfully to watch a poor woman (being tortured)? What kind of 
sharī'ah and prescribed penalties are these that were provided by the ISIS-style-
caliphate? Why did the scholars neglect the ijtihad (individual rationality)? (Alhurra, 1 
July 2018)  
 
 What Issa says implies that the sharī'ah, the caliphate or the Islamic model, in general, is 
an outdated and violent concept that offers nothing but killing and cutting of necks, which 
suggests that the only model worth following is the Western approach. The Islamic civilization, 
according to Issa, belongs only to medieval centuries. Meanwhile, attributing the economic, 
social, political, and moral decline of these countries to sharī'ah—with a total disregard for the 
economic, political, and social context—is an obvious logical fallacy. On the other hand, using 
powerful words and phrases such as “confirming,” “not asking,” “stating,” or “absolute fact” 
suggests that Issa’s statements are facts and undoubted reality, not plain personal opinions. 
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 Interestingly, commenting on what Issa said, Issam Zuhairi, an Egyptian author and 
researcher, stresses, “He did not offer anything at the level of ijtihad.” When the host asked him 
confusingly whom he is referring to when he says “he,” he replied, “Anyone who calls for the 
application of sharī'ah”—as if all who call for the application of sharī'ah represent one similar 
entity (Alhurra, 1 July 2018). 
 This deliberate distortion of Islamic history, the history of the Caliphate, and Muslim 
scholars and philosophers at the hand of Zeidan, Issa, and other Egyptian secular intelligentsia 
seeks only to convince the public that Islam, the Islamic model, and the Islamic identity, in 
general, have no place in modern Egypt. If our history is shameful and disgraceful, why should 
we stick to it? Is it not worth following the Western rational, scientific approach to achieve 
justice, progress, and democracy? This is what Egyptian liberal elites are stressing through their 
anti-Islam campaigns without even providing any evidence or proof of what they say other than 
Orientalists’ books and statements. 
6.5 Discriminatory Restrictions 
  This anti-Islam discourse was accompanied with statements about discriminatory 
restrictions against observant Muslims in general and veiled Muslim women in particular. For 
instance, since 2015, the burkini (an Islamic swimming suit) has been forbidden on upper-class 
beaches, and veiled Muslim women themselves were prevented from working in or even entering 
some touristic hotels, resorts, and restaurants. The hijab was publicly attacked and depicted as a 
sign of women’s oppression and degradation. In 2015, Sherif el-Shobashi, a famous Egyptian 
journalist, held an anti-hijab campaign under the pretext that women do not wear the hijab out of 
desire and conviction, but out of coercion and fear of their guardians. He used his Facebook page 
to invite veiled Egyptian women to organize a million-women protest against paternal 
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guardianship by removing their veils in al-Tahrir Square. El-Shobashi posits that the majority of 
veiled women are coerced to wear the hijab by their fathers, husbands, or guardians who threaten 
to beat them and lock them in the house if they don’t wear it (AlHayah TV Network, January 11, 
2016).  
 Moreover, he stresses that the idea of wearing a veil is against freedom, and thus should 
be confronted by the state just like terrorism. Other journalists and policymakers—including the 
former Minister of Culture, Jaber Asfoor, his sister, Farida el Shubashi, a well-known journalist, 
and many others—joined el-Shubashi in his anti-hijab campaign that used the Western ‘saver’ 
discourse of Muslim women by depicting the veil as a sign of oppression (Al Jazeera Arabic, 
2015). According to Farida el-Shubashi, the hijab is a Muslim Brotherhood-production and was 
never known in Egyptian society until they introduced it. She joined her brother’s anti-hijab 
campaign stressing that hijab creates sectarian discrimination by distinguishing Muslims from 
Christians; thus, forcing young female students to wear it leads to the destruction of education.  
 Another instance of anti-hijab is seen in the media’s representation of President Morsi’s 
wife, Naglaa Ali Mahmoud who was Egypt’s first veiled First Lady. An article in al-Shorouk 
newspaper, a private Egyptian paper, compared Mahmoud to Suzanne Mubarak, her predecessor 
and Intessar Amer, her successor. Mahmoud was referred to as Egypt’s First Servant (Khademat 
Misr al-Oula’) while the other two were called Egypt’s First Ladies. It is true that the article 
highlighted that this is the title Mahmoud favored to be called, on the grounds that she was at the 
service of her country, but the play on words was clear in the title given that the word khadima 
also means a ‘house servant’ (Hamed, 2014 in Kosba, 2019). Not only the hijab was exposed to 
this campaign, but also all the Islamic aspects and symbols without exception, for instance, the 
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niqab, beard, or jilbab (robes) have suddenly bounced at the forefront of the public discourse and 
media debates and have been depicted as signs of violence and terrorism.  
 The niqab was depicted as a threat to Egypt’s national security, and a sign of terrorism 
and lack of self-esteem on Al-Ibrashi’s Al Ashira Masa’an TV show. In one of his episodes, 
when the Salafi guest, Walid Ismail, argued that wearing a niqab is a personal freedom that no 
one should restrict, liberal journalist Farida el Shubashi replied that women who wear the niqab 
try to hide behind it because they have an inferiority complex, stressing that there are more 
valuable things to think about than hiding a woman behind a veil (Dream TV, 26 September 
2017). This media anti-niqab campaign was accompanied by lawsuits against and calls for the 
ban of the niqab in Egypt for security reasons as well as imposing fines on Egyptian women who 
insist on wearing it in public (Dream TV, 26 September 2017).   
6.6 Conclusion 
 By using a number of linguistic tools, this chapter has analyzed how commonsense 
knowledge about Islam and religiously observant Muslims is constructed on late-night Egyptian 
TV shows. In all of the analyzed data, Islam, Muslims, and the Islamic legacy were negatively 
represented and were depicted as the major cause of Egypt’s problems and decline. Meanwhile, 
Islam was constructed as conflicting not only with the West or Western values but also with the 
modern era and thus Egyptian society. Islam was positively described only during the time of 
Prophet Mohammad or when Islam is discussed as an abstract (in other words, the non-existing 
Islam that exists just in the imagination of speakers). Otherwise, all of the analyzed texts 
assigned negative traits to how Islam has been understood, interpreted, and practised since the 
death of Prophet Mohammad in the seventh century. In sum, what the Egyptian ruling elite, 
religious leaders, and popular media promulgate is that Islam and the Islamic identity no longer 
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have a space in the modern era. However, the proposed solution in most if not all of the 
examined data was to exclude observant Muslims and to eliminate the Islamic approach and 
adopt the Western rational approach instead. 
 In sum, to construct a particular understanding of the narrative of ‘two nations,’ the 
Egyptian liberal intellectuals, the ruling elites, and the popular media have increasingly used 
Islamophobic themes in their representation of Islam and Muslims, which has significantly 
influenced the construction of the new national discourse on Islam. This new national narrative 
of the ‘two nations’ excludes observant Muslims and downplays the role of Islam as a 
constitutive element of Egyptian national identity by presenting the religion of the majority of 
the population as an ‘outsider’ within Egypt and as a major reason for Egypt’s decline and 
deterioration. It is in the context of this narrative that the image of Egypt as a liberal and secular 
civil state has been established in the public discourse. In the next chapter, I discuss the findings 
and conclusion of this dissertation while also exploring what main discourses Egyptian producers 
explicitly and implicitly borrow.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION  
7. 1 Overview 
  In Chapter 6, Fairclough’s (1992) proposed tools of analysis were used to investigate the 
linguistic features of the textual data with a focus on lexicalization, grammar, and ethos—and 
the ways they were used to construct linguistic meanings for “Islam” and “Muslims.” In the 
current chapter, I will pinpoint the common ground underlying the negative representation of 
Islam as explained in the linguistic and discursive practice analysis. To achieve this, I begin with 
a discussion of the findings obtained through the linguistic analysis of data followed by an 
examination of intertextuality and interdiscursivity.12  
7.2 Textual Findings 
 7.2.1 Lexicalization  
 To provide an explanation on how linguistic meanings of “Islam” and “Muslims,” as well 
as “Egyptian-ness” are constructed through word selection, I analyzed lexicalization with a focus 
on the ways in which wordings and alternative wordings are selected. To achieve this, I 
addressed questions such as: “What particular words or phrases are used and why these particular 
words were used and not others?” “What keywords were used in the texts?” “What ideological or 
cultural significance do texts have?” 
 A look at the keywords used in the discursive units under study shows excessive use of 
“we/us” versus “they/them” in reference to “observant Muslim Egyptians” versus Egyptians who 																																																								12	This chapter is based in part on the previously published book chapter listed below:  
     El Zahed, S. (2019). Internalized Islamophobia: The making of Islam in the Egyptian media. In E. Baurakli & F.  
     Hafez (Eds.), Islamophobia in Muslim majority societies (pp. 137-160). London & New York: Routledge. 
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are proponents of a separation of state and society from religion. At other times, this dichotomy 
is extended globally and expressed through the polarity of “the world’s Muslims” versus “non-
Muslims.” The examined data shows that while us is presented in a positive way, negative 
depictions were exclusively attributed to them (observant Muslims) including irrationality, 
senselessness, terrorism, violence, rudeness, oppression, and objectification of women. 
Observant Muslims who teach or preach Islam—including Islamic scholars, intellectuals, 
sheikhs, muftis, clerics, or preachers—were portrayed with words and phrases such as “al jama’ 
dul” (this group),” “the naïve,” “the Islamists,” “ikhwanna dul (our known brothers),” “the 
mashayikhs (Muslim clerics)” (On Ent, 4 February 2018), “one of the unleashed,” “they say 
nonsense,” “they distract us from civilization” (On Ent, 14 October 2017), “they are harsh and 
rude,” “they don’t accept the other,” “they reject art because it opens hearts and minds,” “they 
only want people who hate and listen and follow” (Mukhtalaf ‘alayh, 7 September 2018), “they  
can’t think rationally,” “we won’t be able to convince them that is not true (AlHurra, 8 July 
2018), “they unconsciously say,” “cheaters,” “fake icons,” “those people are lying on you,” 
“mercenaries,” “those who use religion to make a living,” or “those who take their salaries from 
foreign countries” (On Ent, 12 November 2017).  
 Such words and phrases label Muslims who choose to practise the Islamic faith as “the 
Muslims” or “the Muslim group.” Despite their wide and rich diversity, the selected words and 
phrases represent them as one collective and identical group on the ground of their faith and 
religious practices. No personal, social, cultural, or political identification is ever offered in such 
representation except for Muslim scholars and preachers who sometimes are distinguished from 
other practising Muslims via the use of words such as mashayikh, rigal el-deen, i.e., those who 
take their paychecks from foreign countries.  Meanwhile, Muslim scholars frequently have been 
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identified by their Islamic attire (turbines) or appearance (those with beards) with the aim of 
reducing them to useless symbols that are stripped of knowledge and credibility. The term 
“turbines” in its singular and plural forms is specifically used as a reference to Muslim sheikhs, 
scholars, and intellectuals who wear the Azhari uniform that consists of a head covering, a 
turban, and a body garment (caftan). Similarly, ashab el dhuqun (the people with beards) is also 
used to ridicule, in this case, not only sheikhs but also any Muslim who chooses to follow the 
example of Prophet Mohammad in growing a beard. Although Muslim women’s clothing and the 
veil, in particular, have been intensively represented as signs of women’s oppression, the 
analysis shows that males’ beards have been used lately as symbols of irrationality and violence. 
This is seen in the frequent use of expressions such as “the people with beards,” or “turbans,” 
which not only ridicule the prophetic sunnah13 of growing a beard but also dehumanize and de-
individualize Muslims by reducing and equating them with the beard they grow or the turbine 
they wear rather than identifying them with their personal identities.  
 In addition, Muslim scholars are represented as treacherous, valueless, unpatriotic, and 
opportunistic through the use of words and phrases such as “mercenaries,” “those who use 
religion to make a living,” or “those who take their salaries from foreign countries.” Although 
images of treacherous, hypocritical, and opportunistic conservative Muslims are depicted 
frequently in Egyptian movies and TV dramas, the conspiracy narrative is relatively new. Such a 
mode of representation has been circulated in the media since the arrival to power of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but has indeed intensified after the coup with the attempt to justify the removal, 
arrest, and trial of the first democratically elected president in Egypt.  
																																																								13	The term Sunnah refers to “the body of traditional social and legal custom and practice of the Islamic community. 
Along with the Qur'an (the holy book of Islam) and Hadith (recorded sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), it is a 
major source of Sharī' ah, or Islamic law” (Afsaruddin, 2018). 
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Accordingly, President Morsi, his government, and his supporters all were accused of 
conspiring with foreign countries, particularly Turkey and Qatar, which Egyptian popular media 
regard as Egypt’s enemies. Both countries stood against the military coup and have intensely 
condemned the massacres of hundreds of unarmed defenceless civilians in Raba’a and El-Nahda 
squares. Recently, Qatar has faced a diplomatic war not only from Egypt, but also from other 
Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which demanded Qatar to 
shut Al Jazeera, the Qatari-owned and most popular network in the Middle East. Contrary to 
their tightly controlled media, most Arab leaders’ abhorrence towards Al Jazeera evidently stems 
from its critical reporting of their regimes and their exposure to a world-wide audience. The 
station has offered a documented coverage of the military coup and the massacres of Raba’a 
exposing the crimes committed by the military against its political opponents and its extreme and 
blatant violations of human rights. Since then, President Morsi and Egyptians with Islamic 
orientation have all been portrayed as not fully Egyptians and as traitors and conspirators who 
ally and cooperate with Egypt’s enemies (in this case Qatar and Turkey) against their homeland.  
 Moreover, observant Muslims are also discursively constructed as the irrational, rude, 
and violent “Other” through the use of expressions such as “enemies of life,” “enemies of 
beauty,” “Dawa’ish (ISIS members),” “close-minded,” “trash,” “mob,” “backward,” “trash-
minded people,” “they are rude” (Mukhatalf ‘Alayh, 7 September 2018), “they can’t think 
rationally,” “we won’t be able to convince them” (Alhurra, 8 July 2018), “they are followers,” 
“they have no creativity (Alhurra, 22 July 2018), “the ignorant,” “cancer,” “they unconsciously 
say,” “empty-mind people” (On Ent, 12 November 2017), “liberals use rationality and logic 
while rigal el deen (clerics) use Friday speeches (khutbas)” (On Ent, 7 May 2018), and “clerics 
(rigal el deen) have always been against progress” (On Ent, 19 February 2018).  
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 Hence, the diversity within Muslims stemming from their discursive engagement with 
Islam individually in their private and in their public spheres is conflated—and the terms “the 
Muslims” or “the Muslim group” are applied. Thus, the Egyptian secular intelligentsia 
legitimizes and makes it commonly acceptable to make this generalization about multifarious 
Muslim peoples’ discursive engagement with Islam by portraying them all as one congruent and 
homogeneous static cluster that one can easily speak of, define, and analyze. Such false and 
negative representations of Muslims not only increase hostile attitudes and discrimination 
towards observant Muslims, but also support and foster an environment that enables the 
establishment of domestic policies that violate their rights and harm them.  
 7.2.2 Grammar 
 To analyze grammatical features, I examined transitivity and modality. Transitivity is 
examined for the choices of causes and solutions of the problem, as well as the ways of 
attribution of responsibility. The examined data show that Islam is presented as the key problem 
behind Egypt’s decline and instability. This problem is attributed to Islam’s incompatibility with 
modernity as well as observant Muslims’ irrationality and violence. The image of the inherently 
violent and close-minded “other”—who lacks the capability to take decisions, let alone control or 
represent themselves or others—is the prevailing image one encounters in the public debate. 
Subsequently, eliminating the role Islam plays in society and excluding observant Muslims from 
the national debate are presented as the only solution to Egypt’s problems. Meanwhile, the 
Western scientific methodology is portrayed as the one and only irreplaceable approach for 
progress, democracy, and civilized society.  
 Furthermore, an examination of modality, i.e., the degree of affiliation between a speaker 
and his/her statements, reveals that objective modality is most frequent in the analyzed texts. 
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According to Fairclough (1992), modality could either be subjective (when speakers’ affiliation 
is made explicit) or objective (when speakers’ affiliation with statements is left implicit). He 
states that objective modality implies more power because it reflects a statement whereby 
speakers represent their perceptions as universal. Thus, the complete absence of the verbs or 
phrases such as “think,” “believe,” “argue,” “claim,” or “in my view,” reveals that the Egyptian 
secular intelligentsia and elites predominantly used a universal language suggesting that their 
statements are unquestionable or irrefutable. Only verbs and phrases such as “stress,” “confirm,” 
“it is proved that,” or “these are historical facts” have been used in the national debate on Islam 
and Muslims.  
 A noteworthy example is from President el-Sisi’s speech where he stresses, “We have to 
think hard about what we are facing—and I have, in fact, addressed this topic a couple of times 
before. It’s inconceivable that the thinking that what we hold most sacred should cause the entire 
umma [Islamic world] to be a source of anxiety, danger, killing and destruction for the rest of the 
world.” Using words and phrases such as “we have to think hard,” “what we are facing,” “it’s 
inconceivable,” or “should cause” implies that Islam and Muslims are indeed causing a real 
dilemma to the entire world by presenting el-Sisi’s personal perspectives as an objective reality 
or common knowledge.  
The same could be said about the following statement: “Because the door of ijtihad has 
been closed since Al Ma’moun’s death, the way Muslims think is at complete odds with their 
time and era, because they think according to the logic of a thousand years ago.” Just as with the 
previous example, there is a total absence of verbs or phrases that reveal that the speaker—in this 
case, the Egyptian intellectual, El-Qemni—is articulating personal opinions, not factual 
statements. His selection of words leaves no doubt that Islam is a static religion belonging to the 
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Middle Ages and that the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims can easily be reduced to one unique and 
homogeneous entity. The “Muslim mind,” according to him, is also unique and identical and thus 
one can freely define it, analyze it, or characterize it while still presuming to be fair and 
objective. Although Qemni’s affirmation that “the Muslims” think according to the logic of 
1,000 years ago is strikingly far from objectivity, it is mostly representative of the current 
Egyptian discourse on Islam and Muslims. A good example of this pattern can also be seen in the 
assertion by Ibrahim Issa:  
 Every time ISIS commits its savage crimes  including slaughtering, raping, or 
 burning, it provides the legal evidence on which it relied, whether it is a prophetic 
 hadith, a Qur’anic verse, a saying of Ibn Taymiyah or a historical fact. All the proofs 
 that ISIS provides are true. All the proofs that it provides for its shocking and 
 contemptible crimes, brutality and violence and (all ISIS’s)  claims that these proofs are 
 from the (Islamic) books of history and jurisprudence and sharī'ah are the correct 
 evidences that truly exist and anyone who denies this is a liar. (Al-Zahrani, 2015)  
 
 What Issa says here implies that the Qur’an, the hadith, and the Islamic legacy are all to 
be blamed and held accountable for ISIS’ violence and extremism. The Islamic legacy as it is 
posited here paints Islam as a harbinger of violence and terrorism. This negates the complexity 
the term signifies and reduces its numerous dimensions and all that it signifies, including the 
innumerable possibilities of human endeavor to interpret the Qur’an, a Divine revelation, and the 
prophetic hadith literature with all its complexities, in seeking God’s will in the realm of ever-
changing human contingencies and diversities. Significantly, the authoritative language used by 
Issa gives the false impression that his views are irrefutable and have the epistemic certitude of 
commonly known universals that none can question. This is particularly the case when he uses 
words and phrases such as “the correct evidence” and “truly exist” that assert the irrefutable 
validity of his claims and “anyone who denies this is a liar.” 
7.2.3 Ethos  
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  Some aspects of ethos are also examined in order to explore how selves or social 
identities are constructed through language. Ethos is constituted of various features including 
verbal and non-verbal ones. It can be analyzed by examining not only the ways in which 
participants talk, but also through “the cumulative effect of their total bodily disposition—the 
way they sit, their facial expression, their movements, their ways of responding physically to 
what is said, their proxemics behavior” and so on (Fairclough, 1992, p. 167).  
 We analyze body language including facial expressions, vocalizations, gestures, and even 
mockery which is frequently used in almost all of the TV episodes studied.  For instance, while 
Amr Adeeb relies on vocalization, gestures, and facial expressions to show his anger and disgust 
every time he talks about Islamic teachings or religiously observant Muslims, Ibrahim Issa uses 
sarcasm with humorous overtones by ridiculing observant Muslims and mimicking them. 
Likewise, Youssef Zeidan extensively uses facial expressions and body language not only to 
show disgust and disrespect towards observant Muslims but also to demonstrate respect and 
gratefulness to secular and liberal intellectuals. His attitude suggests that he represents the 
enlightened liberal scholar who seeks to educate the ill-informed viewers. This was evident in his 
arrogant smiles, stares, pauses, and posture as well as his blatant words such as “let me teach the 
people,” “Muslims don’t know their actual history,” or “people know nothing (massakeen).” 
 This attitude, a frequently adopted non-verbal mode of communication, is used almost 
every time the Egyptian secular intelligentsia and media personalities discuss matters pertaining 
to Islam and observant Muslims. Some show guests, such as Farida el-Shobashi, are seen not 
only ridiculing other guests who represent the Islamic trend, but also shouting at them. In one of 
the shots, el-Shobashi screamed and yelled at one of the guests while repeating, “Shut up; let me 
finish. Shut up. Shut him up, Wael” (Dream TV Egypt, 26 September 2017). Rather than 
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intervening and stopping her from screaming and striking the table, the TV host El-Ibrashi asked 
the other guest at the receiving end to give el-Shobashi a chance to finish.  
This arrogant attitude towards Islam and observant Muslims manifested only after the 
military coup or, more precisely, following the arrival of President Mohammad Morsi to power. 
A brief investigation of Ibrahim Issa’s TV programs that were aired on Dream 2 before the 
military coup—such as his weekly program “Al-Fihris” (the index) and his daily program “Al-
Ra’aan” (the two magnificent) which was broadcast on Dream 2 in 2010—reveal the dramatic 
shift in Issa’s attitude. The later program was even named after Prophet Mohammad’s 
companions, Abu Bakr El Siddiq and Omar Bin Al Khattab, and thus focused on their lives and 
personal attributes. Such programs were significantly different from his recent programs in terms 
of language and choice of words, topics, and presentation. In his earlier TV programs, Issa used 
to show high respect and admiration to historical Muslim leaders and the Prophet’s companions 
as well as Muslim scholars and intellectuals. A good proof of this positive stance is the very title 
of one of his programs, i.e., “the two magnificent.” Issa’s early TV shows markedly lacked the 
harsh and contemptuous language he has been using in his recent TV shows, where associating 
terrorism with Islam and attacking both Islamic history and its historical leaders has become the 
norm. Even Abu Bakr El Siddiq—one of the two magnificent of whom Issa made a biographical 
presentation before the military coup—didn’t escape this misrepresentation as he is later 
portrayed in one of Issa’s episodes as a violent individual and is disparagingly called “the leader 
of al-Dawash” (the leader of ISIS’ followers).  
This dramatic shift is seen not only in Issa’s speech but also in his facial expressions, 
body language, chosen topics, and themes.  
7.3 Discursive Analysis Findings 
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 This section presents the findings of discursive analysis. Fairclough contends that a 
critical analysis of discourse requires an examination of the features and types of discourse as 
well as an explanation for what made the discourse the way it is. This can be achieved by 
analyzing the relationship between texts, discourse processes, and their social conditions 
(Fairclough, 2015). In Chapter 6, I examined the detailed characteristics and features of texts 
through a comprehensive textual analysis (description) that focuses on the object of analysis 
(visual data). In Chapter 5, I discussed the relationship between texts and discourse processes 
through an investigation of the ways in which power relations shape discursive practices of a 
society—in other words, how the relationship between the government and media influences its 
institutional practices and organizational routines.  
 In this section, I focus on two elements: 1) the structuring processes in the formation of 
texts; and 2) the ‘orders of discourse’ which Fairclough defines as the total patterns of discursive 
practices in a given society or institution. To do this, I examine the way texts have been 
constructed through the use of other pre-existing texts (intertextuality) and the way new texts 
reproduce or generate new conventions by restructuring existing ones (interdiscursivity).  
 7.3.1 Formation of Texts  
 As mentioned above, I used intertextuality and interdiscursivity to analyze discursive and 
social dimensions. Fairclough (1992) emphasizes the relationship between intertextuality and 
hegemony, revealing that the productivity of texts is conditional and constrained by power 
relations because the public space is not equally available to everyone and hence intertextuality 
cannot itself, in this case, be accountable for these social practices or changes. Thus, 
deconstructing the process of production is necessary to explore how the production of texts is 
socially constrained by the nature of social practice of which it is a part. That being said, this 
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dissertation focuses on two elements: 1) the way the text is produced; and 2) whether the text has 
reproduced or contested social practices.  
 In Chapter 5, I examined the process of production by analyzing the relationship between 
the Egyptian government and the media. I posed questions such as: “How was the text 
produced?” “What is the relationship between the media and the government?” “Who owns the 
media?” and “How do these presuppositions affect the image of Islam and Muslims?” In this 
chapter, I reveal how and why hegemonic discourses are established by emphasizing voices of 
certain groups and allowing them access to media discourse while excluding, marginalizing, and 
obscuring others. I also examine the ways in which texts have been constructed through the use 
of pre-existing texts (intertextuality) with the aim of understanding how agencies and institutions 
produce, reproduce, and legitimize social injustices.  
7.3.2 Sourcing  
 This section discusses whose voices were given prominence in the Egyptian national 
debate on Islam in order to provide insight on the ways in which hegemony is constructed by 
allowing certain groups access and credibility while obscuring others. An investigation of 
sourcing reveals that secular liberal intellectuals, state-religious figures, and ruling elites are 
allowed access and given prominence in the Egyptian TV shows while the moderate and 
knowledgeable Islamic scholars, intellectuals, and clerics are absent and excluded. Meanwhile, 
the voices of Muslim politicians, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, are totally absent. 
The only Islamic voice that is often emphasized is that of Salafi Muslims from El-Noor Party 
who support the government as well as radical Muslims or those whose knowledge of Islamic 
teachings is very limited and whose views are at odds with prophetic tradition.  
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 This was evident, for example, in Adeeb’s TV show Kul Yawm, which dedicated a 
biweekly section under the title of Raheeq el Kutub (nectar of the books), to discuss and review 
some of the most popular Islamic and Western classical books. Rather than providing multiple 
perspectives, Adeeb’s show is devoted to propagating views of the self-acclaimed secular 
liberals on “Islam” while totally excluding views of progressive Muslim scholars and 
intellectuals—even though “Islam” and “Islamic legacy” are the main theme throughout the TV 
program, which lasted for more than six months. Youssef Zeidan was the only invited guest; 
consequently, the show spent approximately 20 hours emphasizing what numerous Muslim 
scholars considered anti-Islamic views that aim to misrepresent Islamic history.  
 Zeidan (1958) is a controversial Egyptian intellectual, public lecturer, novelist, and 
director of the Manuscript Centre and the Manuscript Museum affiliated with the Bibliotheca 
Alexandrina. He has written about 60 books on Islamic philosophy and Arabic manuscripts and 
heads an institute that mostly focuses on editing, cataloging, and publishing medieval 
manuscripts. Zeidan has become a celebrity intellectual after winning the International 
Prize for Arabic Fiction in 2009 for his novel Azazeel, which has been translated into 
English and several other languages. His controversial views about Islamic tradition and 
Arab history have earned him enemies (“Youssef Zeidan, the Egyptian intellectual,” 
2017). He attributes Egypt’s decline to the spread of superficial religiosity and despotism 
that discourages critical thinking. He asserts that cultural change can only occur when 
Egyptians begin to question their sacred beliefs, especially religious ones. He questions the 
sunnah, denies the mi’raj14 of Prophet Mohammad, and claims that Al-Aqsa Mosque is not 
located in Quds but Jarana, on the road to the city of Taif, in Saudi Arabia. Zeidan is criticized in 																																																								
14
 The Isra and Mi’raj are the two parts of Prophet Mohammad’s Night Journey that, according to Islam, took place 
during a single night around the year 621 CE. It has been described as both a spiritual and physical journey. 
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social media for distorting the Islamic legacy and misrepresenting Islamic symbols and 
traditions. 
 Another noteworthy example is Khaled Montaser, a famous secular Egyptian media 
figure, who is a frequent guest on TV shows where he discusses issues relating to science and 
religion. He is the Head of the Department of Dermatology and Genetics and a liberal 
intellectual, TV presenter, and writer. He writes for a number of Egyptian newspapers including 
Al-Masry Al-Youm, Nus el Donia, and Rosa el Youssef; in addition, he has written a large number 
of books. Montaser is criticized for his position on Islam, which is viewed as biased and 
extremist by many, including other liberal intellectuals. For instance, Mohammad el Baz—
himself a liberal and secular media personality—harshly criticized Montaser for his extremist 
views on Islam and Muslims. He states,  
It is not right for you to be secular while having a tight chest that does not tolerate others, 
or accept their ideas even if you reject them. If you have the right to exercise your 
freedom in accordance with your ideas, it is the right of others as well to exercise their 
freedom in their lives according to what they believe. (El Baz, 2018)  
 
El Baz then added, “Khalid suddenly turned into a very fanatical, very radical, very nervous 
person to the degree that I imagine him like the extremist and arrogant head of Salafist, Sheikh 
al-Hawaini, but in the secular way.”  
 A similar case can be made for several of the TV personalities/hosts and their guests. 
These include Sayed El Qemny, a secular intellectual who emphasizes the importance of the 
Western scientific approach and opposes religious approaches, as well as liberal journalists and 
media personnel such as Ibrahim Issa, Amr Adeeb, Wael Al Ibrashi, Youssef el Husseini, Farida 
el Shubashi, and Sahar al-Ja’ar. This list also consists of individuals from diverse disciplines, 
including: Abeer Solaiman, liberal feminist; Samir Sabri, well-known lawyer; Thuraya Abdel 
Gawad, liberal sociology professor;	Said Sadiq, professor of political science at the American 
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University at Cairo; Ahmad Samer, of Al Masriyeen al Ahrar Party; and most of the other guests 
whose voices and views are prominent on TV talk shows.  
 Moreover, I found that the examined TV episodes obscured and excluded the Muslim 
voice in general and the knowledgeable and intellectual voice in particular, while emphasizing 
the Salafi voice. Salafi guests from the public represent the Muslim perspective; this includes 
Said Numan, Mahmoud Amer, Walid Ismail (a Salafi), Rania Hashem (a niqabi writer), and 
others. A significant example is seen in Al-Ibrashi’s TV show where most of his guests are either 
“liberal” intellectuals or Salafi Muslims. Ibrashi’s program uses a number of strategies including 
emphasizing anomalous and peculiar opinions issued by uninformed religious people regardless 
of their lack of knowledge, background, or ability to issue a fatwa and representing their personal 
interpretations as if they speak for the whole of Islam and Muslims in totality. Most of the issues 
discussed in his program are secondary issues and odd opinions that represent no one but those 
who make the claims.  
 El-Ibrashi hosted Sheikh Saeed Numan, an unknown Egyptian cleric and a graduate of Al 
Azhar University, in an episode on his TV show Kul Yawm, which aired 14 November 2018 on 
On E. Numan claimed that according to the Qur’an, girls could get married in their mother’s 
wombs by a marriage contract between their respective guardians that is suspended until the 
children grow up. Although this odd perspective represents no one but Saeed Numan, the way it 
was discussed and debated in the TV show suggests that it represents Islam and Muslims. A 
particularly telling example are El-Ibrashi’s words when he states, “You people are the cause of 
our catastrophe. Our catastrophe begins here” (ONdrama, 14 November 2018). By addressing 
Numan with “you people,” El-Ibrashi implies that his guest is a representative of Muslim 
scholars and clerics, particularly since Numan introduced himself as a former member of the Al-
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Azhar Fatwa Committee, a claim that Al-Azhar negated later on (ONdrama, 14 November 2018). 
Although Al-Azhar stressed that Numan is not a part of Al-Azhar’s Fatwa Committee and 
portrayed his perspective as odd and strange, the Egyptian media continued to circulate it and 
discuss it as an Azhar Fatwa. The Islamic Research Academy in Al-Azhar declared that Sheikh 
Saeed Numan, who appeared as a member of a previous fatwa committee at Al-Azhar and was 
hosted by some satellite channels and issued fatwas directly under this name, does not represent 
the Fatwa Committee in Al-Azhar, has no personal connection to it, and does not represent Al-
Azhar (RT, 2018). Also, the Islamic Research Academy asked the media to show more 
responsibility and transparency by investigating the accuracy and credibility of its guests when 
hosting someone to speak on religious matters to maintain the security and stability of society 
(Rif’at, 2018).  
 Another example that further highlights this trend is also from El-Ibrashi’s Al Ashira 
Masa’an in his episode aired in April 2016 with Sheikh Mahmoud Amer on Dream TV where he 
discussed Amer’s personal view that an Egyptian national song should be forbidden to be played 
because its lyrics portray Egypt as the most valuable name in existence. El-Ibrashi spent two 
hours discussing what he calls Amer’s fatwa, which calls for a ban on the song because it goes 
against Islam by claiming that the most valuable place on earth is Egypt and not Mecca. El-
Ibrashi then went on to discuss more of Amer’s odd personal views while his liberal guests 
rationally debate his superficial views and ridicule and alienate him (Dream TV Egypt, 19 April 
2016). It is necessary here to highlight that Amer, El Ibrashi’s guest, is not a mufti, a faqih, or a 
scholar whose views are worth discussing. Just as with the case of Numan, presenting Amer as a 
representative of “observant Muslims” and debating his perspectives as equivalent to “Islam” 
doesn’t do justice to the subject because it associates observant Muslims with irrationality and 
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ridiculousness, and equates seculars and liberals to reason and logic. This pattern is of great 
importance because it emphasizes the idea of Islam’s incompatibility with the modern era and 
thus validates the need to eliminate the role played by Islam and Muslims in Egyptian society. 
Such debates create a distorted image of Islam and Muslim clerics; as well, they normalize anti-
Islam and anti-Muslims rhetoric by portraying religious Muslims as ridiculous objects while 
creating a powerful and positive image of secular and liberal subjects. 
 Amer has become a famous religious media figure, and his personal views have been 
constantly highlighted and circulated in the media. His personal views have been termed fatwas 
even though he has no Islamic religious knowledge or credibility that qualifies him to give a 
fatwa (a legal opnion). He is a salafist who holds a Bachelor of sharī'ah from the Islamic 
University in Al-Madina and is known for his unwavering support of the government and the 
rulers. A good example of his so-called fatwas is his portrayal of the trial of the former President, 
Hosni Mubarak, as a forbidden step that violates the sharī'ah and the prophet’s commandments. 
It is important to highlight here that all of the prominent voices highlighted in the Egyptian 
media strongly support the regime and military coup. Even the Muslim salafi guests representing 
the Muslim religious side are also supportive of the government. On the other hand, voices 
critical of the government and human rights activists are almost totally excluded, let alone voices 
of Muslim politicians or the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 7.3.3 Intertextuality 
 An investigation of the way texts have been constructed through the use of other pre-
existing texts reveals that a sizable segment of Egyptian secular elites and policymakers have 
adopted various meanings of Western Orientalism and Islamophobia in their discursive 
construction of “Islam” and “Muslims” by problematizing and otherizing them. Indeed, a deep-
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seated Islamophobic approach is clearly evident in their anti-Islam language and attitudes. 
Egyptian Islamophobes depict the Islamic faith and anyone who identifies with Islam as the 
cause behind all of Egypt’s problems and thus suggest that Islam should be replaced with the 
Western scientific approach. As shown in the earlier discussion, Islam is depicted as a 
problematic religion that reinforces violence, irrationality, and misogyny while observant 
Muslims are shown as the uncivilized “Other” who needs to be civilized and modernized or 
otherwise distanced and isolated from modern Egyptian society.  
 As shown in Chapter 1, the concept of “Islam” as being incompatible with modernity and 
“Muslims” as uncultured and uncivilized people is a predominant narrative in the Orientalist 
discourse and has been used extensively to justify and legitimize the colonization of the Muslim 
world—all for the so-called purpose of civilizing, modernizing, and secularizing it. An 
investigation of the discursive construction of Islam reveals that Egyptian elites constantly 
reproduce, echo, and recycle Orientalist meanings without explicitly referring to them or overtly 
drawing upon specific texts. 
 7.3.4 Order of Discourse (Interdiscursivity)   
 In this section, I examine the ways in which narratives have been constructed through the 
use of pre-existing texts, to understand how agencies and institutions produce, reproduce, and 
legitimize social injustices. To this end, I focus on intertextuality and interdiscursivity to 
examine how producers draw on already existing discourses and genres to generate the text. I 
pose questions such as: “What texts are drawn upon and how?” “Are the texts under analysis 
explicitly or implicitly drawing upon existing texts?” “Are there new discourses added to the 
already existing discourses?” Then, in the next chapter, I identify the social situation out of 
which these statements emerge. According to Fairclough, “Intertextuality is basically the 
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property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated 
or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth” 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 84). In other words, “intertextuality refers to the fact that whenever we 
speak we produce the words of others, we constantly cite and recite expressions, and recycle 
meanings that are already available” (Blommaert (2005, p. 46) in Fairclough, 1992, p. 84).  
 Fairclough demonstrates that there are two types of intertextuality: 1) ‘manifest 
intertextuality,’ where “specific other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text;” and 2) 
‘constitutive intertextuality’ or ‘interdiscursivity’ which refers to “the heterogeneous constitution 
of texts out of elements (types of convention) of orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 85). 
Whereas ‘manifest intertextuality’ focuses on texts that are explicitly drawn upon in the 
constitution of the text under analysis, interdiscursivity or ‘constitutive intertextuality’ examines 
discourse conventions to explore whether new discourses have been added to the already existing 
discourses.   
The findings of this dissertation show that narratives on “Islam” and “Muslims” are 
mostly constituted and reproduced by the mixing of three pre-existing discourses with two new 
discourses. As shown in the literature review in Chapter 2, the three pre-existing discourses are 
the discourse of “Islamism as a threat,” “Islamists as aliens,” and “observant Muslims as 
uncultured.” Whereas the first two discourses are preoccupied with the national security and 
stability of the state, and the alleged chaos that Muslim extremists have created in the Arab 
region, the discourse of “observant Muslims as uncultured” is interested in modernizing Egypt 
and getting it out of its darkness and backwardness. In addition to these pre-existing discourses, a 
new discourse is added: the discourse of “Islam (aside from politics) as incompatible with 
modernity” and “observant Muslims as the ‘Other.’ ” These two additional discourses are 
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concerned with democracy, modernity, and civilization and thus aim to construct Islam and 
Muslims as distracting the modern Egyptian nation-state from its march toward modernity.  
The pre-existing discourses, as shown in the literature review, focus on political Islam 
and Islamists, and the need to separate religion and state. It emphasizes the need to isolate 
Islamists and exclude them from the national debate by depicting them as a threat to the national 
security and safety of Egyptian society. Moreover, religious Muslims who are committed to 
Islam are depicted as less cultured and progressive than their non-religious Egyptian 
counterparts.  
However, a close investigation of the visual data shows that the discourse on Islam and 
Muslims has clearly changed after the arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. The focus 
has shifted from political Islam and Islamists to Islam and Muslims in general, extending the 
realm from the political sphere to an all-encompassing domain. In all of the examined discursive 
units (as shown in the textual analysis), Islam and religious Muslims are identified as the major 
reason behind Egypt’s decline and its failure to achieve progress and modernity by deterring 
critical thinking and reinforcing superficial and traditional approaches. According to the new 
narrative, both Islam and Muslims are perceived as a threat to contemporary Egypt’s national 
and cultural security and thus as a menace in Egyptian society that it ought to get rid of. This 
discourse is constructed via particular words and phrases that constructed Islam as a static 
religion that preaches terrorism and violence, and reinforces irrationality, repression, and 
despotism and thus is at odds with modernity, globalism, democracy, and freedom. Moreover, 
the very diverse groups of peoples that the word “Muslims” signifies are reduced to represent a 
single static entity that one can conveniently label as “the Muslims,” while also attributing to 
them every possible negative trait. For followers of this narrative, the obvious alternative is the 
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Western secular approach, which they assert and promulgate as the only methodology that 
cannot be substituted or even questioned.  
Mixing the three pre-existing discourses together with the new discourses in the texts 
portrays Islam in a particular light, a light in which allowing Islam to be in the public sphere 
becomes a potential security threat; hence, the only means to attain national security is through a 
violation of the human rights of religious Muslims. Furthermore, it undermines the Muslim 
identity by constructing Muslims as the “other” and places them in opposition to the “we” 
national group. It is these images of Islam and religious Muslims as a menace that leads to a 
shared sense of legitimacy of collective oppression and violent exclusion of religious Muslims.  
These images nurture the biased narratives, making them acceptable to public opinion and 
creating an atmosphere of hatred and prejudice that justifies violations and crimes against 
Egyptian religious Muslims—in the name of public and national security. 
7.4 Conclusion 
 An investigation of the visual data shows that various meanings of colonialism, 
Islamophobia, and Orientalism influence the discursive construction of “Islam” and “Muslims” 
amongst policymakers and secularized intelligentsia who—as seen in the role of TV hosts, 
producers, directors, and owners of TV satellite channels—dominate and determine how this 
production of cultural tropes takes form. This discursive construction can be seen in the way they 
perceive and represent their identity, their religion, and their tradition through the lens of 
Orientalism. This is also viewed from the similarity between the Islamophobic discourses of the 
Egyptian secular intelligentsia with those of Western societies. These joint efforts of academics 
and intellectuals have succeeded in constructing Orientalism as a complete language, a discourse, 
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and an ideology, to maintain the Western secular approach as if it is the only natural choice and 
hence inevitable.  
 In sum, the way this discourse is conceptualized produces an idea that validates the 
exclusion of Islam and Muslims from modern Egypt. It does this by establishing a cluster of 
ideas or a body of thought that together construct a discursive formation that creates fear of Islam 
and persuades people to accept and believe that Islam and Muslims represent a threat to their 
security and wellbeing. It is a reductionist and totalizing mode of thought that negates and aims 
to wipe away the Islamic identity and civilization of Egyptians, whereby dislocating their 
identity and creating a sense of inferiority encapsulated within the ‘Muslim’ self.  
 However, although the Egyptian discourse is rooted in colonization, and is derived from 
Western Orientalist and Islamophobic discourses, it still has its own features and characteristics 
that differentiate it from the Western discourse. In the next chapter, I discuss the differences 
between the Egyptian internal Islamophobic discourse and Western discourse and answer 
questions such as: “What made the discourse the way it is?” “What are the socio-political 
conditions that govern the processes through which the discourses on Islam are produced?” 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter consists of five parts. In the first section, I summarize the entire dissertation 
and review the problem as well as this work’s core hypotheses. The second, third, and fourth 
sections summarize my findings with reference to the research questions. In the fifth section, I 
present suggestions for future studies by giving some thought on what could be investigated in 
this area of research.  
8.1 Summary of the Research 
 In this dissertation, I examine the ways in which “Islam” and “observant Muslims” have 
been represented in the Egyptian public discourse since the ascent of President Mohammad 
Morsi to power in June 2012. I maintain that Egyptian self-acclaimed secular liberals and the 
ruling elite constructed a hegemonic discourse about “Islam” that is very much derived from 
Western Islamophobic narratives, and that they created an image of “Egyptian-ness” dominated 
by Western perceptions of modernity. I argue that such discourse goes far beyond decrying the 
supposed incompetence of political Islam. In fact, the discourse suggests that it is Islamic 
teaching in and of itself that is incompatible with the values of contemporary Egyptian society by 
constructing an image of “Islam” as an irrevocably static, anti-modern, and irrational religion 
and by claiming that violence has an essential place in the Islamic faith. Thus, I argue that the 
Egyptian mainstream media representation of “Islam” should be viewed not merely as a 
manifestation of the secular elites’ desire to support the government in holding on to its political 
power, but rather that it reflects some deep-seated colonialist ideas about “Islam.”  
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 To prove this, I pose the following research questions: 
1. What are the dominant narratives constructing “Islam” and “Muslims” in the widely 
watched Egyptian late-night TV shows between June 2012 and April 2018? What are 
the new forms of knowledge about Islam in Egypt?  
2. In what ways does the contemporary discourse regarding “Islam” found in the 
Egyptian mainstream media during the research’s time period reinforce or challenge 
the Western Islamophobic discourse about Islam? Are there manifestations of 
Islamophobia in the Egyptian discourse? 
3. How can internalized Islamophobia in the Egyptian media, if it exists, be defined, 
explained, and justified? In what ways does it differ from Islamophobia in “Western” 
societies? 
 To answer these research questions, I used Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to explain 
how “Islam” and “observant Muslims” are represented in Egypt’s post-military coup media. I 
drew on Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach, which includes three reciprocal dimensions 
that are tied to three stages of analysis: 1) a comprehensive textual analysis (description), which 
focuses on the object of analysis including written, spoken, visual, or verbal texts; 2) a macro-
sociological analysis of social practice (interpretation) that focuses on the processes through 
which the object of analysis is produced and received; and 3) a social analysis (explanation) that 
focuses on conditions governing these processes. Thus, in my attempt to answer the 
dissertation’s research questions, I bring together Fairclough’s three stages of analysis. Thus, to 
answer the first question of the study, I used textual analysis (description) while I adopted 
discursive (interpretation) and social analyses (explanation) to answer the second and third 
questions.   
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8.2 First Research Question 
• What are the dominant narratives constructing “Islam” and “Muslims” in the widely 
watched Egyptian late-night TV shows between June 2012 and April 2018? What are the 
new forms of knowledge about “Islam” in Egypt?  
 To answer the first research question, I used Fairclough’s first analytical dimension 
(description). To do this, I examined words, grammar, metaphors, and ethos by creating a code 
sheet that contains a number of questions. I presented the findings in Chapter 6 and then 
discussed them in Chapter 7 after I checked each text for the set of questions. An investigation of 
texts shows that the public debate has excessively depicted “Islam” and “observant Muslims” in 
a repulsive manner and has reduced them to a range of negative connotations. Egyptian late-
night TV programming has constructed “observant Muslims” as “the Muslims” or “the Muslim 
group” and thus has represented them as one comparable, congruent, and static cluster that one 
can easily speak of, define, or analyze. Egyptian late-night programming has depicted “the 
Muslims” as having no place in the political arena and as a menace to Egypt’s stability, security, 
and modernization process. Meanwhile, it has diagnosed “Islam” as the major reason behind 
Egypt’s decline and failure to achieve progress and modernity by deterring critical thinking and 
reinforcing superficial and traditional approaches and thus late-night television programming has 
represented them as a threat to contemporary Egypt’s national and cultural security.  
8.3 Second Research Question  
• In what ways does the contemporary discourse regarding “Islam” found in the Egyptian 
mainstream media during the research’s time period reinforce or challenge the Western 
Islamophobic discourse about “Islam”? Are there manifestations of Islamophobia in the 
Egyptian discourse? 
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 To answer the second research question, I used Fairclough’s second (discursive) and third 
(social) levels of analysis. I examined “intertextuality” to explore the texts, meanings, or notions 
that Egyptian secular liberals have used in their discursive construction of Islam. Then, I 
examined “interdiscursivity” to figure out whether the contemporary discourse reproduces or 
generates new conventions on “Islam.” Finally, I examined whose voices were given prominence 
in the Egyptian national debate on “Islam” in order to gain insight on the ways in which 
hegemony is constructed by allowing certain groups access and credentials while obscuring 
others. The findings were provided in Chapter 7.  
 An investigation of intertextuality and interdiscursivity reveals that a sizable segment of 
Egyptian secular liberals and ruling elites echo Western Orientalists and Islamophobes in their 
discursive construction of “Islam” and “observant Muslims.” They reinforce and circulate a 
narrative about	“Islam” stemming from Western Orientalist and Islamophobic discourse through 
four specific representational practices: 1) establishing “Islam” as a static, anti-modern, and 
backward religion that propagates terrorism and irrationality; 2) creating a link between terrorism 
and the Islamic faith by claiming that violence is a religious obligation that has an essential place 
in Islam; 3) representing the “war on terrorism” as part of a struggle that seeks to defend Egypt 
and its values against “Islam” and “observant Muslims”; and 4) creating an image of “Egyptian-
ness” dominated by Western perceptions of modernity.  
Interdiscursivity was then examined to explore if this anti-Islamic discourse is a new kind 
of discourse that did not exist in Egypt before the 2013 military coup. In other words, I tried to 
investigate whether the new narrative on “Islam” in Egypt is reproduced from pre-existing 
discourses or recently produced from new discourses that did not predate the coup. According to 
the findings, Egyptian self-acclaimed secular liberals mixed pre-existing discourses with new 
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discourses in their construction of their new anti-Islamic narrative, which can be traced back to 
2012 when the Muslim Brotherhood nominated a candidate for office. This is despite the fact 
that attempts to alienate “Islam” and “Muslims” have existed in Egypt for a long time previously 
under presidents Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak particularly at times of political conflicts with the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  
However, this dissertation’s findings show that—for many reasons that will be discussed 
in the following pages—what previous attempts couldn’t achieve in the past has been 
successfully accomplished in Egypt following the coup. It also shows that the discourse on 
“Islam” and “observant Muslims” has dramatically changed as the focus has shifted from 
Islamism and Islamists to the Islamic faith itself and anyone who identifies with it. Since then, 
“Islam” and “observant Muslims” have been unprecedentedly emphasized in the Egyptian public 
debate and issues such as the place of “Islam” in Egyptian society or the role “Islam” should 
play; these questions have become the focus of intense national debate among Egyptian secular 
Western-oriented elites. Meanwhile, a new form of knowledge on “Islam” and “observant 
Muslims” as hindering Egypt’s march toward modernity and as threatening the nation-state’s 
national security was constructed. This was achieved by mixing the pre-existing discourses that 
alienate Islamism and Islamists with new discourses that problematize and otherize “Islam” and 
“observant Muslims.”  
 Before the January 25 Revolution, “Islam” and “observant Muslims” were barely 
discussed or talked about in the Egyptian media because any discussion of Islam’s place outside 
of the political sphere was often debated exclusively on Islamic channels and programs 
predominantly by Muslim scholars, intellectuals, and clerics. The same can be said of “observant 
Muslims” who were barely mentioned in the mainstream media in general, except for films and 
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TV dramas. The emphasis in pre-revolution Egyptian discourse was mainly on political Islam 
(Islamism) and Muslim politicians (Islamists). This was the case not only on TV shows and 
programs but also in the Egyptian media in general, as highlighted in Chapter 2. However, this is 
no longer how Islam is constructed and debated in Egypt after the military coup.  
 According to this dissertation’s textual, discursive, and social analyses, the way Egyptian 
secular liberals and ruling elites recently have been conceptualizing “Islam” and “observant 
Muslims” produces an idea that validates the exclusion of the faith from modern Egypt—despite 
the fact that it is followed by the majority of the population—by persuading the public to believe 
that they represent a threat to their national security. Given the influential and powerful role of 
discourse in shaping people’s thoughts and attitudes, the findings of this dissertation indicate that 
the Egyptian mainstream media participate in circulating a new form of knowledge on “Islam” 
through its use of the Orientalist discourse. This hegemonic narrative seeks not only to justify the 
military coup d’état of 3 July 2013, but also to separate Islam from the public sphere by creating 
fear of the religion and attaching narrow and negative connotations to the words “Islam” and 
“observant Muslims” that are signifiers for an undeterminable and diverse array of notions in 
existing manifestations of societies and individuals.  
 This is evident not only in hostile language, prejudiced themes, and anti-Islamic attitudes 
but also in the social, political, and cultural conditions that supplement these discourses. Never 
before have “Islam,” Islamic teachings, Islamic symbols, and observant Muslims been so 
targeted and misrepresented in the way they have today. Egyptian secular liberals have harshly 
attacked passages from the Qur’an, prophetic hadith, sharī'ah, caliphate, and the entire Islamic 
history and legacy. They depicted Islamic history as shameful, bloody, and violent; as well, they 
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have associated the sharī'ah with physical punishment and represented it as a totalitarian law 
system that aims to replace the constitution and violate the private life of Egyptians.  
Meanwhile, Egyptian secular liberals have portrayed the entire cultural legacy of “Islam,” 
including the hadith, sunnah, and sirah, as lacking credibility and accuracy. In the same way, the 
military ruling regime has: banned numerous clerics (sheikhs) from preaching; closed a large 
number of mosques; and placed many others under surveillance while bulldozing dozens of 
mosques in Alexandria and other cities (Al Jazeera, 2019). In the meanwhile, restrictions were 
applied on veiled or niqabi Muslim women and bearded Muslim men. As illustrated in the 
previous chapters, Egyptian businessmen have prohibited veiled women from entering specific 
resorts, public beaches, hotels, restaurants, and concerts since 2015. They were also banned from 
working at some of these venues (Khalil, 2015). Not only women’s apparel but also men’s 
Islamic attire was attacked in different occasions and linked to terrorism. Dar al-Ifta’ al-
Masriyya, the Egyptian government body and educational institute, issued a short educational 
animated video depicting a terrorist as an observant Muslim with a dark beard and Islamic 
Azhari clothing.  
 In the face of this cultural hostility, Egyptian conservative Muslims have found 
themselves in a situation where they struggle for the protection not only of their liberties and 
civil rights but also their credibility as equal Egyptian citizens. Their patriotism is being 
questioned as a result of their faith. Islamophobia has been used to attack their faith and has been 
tied to issues such as “patriotism” to gain popular support. The public discourse promoted 
Islamophobia to spread fear among Egyptians and normalize stereotypes against “Islam” and 
“observant Muslims.” Meanwhile, conspiracy theories propound the theory that observant 
Muslims have more loyalty to “Islam” than to their own country and thus tend to serve and 
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support non-Egyptian Muslim countries and movements such as Turkey, Qatar, or Hamas (an 
Islamic Palestinian movement) at the expense of Egypt’s national security and general welfare.  
 8.3.1 Internalized Islamophobia? 
 These joint efforts of Egyptian self-acclaimed liberal and ruling elites succeeded in 
constructing Orientalism as a complete language, a discourse, and an ideology, with the aim of 
maintaining the Western secular approach and making it look natural and inevitable. They 
emphasized the imaginary unity of the nearly 1.6 billion Muslims around the world whom they 
labelled as “the Muslims,” and characterized the Islamic civilization as violent, static, and 
incompatible with modernity—thereby constructing “Islam” and “Muslims” as subjects that can 
be studied, represented, and portrayed. They are further constructed as inherently irrational and 
violent, and thus as lacking the capacity to think logically or control or represent themselves.  
On the other hand, the West was established as rational, superior, modern, and 
developed; thus, following the Western scientific approach was subsequently represented as 
logical and inevitable. Such a mode of discourse not only uses an Orientalist language but also 
replicates and echoes Orientalist notions in two ways: 1) its approval and emphasis of the idea 
that “Muslims” are epistemologically and ontologically distinct from “Westerners”; and 2) its 
dealing with “Muslims” as objects of study that they can freely describe, restructure, and 
dominate.  
However, Egyptian secular self-identified liberals included an additional internal 
distinction that distinguishes between Egyptian “observant Muslims” and other Egyptians. It 
classifies them according to their cultural affiliations or in other words their stances towards 
Islamic civilization. For instance, they attributed supporters of the Western scientific approach to 
civilization, enlightenment, modernity, and patriotism while attributing terrorism, misogyny, 
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irrationality, and non-patriotism to anyone who identifies with the Islamic faith. Based on this, 
the situation in Egypt was portrayed in the Egyptian public discourse as a civilizational conflict 
between “observant Muslims” who deliberately chose to adhere to the Islamic faith and self-
acclaimed “liberals” who advocate the Western scientific approach while identifying themselves 
as Egypt’s guardians of science, rationality, freedom, and democracy. This sort of discourse that 
represents “Islam” as being at odds with modernity and progress is an initial notion for Egyptian 
postcolonial so-called liberals who imitate the universal standards established in European 
models with a profound enmity towards religion. The core of this European hostile discourse 
towards religion is due to Europe’s past experiences with the Catholic Church. Looking at 
“Islam” through the lens of Western Christianity, colonial Europeans and Orientalists 
constructed their anti-Islamic framing of the modern nation-state in the Muslim world according 
to their own experiences (Bazian, 2019).  
 As such, it could be said that the essence of the anti-Islam discourses and irrational set of 
associations about an imaginary unity of more than one and a half billion diverse persons was 
originally constructed in the 18th century when the so-called enlightened scholars began to 
classify humans according to race and color and to produce an image in which whiteness was 
associated with cultural and racial superiority, and non-Whites were associated with savagery 
and unreason (Kumar, 2012). The uppermost share of this racist discourse was given to “Islam” 
as Western scholars played a vital role in constructing an image of “Islam” and “Muslims” as the 
enemy, and as Europe’s “Other” that should be introduced to modernity, enlightenment, and 
democracy (Kumar, 2012; Qureshi & Sells, 2003). This anti-Islamic discourse has since 
continued to instruct Western knowledge and shape its perceptions of “Islam” and “Muslims” 
(Lyons 2012; Kumar 2012). Since then, the modern postcolonial world that condemns racism 
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and discrimination has remained loyal and tolerant to a 600- or 1,000-year-old racist language 
that “otherizes” approximately one-fourth of the world’s population (Lyons, 2012).  
 According to Said (1997), this longstanding hostility and constant fear of Islam could be 
attributed to the historical relationship between Islam and Western Christianity. He points out 
that the West has always seen Islam as a persistent concern and challenge to Christianity because 
it is the only religion that has never entirely submitted to the West and has refused to submit to 
the concept of the separation of church and state, a challenge that still exists to this day despite 
the many attempts to isolate “Islam” from modern Muslim nation-states.  
This line of continuity was particularly apparent in the past few decades, particularly after 
the end of the Cold War and especially post-September 11, 2001, and has shown a global and 
dramatic shift regarding the escalation and hostility toward Islam and Muslims, not only in the 
United States, but also around the world. Although these anti-Islam discourses are constructed in 
the West by a few powerful political and intellectual elites and prominent Islamophobes, it has a 
universal quality that allows it to depict the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims as real potential enemies 
(Shryock, 2010). Such ideologies of constructing others as different and as threatening furnished 
the ground for biased narratives to be acceptable to public opinion, creating a worldwide 
atmosphere of hatred, prejudice, and racism that justifies violations and crimes against 
Muslims—in the name of the “war on terror.” As such, one can say that Egyptian secular 
postcolonial secular elites have accepted and embraced almost all of the contradictory violent 
policies developed in Europe and the US, which are manufactured on stereotypical imaginary 
Orientalist theses that represent the Muslim subject as a violent specimen distinct from all other 
humans (Bazian, 2019, p. 57).  
8.3.2 Who Defines “Islam” in Egypt?  
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This new narrative on Islam and Muslims, according to this dissertation’s findings, has 
mainly been constructed by modern Egypt’s secular self-identified liberal elites who constantly 
represent themselves as the guardians of Egypt’s rationality, secularism, and modernity. On the 
other hand, the voice of Muslim moderates and educated citizens was totally obscured from the 
national debate as perceptions and views of Islamic intellectuals, scholars, and muftis were 
totally absent from the picture. As such, it could be said that Egypt’s ruling elite and secular 
liberals were, for the most part, responsible for constructing the Islamophobic narrative of 
“Islam” and “Muslims,” defining the faith of the majority of the people and determining the role 
it should play in post-military coup Egypt. Thus, a brief clarification of the meaning of the term 
“liberal” and the meaning of liberalism that the Egyptian secularists under consideration are 
understood to be part of, is necessary here for an understanding of the new Islamophobic 
narrative of “Islam” constructed by the so-called defenders of freedom and democracy.  
8.3.3 Illiberal Liberal Egyptians 
Egyptian liberals constantly define “liberalism” as a mode of thought that believes that 
every citizen has a full right to freedom of expression and opinion and thus present themselves as 
champions of civil rights and defenders of democracy and freedom.  Ibrahim Issa, a well-known 
Egyptian liberal journalist whose TV appearances are examined in this study, defines a liberal 
person as,  
A person who believes that the mind is free and that any citizen has the right to 
 freedom of expression and opinion; that the nation is the source of authority; that 
 democracy is the only way to choose rulers and representatives of the people; that  power 
 is not absolute but restricted by the will of the masses; that power is not eternal. 
 Liberalism is the belief in the state’s right to own key industries and vital  facilities, and 
 the citizens’ right to free health and education services. (Issa, 2012) 
 
 However, the political stances that a sizable segment of Egyptian liberals have adopted 
since the arrival of President Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood to power bring the 
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self-proclaimed liberality of Egyptian liberals under question. As illustrated in Chapter 1, despite 
representing themselves as guardians of democracy and champions of human rights, most 
Egyptian secular liberal groups have turned a blind eye to the military coup’s unparalleled 
human rights violations that claimed the lives of more than 1,000 unarmed Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters.  
Rather than condemning these violations (let alone protesting them), they enthusiastically 
supported the “new authoritarian order under President el-Sisi’s rampant illiberal repression” 
(Fahmy & Faruqi, 2017, p. 2). Moreover, they launched a hostile anti-Islamic campaign in order 
to support and justify not only the military coup that removed Egypt’s first democratically 
elected president but also the human rights violations that followed it. Moreover, they constantly 
and openly criticized el-Sisi for not being brutal enough with protestors (Hamid, 2015). They 
resorted to a well-crafted Islamophobic discourse originating from Western Orientalism, with a 
deliberate representation of Islam as inherently problematic, violent, and non-democratic. They 
reinforced this image by characterizing the Islamic culture as static, lacking dynamism and 
growth, and consequently an uninspiring model for any civilization. Subsequently, this narrative 
created the following widespread consensus: downgrading the role of Islam entirely—not just 
political Islam—is the way to restore and safeguard the nation-state as it reshapes Egyptian 
society. The illiberal stance and deep-seated Islamophobic attitude of Egypt’s secular liberals 
reflects their theory and concept of the state, which imitates and follows the European secular 
model that is hostile towards religion.  
 “Islam” in Egypt has been an object of change and the source of heated debates since the 
19th century and attempts to modernize Egypt have taken place on many occasions since the 
country came into direct contact with imperialist European powers. This issue raised enormous 
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debates, creating two opposing trends: one argued that “Islam” and “modernization” do not 
conflict; and the other rejected the idea, stressing that Egyptians should adhere to their Islamic 
identity.  
However, “modernization” attempts were not only limited to the postcolonial Egyptian 
nation-state nor were they advocated solely by Egyptian “modernists.” In the postcolonial era, a 
move toward “modernization” and secularization started to take place in most of the Muslim 
world, which paved the way for a gradual displacement of Islam as the basis of Muslim society 
and for an acceptance of secularism in its place (Kumar, 2012). These “modernizing” reforms 
resulted in the creation of a new secular and Western-oriented middle class that was given 
positions of importance in government, education, and law. They eventually led the early 
national liberation struggles in various Islamic countries (Kumar, 2012). This Arab class was a 
Western by-product formed through a discourse that made them feel inferior to the West (Moore-
Gilbert, 1997). They viewed themselves through the lens of the “Orientalist” and thus exercised 
their hegemony in the region through the borrowed language of Orientalism, and through the 
vocabulary of modernization (Dabashi, 2011). Their desire to be “modern” led them to see 
religion as dispensable to the society and to consider “modernization” and secularism as the only 
option (Bayoumi, 2010). With Western support and media propaganda, this class gradually 
succeeded in constructing a sense of devaluation of the Islamic faith in countries with Muslim 
majorities. They used the same Orientalist discourse to serve Western interests in the Middle 
East on the one hand and to advance their own ideological and political agenda on the other.  
 Interestingly, the emergence of this Western-oriented class was not a coincidence; the 
colonizer has always been aware that controlling the masses would not be possible without the 
help of native intellectuals. However, this is not to say that all Egyptian nation-state’s secular 
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“liberals” have adopted this same hostile political stance against “Islam” and “Muslims.” “A few 
protested and suffered the ire of the repressive state; a few more fell silent; but most, 
accompanied by atonal narratives about the many shades of legitimacy, continued to support the 
Sisi regime” (Abou el Fadl, 2017, p. 241). 
This brings us to the following question, which will be discussed in the next section: The 
Egyptian liberal movement’s attempts to separate church and state trace back to the late 19th 
century, so why was it only until after the 2013 military coup and el-Sisi’s ascent to power that 
they were able to create this hegemonic discourse that seeks to marginalize the role of “Islam”? 
This sort of narrative would not be able to come to light without the political and social 
conditions that Egypt has undergone under the military rule of President el-Sisi that paved the 
way for such a discourse of hate to dominate and circulate.  
8.4 Third Research Question 
• How can internalized Islamophobia in the Egyptian media, if it exists, be defined, explained, 
and justified? In what ways does it differ from Islamophobia in “Western” societies? 
 This section answers the third and final research question by investigating the socio-
political factors that help us understand the discourse. It tries to answer questions such as: “What 
are the social conditions that controlled the process of production in Egyptian media 
institutions?” “How can internalized Islamophobia in the Egyptian media be explained, justified, 
and defined?” “What are the socio-political conditions that govern the processes through which 
the discourses on ‘Islam’ are produced?” 
  8.4.1 Conditions of Production in Egyptian Media Institutions 
 To answer the third research question and the sub-questions under it, I used Fairclough’s 
macro-sociological level (interpretation) to explore the conditions of production in the Egyptian 
177	
media institutions and the pressures exerted on the media as a result of the political, economic, 
and social circumstances. The findings of the discursive analysis, which were discussed in 
Chapter 5, reveal that the relationship between the media and the government and Egyptian elites 
is partially responsible for problematizing “Islam” and “observant Muslims.” This dissertation 
shows that since the introduction of the press to Egypt, the Egyptian government has realized the 
media’s pivotal role in the mobilization of the masses and the manufacturing of culture and 
knowledge. Specifically, the television broadcasting, as the most popular media form in Egypt, 
was regarded as a key tool of “citizen education” and “public information” (Abu Lughod, 2005, 
p. 10).  
Therefore, controlling and dominating the mass media in general and television 
broadcasting in particular was a permanent concern for Egypt’s rulers. Even when the state 
allowed the introduction of private media, it carefully issued laws and restrictions to ensure the 
subordination and loyalty of its owners. As a result, the Egyptian media institution, both 
governmental and private, has always been in the service of the ruling authority and the elite 
businessmen rather than the Egyptian people. This skewed relationship has created an 
irresponsible and biased media in Egypt; a media that has long been used as a governmental 
apparatus and a propaganda tool justifying the regime’s policies and serving its major interests. 
This state hegemony over the media is explored in Chapter 2 which illustrates that since the 
arrival of President Nasser to power, political Islam has never been positively represented in the 
Egyptian press, cinema, and television broadcasting. This raises the following question: if the 
media has always been under the control of ruling elites, why did this Islamophobic discourse 
not evolve before, under the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak regimes, despite their political conflicts 
with the Muslim Brotherhood? A brief overview of local, regional, and global socio-political 
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conditions that paved the way for such forms of discourse to prevail is necessary here for an 
understanding and a justification of what makes the discourse on “Islam” the way that it is.  
 8.4.2 Political and Social Influences that Shaped the Narrative on “Islam”   
 A number of local, regional, and global socio-political factors and circumstances helped 
to empower this discourse on the same three levels: the local, regional, and global.   
At the local level, a set of factors paved the way for Egyptian liberals’ discourse to 
dominate. The first is the historical moment and the social conditions that Egypt experienced 
during that period. After the overthrow of Mubarak’s military regime in 2011, the first 
democratic elections in Egypt enabled the Muslim Brotherhood for the first time in the country’s 
history to come to power through ballot boxes, assuring the world that the Islamic voice is still 
strongly present despite postcolonial attempts to marginalize the role of Islam in modern nation-
states. This unprecedented political achievement alarmed Egyptian postcolonial elites, as well as 
the international community, by reminding them that “Islam” and “Muslims” are ontologically 
capable of controlling themselves; it further revealed that sizeable segments of the Egyptian 
people still insist that Islamic epistemology is capable of overcoming their political, social, and 
economic problems.  
This alarming message was well understood by the military; they recognized that their 
conflict with “Islam” and Islamists is a struggle for existence. As revealed in the previous 
chapters, the Egyptian military has ruled, controlled, and directed the postcolonial Egyptian 
nation-state since the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Additionally, since the peace treaty with 
Israel in 1979, the army has been enjoying unprecedented financial, political, and social 
advantages; abandoning all these privileges, or having them removed, as long-term Brotherhood 
rule might have entailed, was not an option. Perhaps this also explains the army’s slackness in 
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supporting Mubarak and his regime during the revolution, due to their fear that Gamal Mubarak, 
a civilian, would take over the presidency. Thus, their cooperation and alignment with all other 
anti-Islamic parties, including the secular “liberals,” the remnants of Mubarak’s regime, and 
Egyptian businessmen, in their efforts to restore the pre-revolution status quo and return power 
to the army was not a surprise. As a result, Egyptian self-acclaimed liberals cheered this 
cooperation despite the military’s violations of human rights and of democratic and liberal 
values. This explains their intimate bond with the military regime after being subjected to 
imprisonment and exclusion under the rule of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak.  
 Egyptian liberals’ antipathy to the Muslim Brotherhood didn’t stop there; they took steps 
to guarantee a permanent exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood’s voice not only from the 
political scene, but also from the entire society. They provoked the military to kill, imprison, and 
abuse the Islamists and their supporters under the claim of defending the country’s national 
security. To achieve their goals, Egyptian secular “liberals” recycled “every negative Orientalist 
trope directed at Islam and Muslims over the past 200 plus years. However, in the process of 
attacking Islam they end up inserting themselves as the true guardians of ‘democracy’, 
‘modernity’ and ‘rationality’ opposite the Islamic-oriented political parties that have won 
elections” (Bazian, 2019, p. 65). They totally ignored the fact that the Western approach has 
never achieved democracy, freedom, or justice for the Muslim world, but rather has replaced the 
colonialism with dictatorship and authoritarian regimes whose only concern is to ensure that they 
remain in power by serving and advancing the interests of the West.  
All this resulted in more social and financial hardships, more police brutality and human 
rights violations, and less freedom of expression and employment opportunities. However, the 
Egyptian mainstream media—the rulers’ soapbox—promoted and circulated their anti-Islamic 
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rhetoric empowered by the support of Egyptian billionaires and Egyptian Copts as well as Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It was their united desire to exclude the Muslim 
voice from public debate and eliminate the role Islam plays in the society that helped getting 
these disparate parties together. Efforts have been devoted to marginalize the Islamic faith in 
order for each party to achieve its own agendas and strategies by returning the military to power.  
 At the regional level, Saudi Arabia and the UAE made every effort to get rid of the 
Brotherhood’s rule and isolate them from society. They directed their various television channels 
to launch a fierce campaign against Islam and observant Muslims while also providing millions 
of dollars to support the military in its conflict of existence. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
attempted to ensure the domination of the Wahhabi Islam, which forbids any resistance to the 
ruler and as such ensures that the houses of Al-Saud and Al-Zayed continue to rule. 
 At the international level, many factors have helped this Islamophobic discourse to 
spread and dominate, including: the Cold War; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the ensuing 
Saudi and US support for the so-called Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan, which resulted in the 
production of militant groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban; and the silencing and exclusion 
of moderate Islamic thought from the political scene in Afghanistan, especially after the arrival 
of the Taliban to power. More importantly, the attacks of September 11—which were an 
expected outcome of the exclusion of “moderate” Islam in Afghanistan—contributed to the 
recycling and reproduction of anti-Islamic Orientalist discourses under the pretext of the war on 
terrorism and thus the prevalence of worldwide Islamophobia. The oppressive Arab regimes 
have exploited the war on terror in their struggle against Islamists, just as the military used it in 
Egypt to legitimize their abuse of the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters. This is in 
addition to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the West’s constant concern for Israel’s protection, 
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something the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists in general would never accept or support. 
Egypt’s role in the protection of Israel has been particularly important since the signing of the 
1979 peace treaty, which makes the West turn a blind eye toward the military regime’s human 
rights abuses. 
 Due to limited space and time, this dissertation does not elaborate on the previously 
mentioned factors that enabled anti-Islam discourses to dominate. They were briefly mentioned 
to shed some light on the political and social circumstances that helped secular liberals in Egypt 
legitimize Islamophobic discourse and the unprecedented violations of human rights violations 
that accompanied it.  
 8.4.3 How Can This Discourse be Explained? 
 As seen above, the rise of Islam and Islamists in the political arena has problematized the 
form and structure of the modern nation-state by proving the unfairness of the ontological 
assumption that claims that either “Islam” no longer has a role to play in the modern nation-
states, or if it does, that it should then be contained within the secular project and restricted by its 
epistemological constraints (Bazian, 2019, p. 66). The emergence of Islam and Muslims in the 
political scene was a clear challenge to Orientalist theses—echoed and imitated by postcolonial 
liberal elites—that claim “Islam” to be a static, violent, and anti-modern religion that has no 
longer a place in postcolonial modern Egypt. It sent a message to postcolonial secular elites—
who aimed to internalize the Western epistemology by imitating the postcolonial secular hostile 
discourses and by following the Western approach, which profoundly opposes and shows 
hostility towards religion—that Islam and Muslims are ontologically and epistemologically 
capable of controlling, ruling, and developing. It sent a clear challenging message to local, 
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regional, and global anti-Islam parties of the ineffectiveness of the 200-year-long efforts and 
theses.  
 Accordingly, Islamophobia in Egypt can be defined as “a political, social, economic, 
military, cultural and religious process emerging out and shaped by the colonial-Eurocentric 
hegemonic discourses dating to late eighteenth century, constituted and internalized through an 
imitative project by post-colonial elites that posited itself or was designated to Western powers 
as the custodian of the modern, secular, nationalist and progressive Muslim nation-state projects” 
(Bazian, 2019, p. 45).  
Although the rhetoric on Islam in Egypt originates its vocabulary and ideas from 
Orientalism and Islamophobia, this dissertation argues that Egyptian self-Orientalism 
nevertheless has its own unique features:  
1) With Egyptian self-Orientalism, the pronoun “we” refers to the conservative or practising 
Muslim “Other” and the pronoun “they” refers to the remainder of the world.  
2) Unlike Western Orientalism, by including themselves with the “Other,” self-Orientalists are 
more likely to be approved by the Muslim audience and their Orientalists thoughts are more 
likely to be accepted by the society since it comes from within.  
3) Self-Orientalist discourse constructs an image of “good” Muslims and “bad” Muslims with the 
first referring to those who separate their religion from the public sphere.  
4) Egyptian self-Orientalists are bolder and more offensive without attempting to be politically 
or historically correct.  
5) The information held and used by Egyptian self-Orientalists is often inaccurate, and they have 
many historical and logical fallacies, which is a general feature of the discourse on Islam even in 
the West.  
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6) The “liberal” journalists and presenters involved do not practise investigative journalism; 
rather, they present their personal views as facts.  
In conclusion, there is no doubt that Western Islamophobia has hugely harmed Islam, 
Muslims, and the Muslim world by distorting the image of “Islam” and its legacies over the 
centuries. However, Muslim Egyptian self-Orientalists could provide an even more significant 
threat than their fellow Western Orientalists because they are people within the Egyptian 
community who speak the same language and have the same skin color. Furthermore, they know 
how to communicate the message because they understand the culture and the behavior, and 
have a grasp on the sociology of the country. In order to grab people’s attention, they praise 
Islam and even repeat verses from the Qur’an in an attempt to show respect. Through their fear-
mongering tactics and narratives on Islam, Muslim self-Orientalists are successfully pushing 
their agenda of normalizing Islamophobia within Egyptian society. 
8.5 Study Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
A number of factors limit the analysis and conclusion of this dissertation. First, it investigates 
only the ways in which “Islam” and “observant Muslims” are represented on Egyptian widely 
watched TV shows. Thus, it cannot claim that the conclusions extend to all other media outlets 
such as the press or social media. It cannot even claim that the conclusions apply to all other TV 
shows that were not part of the dissertation research. Second, the data cover the time period 
between 2012 and 2018 and, therefore, it cannot be claimed that the conclusions apply to all 
other periods but it rather suggests further studies and researches in this area.  
 This paragraph presents some suggested studies in the same area. Although this 
dissertation focused on the coverage of Islam on TV, future studies could examine other media 
outlets such as the press or social media, other time periods, and other modern Muslim majority 
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nation-states. This research process used Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA approach; future 
studies could use different theories such as Foucault’s theories, especially for those with a 
historical focus. Because so much research focuses more on mainstream media outlets and 
hegemonic discourses, future studies could examine counter-discourses and resistant media. For 
instance, a study of Mu’taz Matar or Mohammad Nasser’s resistant programs would be very 
beneficial. Last, but not least, studying and examining political satire programs such as the 
Egyptian comedic talk show Joe Show would be interesting.  
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